A World at Arms (207 page)

148
Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 308–11.

149
Marshall to Roosevelt, 30 July 1942, FDRL, PSF Safe File, Cont. I, Marshall.

150
See the documents in PRO, CAB 119/56; but see Roosevelt to King, 24 Aug. 1942, FDRL, PSF Cont. 5, King, which suggests that Roosevelt believed after the decision for “Torch” that “Roundup” would be possible in the fall of 1943. There is evidence, cited in Chapter 8, that Churchill thought so also.

151
Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 333ff; Matloff and Snell,
Strategic Planning, 1941–1942
, chap. 14; Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley,
Global Logistics and Strategy,
1940–1943
(Washington: GPO, 1955), chap. 17.

152
Churchill to Auchinleck 02829 of 27 July 1942, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers, 6/D/4(f) item F.

153
Stoler,
Politics of the Second Front,
pp. 60–62; Gilbert,
Churchill,
7: chap. 11.

154
ADAP
,
E, 3, Nos. 205, 217. Hitler’s comments of 26 Aug. 1942 are in Jochmann,
Hitler Monologe,
P.368.

155
Butler,
Grand Strategy,
Vol. 3, Part 2, pp. 638–42; Hinsley
British Intelligence,
2, Appendix 13; Roskill,
War at Sea,
2: 239–42; John Keegan,
Six Armies in Nonnandy
(New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 120–25; Daniel J. Webb, “The Dieppe Raid - An Act of Diplomacy,”
Military Review
60, NO.5 (1980), 30–37; Hamilton,
Monty,
pp. 548–57; Ronald Atkin,
Dieppe 1942: The Jubilee Disaster
(London: Macmillan, 1980). The material on the Dieppe raid collected after the war by Ismay in helping Churchill write his memoirs shows that Churchill had very strongly pushed the project and that the Germans had no prior knowledge (Liddell Hart Centre, Ismay Papers, 11/3/260). A very detailed analysis in Brian Loring Villa,
UnauthorizedAction: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid
(Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), is summarized in his article, “Mountbatten, the British Chiefs of Staff, and Approval of the Dieppe Raid,”
Journal ofMilitary History
54 (1990), 201–26, with commentary by Philip Ziegler and a rejoinder by Villa.

156
Grigg to Churchill, 19 Oct. 1942, PRO, WO 259/75.

157
Hamilton,
Monty,
Part 5, chaps. 12–20; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 425–35;
DRuZW,
6: 725ff (which shows that it rained on the Germans as well as the British when the former escaped the slow follow–upof the latter); Neurath to Weizsäcker, 5 Oct. 1942, AA, St.S., “Schriftwechse1 mit Béarnten,” Bd. 7, fro 70443–45.

158
See Löwisch, “Kurze Inhaltsangabe des Vortrages Marineattache Rom beim Herrn Ob.d.M. am 13. Oktober 1942,” BA/MA, RM 7/233, f. 431–32.

159
On problems in German-Italian-Arab relations in the fall of 1942, see
ADAP
,
E, 3, No. 250; items 34 and 35 in the Canarisl Lahousen file, Imperial War Museum, AL 1933.

160
It had been these hopes which had earlier affected United States policy toward the Free French; note
FDR Letters,
2: 1268–69, 1315–16; Arthur L. Funk,
The Politics of Torch
(Lawrence, Kans.: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1974), chaps. 1–8; Krautkramer, “Vorgeschichte,” pp. 244–45.

161
David A. Walker, “OSS and Operation Torch,”
JCH
22 (1987),667–79.

162
Krautkramer, “Vorgeschichte,” pp. 250–51.

163
Ibid., pp. 247.

164
Ibid., pp. 230–31.

165
Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 476–82. The first German knowledge of the landing was the broadcast from Algiers radio that the landing was under way; see OKM, Skl, Chef MND III, “X.B. Bericht Nr. 45/42,” 12 Nov. 1942, in NA, RG 457, SRS 548, Vol. 13. On the German dilemmas in coping with any Allied landing, see Kontrollinspektion Afrika, “Studie über die franzosischen Abwehr-Moglichkeiten und -Aussichten bei einem Anglo-Amerikanischen Angriffauf Franz.-Marokko,” 28 May 1942, BA/MA, PG 33651, Case 579, f. 191–93. The Germans had reassured the anxious Japanese that no landing the broadcast from Algiers radio that the landing was under way; see OKM, Skl, Chef MND III, “X.B. Bericht Nr. 45/42,” 12 Nov. 1942, in NA, RG 457, SRS 548, Vol. 13. On the German dilemmas in coping with any Allied landing, see Kontrollinspektion Afrika, “Studie über die französischen Abwehr-Möglichkeiten und -Aussichten bei einem Anglo-Amerikanischen Angriffauf Franz.-Marokko,” 28 May 1942, BA/MA, PG 33651, Case 579, f. 191–93. The Germans had reassured the anxious Japanese that no landing was likely on Sep. 7 and again on Nov. 5, 1942, see RM 7/253, f. 399–410, 438–43.

