Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (64 page)

Roosevelt of January 1 and His Reply — My
Efforts to Arrange a Meeting of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff — I Press My Proposals — Harry
Hopkins Comes to London, January
21 —
Doubts
about Yalta — I Fly to Malta, January
29
— The
Scene in Valletta Harbour, February
2 —
Discussions Between the British and American Chiefs of
Staff — A Cold Flight to Saki — The Drive to Yalta.

E
ARLIER CHAPTERS have traced the advance of the Soviet armies to the borders of Poland and Hungary. After occupying Belgrade on October 20 the Russians had resumed their thrust up the valley of the Danube, but resistance stiffened the farther they penetrated across the Hungarian plain. They forced a bridgehead on November 29 over the Danube eighty miles below Budapest, and struck north. By the end of December the capital was completely surrounded, and for six weeks endured some of the grimmest street fighting of the war. On the shores of Lake Balaton solid German resistance and violent counterattacks also brought the Russian advance to a halt until the spring.

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In Poland the Russians spent the autumn months in building up their forces after the extraordinary advances of the summer. In January they were ready. Striking westward from their bridgeheads about Sandomir, at the end of the month they had crossed the German frontier and pierced deep into the great industrial basin of Upper Silesia. Farther north, crossing the Vistula on both sides of Warsaw, they captured the city on January 17, and, investing Posen.

fanned out towards the lower reaches of the Oder and towards Stettin and Danzig. Simultaneously they crushed East Prussia from east to south. By the end of January they were in complete possession, except for the heavily defended fortress of Königsberg. Here, as at Danzig, the garrison was to continue a stubborn but hopeless defence until April. The German forces cut off in Courland remained there till the surrender, as Hitler refused to let them come away.

The Soviet High Command, with a superiority of perhaps three to one on land and dominance in the air, used a strategy which recalls Foch’s final victory in 1918. A series of battles, now here, now there, along a wide front punched successive holes until the whole line was forced to recoil.

Our own campaign in the West, though on a smaller scale, had equally brought us to the frontiers of Germany, so that at the end of January 1945 Hitler’s armies were virtually compressed within their own territory, save for a brittle hold in Hungary and in Northern Italy. There, as has already been recorded, Alexander’s skilful but hopelessly mutilated offensive had come to a halt. In November the strategic and tactical air forces had opened a six-months campaign against the railways from the Reich to Italy. By destroying

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transformer stations a great part of the Brenner line was forced from electric to steam traction, and elsewhere the movement of enemy reinforcements and supplies was severely impeded. It is not possible to record the strenuous day-by-day operations of the Allied tactical air forces, commanded by General Cannon under the U.S. General Eaker, the Air Commander-in-Chief. Quelling their opponents, in spite of atrocious weather, they had done great things to help the autumn campaign, and they well deserved this tribute from General Alexander’s dispatch:
I cannot speak too highly of General Cannon’s gifts
as a leader or of the encouragement which his
assistance and support always gave me. The measure
of his achievement can be seen in the complete
immunity we enjoyed from enemy air attacks, the close
and effective support enjoyed by the ground forces,
and the long lines of destroyed enemy vehicles, the
smashed bridges, and useless railways found by my
armies wherever they advanced into enemy territory.

Nevertheless the liberation of Italy was not to be completed till the spring.

Such was the military position on the eve of the impending Triple Conference.

The political situation, at any rate in Eastern Europe, was by no means so satisfactory. A precarious tranquillity had indeed been achieved in Greece, and it seemed that a free democratic Government, founded on universal suffrage and secret ballot, might be established there within a reasonable time. But Rumania and Bulgaria had passed into the grip of Soviet military occupation, Hungary and Yugoslavia lay in the shadow of the battlefield, and Poland,

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though liberated from the Germans, had merely exchanged one conqueror for another. The informal and temporary arrangement which I had made with Stalin during my October visit to Moscow could not, and so far as I was concerned was never intended to, govern or affect the future of these wide regions once Germany was defeated.