7: THE WAR AT SEA AND THE BLOCKADE

1
Forster, “Strategische Öberlegungen.”

2
There is a good account in Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
1: 354ff., 2: 21ff.

3
Ibid., 2: 33–35; Roskill,
War at Sea,
2: 168–73.

4
Studies of this issue are David Woodward,
The Tirpitz
(London: Kimber, 1953, and other editions); Ludovic Kennedy and Henry Coverlay,
Menace: The Life and Death of the Tirpitz
(London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1979). See also Villa,
Unauthorised Action,
pp. I I 1–13.

5
Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1: 258–62.

6
Ibid., pp. 271–78, Appendix 13. On Soviet cooperation in one of these raids, see N 5858/5858/38, PRO, FO 371/34442.

7
Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 196–20 I; Roskill,
War at Sea,
2: 291–99; important revisions of earlier accounts in
DRuZW,
6: 418–24; see also Dudley Pope, “73
North” The Battle of the Barents Sea
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1989).

8
The crisis is reviewed in Michael Salewski, “Von Raeder zu Dönitz: Der Wechsel im Oberbefehl der Kriegsmarine 1943,” MGM, 1973, NO.2, pp. 101–46; see also his
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 202–38. Hitler’s violent reaction to the events off the Norwegian coast was surely in part related to his hope that a signal German victory there might off-set the gloom associated with the simultaneous defeat at Stalingrad. Raeder, who always wanted to appear to be in the right about everything, had the war diary of the navy altered to support his own interpretation of events (Salewski, “Raeder zu Dönitz,” p. 116). On Japanese interest in the Germans
not
decommissioning their big ships, see ONI London, “X 4646” of 19 Nov. 1943, NA, RG 38, Chief of Naval Operations, ONI Attache Reports 1940–46, u-I-i #7510-E.

9
Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 333–45; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1, pp. 269–71 and Appendix 14; OKM, Skl, Chef MND III, “XB-Bericht Nr. 52/43,” 30 Dec. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRS 548, Vol. 16, pp. 6–8, 12, Anlage 4.

10
Salewski, 2: 351; Hinsley, 2: 538–40; Roskill,
War at Sea
2: 177–82,257,265–69,405, 411–12; Patrick Beesly,
Very Special Intelligence
(New York Ballantine, 1977), pp. 228–3 I;
DRuZW,
6: 388–94. On difficulties between the Germans and Japanese about a 3 I;
DRuZW,
6: 388–94. On difficulties between the Germans and Japanese about a German auxiliary cruiser in the Indian Ocean, see Skl, “Stichwortartige
Zusammenstellung der Verhandlungen mit der Japanischen Admiralität über das Operationsgebiet für den deutschen HSK im Indischen Ozean und im südlichen Pazifik,” 25 Oct. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/253, f. 433–35.

11
See Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
11: 123–25; 3/2:, 56. A good brief survey in Paul Beaver,
E-Boats and Coastal Craft: A Selection of Pictures from the Bundesarchir Koblenz
(Cambridge: Stevens, I98o). The Slapton Sands disaster is discussed in connection with the Normandy invasion in Chap. 12; an account in Edwin P. Hoyt,
The Invasion before Normandy: The Secret Battle of Slapton Sands
(New York: Stein & Day, 1985).

12
Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 123–25; Donovan to Roosevelt, 3 Oct. 1941, FDRL, PSF Safe File, Germany, Box 4; British Admiralty to Opnav, Personal for CNO, 1645A/16, NCR 148, 17 Jan. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRMN 35, p. 12; “Besprechungsnotiz 109/42,” Göring conference of 29 June 1942, Imperial War Museum, Milch Papers, Vol. 62, p. 5234.

13
Morison,
US Naval Operations,
1: 411-12, 10: 184–88,374.

14
Ibid., 1: 226–28; Rohwer,
Geleitzugschlachten,
pp. 29–32,64–66,310–14.

15
Morison, 1: 212–19.

16
The written confirmation of the oral order of Dec. 8 is in the diary of the Seekriegsleitung for 9 Dec. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/31, f. 135–36. Hitler was especially down on Uruguay for 9 Dec. 1941, BA/MA, RM 7/31, f. 135–36. Hitler was especially down on Uruguay because of its role in the loss of the
GrafSpee
. The Central American countries were Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama; of these the last named was of special importance because so many ships were operating under Panamanian registry.

17
See
ADAP
, D, 9, Nos. 365, 412, 519; Buenos Aires to Tokyo No. 561 of 25 June 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 24182–83.

18
Frank D. McCann, Jr.,
The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 275–90; Roskill,
War at Sea,
2: 203; Morison,
US Naval Operations
, I: chap. 15. Badly wrong on this,
DRuZW
, 6: 350.

19
See, e.g., the picture in Rohwer,
Geleitzugschlachten
, facing p. 289. A good account in Hinsley, 2: Appendix 15. See also document 377-PS, NA, RG 238.

20
Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 350.

21
A full account of Spanish support of German naval operations in World War II may yet be written now that Spanish archives are becoming accessible; the subject has been ignored by German historians who have preferred to discourse upon the alleged violations of neutrality by those fighting their submarines rather than by those aiding them. The best account currently is Charles B. Burdick, “‘Moro’: The Resupply of German Submarines in Spain, 1939–1942,”
Central European History
3 (1970), 256–84. The scene in the movie “Das Boot” makes the stop in Spain rather more public than the facts warrant. See also KTB Skl A 34, I2June 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/37, f. 222. The Germans continued to maintain a radio monitoring station in Sevilla, being notified by the Spanish navy ahead of time when it was about to be raided (KTB Ski A 53, 15 Jan. 1944, RM 7/56, f. 260). See also Robert Cecil, “e’s War,”
Intelligence and National Security
1 (1986), 181; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 172, 719–21; Ski, “Abwehr feindlicher Angriffe in spanischen Hoheitsgewassern,” 21 June 1944, BA/MA, PG 33751Case 643.

22
Fisk,
In Time of War.
pp. 278–84; Brooke Diary, 8 Dec. 1941, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers;
ADAP
, E, I, No. 24. Though extremely pro–de Valera, T. Ryle Dwyer,
Strained Relations: Ireland at Peace and the USA. at War,
1941–1945 (Totowa, NJ.: Barnes & Noble, 1988), and Ronan Fanning, “The Politics of Irish Neutrality During World War II,” Les Etats neutres europeens et la seconde guerre mondiale, Colloque international (Neuchatel: Editions de la Baconniere, 1985), pp. 125-33, contain additional details.

23
See the map in Roskill,
War at Sea,
2, facing p. 205.

24
The crisis of spring 1943 in the Battle of the Atlantic on the one hand, and the Allied
victory in North Africa on the other, made that time a good one to raise the issue with Lisbon; see Woodward,
British Foreign Policy,
4: 48–57. Churchill had wanted to move earlier and to use force, but the Cabinet refused to go along. See also “Vertraulicher Informationsbericht von Herrn Seligo, Lissabon, vom 15.10.1943,” 23 Oct. 1943, BA,

25
Note de Gaulle’s comment on their getting steadily older unused in Harold Nicolson,
The War Years
1939–1945, Vol. 2 (New York: Atheneum, 1967): 139.

26
Krautkramer, “Vorgeschichte,” pp. 220–21.

27
Ibid., pp. 219–20, 222–23; Paxton,
Vichy,
pp. 387–90;
ADAP
, E, I, No. 182; documents on Darlan’s dealings with the German navy in Dec. I941-Jan. 1942, in BA/MA, RM 6/75, f. 250–63 and M 1697/71826 a-f.

28
Jochmann,
Hitler Monologe,
31 Jan. 1942, p. 245.

29
ADAP
, E, 2, Nos. 196, 200, and related documents in AA, St.S., “USA,” Bd. I I.

30
Rudolf Rahn memorandum of 19 Aug. 1943, AA, Nachlass Renthe-Fink, Paket 5, Bd. I, fro 0514473. See also Tagebuch Koller, 21 Nov. 1942, Institut für Zeitgeschichte.

31
Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaujklän Jng,
pp. 160–6 I.

32
Roskill,
War at Sea,
2: 211; Morison,
US Naval Operations,
1: 329. The only German

33
Maps in Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaujklärung,
p. 163; Roskill, 2, map 40.

34
Roskill, 2, chap. 3.

35
See Stephen W. Roskill,
Hankey: Man of Secrets,
3 vols. (New York: St. Martin’s, 1970–74), 3: 546–47, 559–61. Note WP.(42) 302, also COS(42) 204(0) Final, “Provision of Aircraft for the War at Sea,” 18 July 1942, PRO, PREM 3/119/7; Roosevelt to Marshall

36
Morison,
US Naval Operations,
1: 250–5 I, and 10: 187, 190, 194,223–24, is very skeptical about the usefulness of blimps. See also Alfred Price,
Aircraft versus Submarines: The Evolution of the Anti-Submarine Aircraft 1912–1972
(London: Kimber, 1973), pp. 146–47. On U.S. blimps turned over to the British, see documents in PRO, AIR 20/1311. On the crews of merchant ships, see Tony Lane,
The Merchant Seamen’s War
(Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1990), which is quite useful but overemphasizes the author’s “discovery” that these men were people.