The whole shape and structure of post-war Europe clamoured for review. When the Nazis were beaten how was Germany to be treated? What aid could we expect from the Soviet Union in the final overthrow of Japan? And once military aims were achieved what measures and what organisation could the three great Allies provide for the future peace and good governance of the world? The discussions at Dumbarton Oaks had ended in disagreement. So, in a smaller but no less vital sphere, had the negotiations between the Soviet-sponsored “Lublin Poles” and their compatriots from London which Mr. Eden and I had with much difficulty promoted during our visit to the Kremlin in October 1944. An arid correspondence between the President and Stalin, of which Mr. Roosevelt had kept me informed, had accompanied the secession of M. Mikolajczyk from his colleagues in London, while on January 5, contrary to the wishes of both the United States and Great Britain, the Soviets had recognised the Lublin Committee as the Provisional Government of Poland.

The President had already told me about his exchanges with Stalin. They were as follows:

Marshal Stalin to

27 Dec. 44

President Roosevelt

… A number of facts which took place during the
time after the last visit of Mikolajczyk to Moscow, and in
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particular the radio communications with Mikolajczyk’s
Government intercepted by us from terrorists arrested
in Poland — underground agents of the Polish émigré
Government — with all palpability prove that the
negotiations of M. Mikolajczyk with the Polish National
Committee served as a screen for those elements who
conducted from behind Mikolajczyk’s back criminal
terrorist work against Soviet officers and soldiers on the
territory of Poland. We cannot reconcile with such a
situation when terrorists instigated by Polish emigrants
kill in Poland soldiers and officers of the Red Army, lead
a criminal fight against Soviet troops who are liberating
Poland, and directly aid our enemies, whose allies they
in fact are. The substitution of Mikolajczyk by
Arzyshevsky, and in general transpositions of Ministers
in the Polish émigré Government, have made the
situation even worse and have created a precipice
between Poland and the émigré Government.

Meanwhile the Polish National Committee has made
serious achievements in the strengthening of the Polish
State and the apparatus of Governmental power on the
territory of Poland, in the expansion and strengthening
of the Polish Army, in carrying into practice a number of
important Governmental measures, and, in the first
place, the agrarian reform in favour of the peasants. All
this has led to consolidation of democratic powers of
Poland and to powerful strengthening of authority of the
National Committee among wide masses in Poland and
among wide social Polish circles abroad.

It seems to me that now we should be interested in
the support of the Polish National Committee and all
those who want and are capable to work together with
it, and that is especially important for the Allies and for
the solution of our common task — the speeding of the
defeat of Hitlerite Germany. For the Soviet Union,
which is bearing the whole burden for the liberation of
Poland from German occupationists, the question of
relations with Poland under present conditions is the
task of daily close and friendly relations with a Power
which has been established by the Polish people on its
own soil and which has already grown strong and has
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its own army, which, together with the Red Army, is
fighting against the Germans.

I have to say frankly that if the Polish Committee of
National Liberation will transform itself into a Provisional
Polish Government, then, in view of the above-said, the
Soviet Government will not have any serious ground for
postponement of the question of its recognition. It is
necessary to bear in mind that in the strengthening of a
pro-Allied and democratic Poland the Soviet Union is
interested more than any other Power, not only
because the Soviet Union is bearing the main brunt of
the battle for liberation of Poland, but also because
Poland is a border State with the Soviet Union and the
problem of Poland is inseparable from the problem of
security of the Soviet Union. To this I have to add that
the successes of the Red Army in Poland in the fight
against the Germans are to a great degree dependent
on the presence of a peaceful and trustworthy rear in
Poland. And the Polish National Committee fully takes
into account this circumstance, while the émigré
Government and its underground agents by their
terroristic actions are creating a threat of civil war in the
rear of the Red Army and counteract the successes of
the latter.

On the other hand, under the conditions which exist
in Poland at the present time there are no reasons for
the continuation of the policy of support of the émigré
Government, which has lost all confidence of the Polish
population in the country, and besides creates a threat
of civil war in the rear of the Red Army, violating thus
our common interests of a successful fight against the
Germans. I think that it would be natural, just, and
profitable for our common cause if the Governments of
the Allied countries as the first step have agreed on an
immediate exchange of representatives with the Polish
National Committee, so that after a certain time it would
be recognised as the lawful Government of Poland after
the transformation of the National Committee into a
Provisional Government of Poland. Otherwise I am
afraid that the confidence of the Polish people in the
Allied Powers may weaken. I think that we cannot allow
the Polish people to say that we are sacrificing the
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