A World at Arms (208 page)

37
A good introduction in John A. Swettenham,
Canada’s Atlantic War
(Toronto; Sarasota, Fla.: Samuel Stevens, 1979).

38
This point is well made in Rohwer,
Geleitzugschlachten,
p. 64. Of course, occasionally an evading route brought a convoy into the view of a different group of submarines.

39
See Beesly,
Very Special Intelligence,
p. 115.

40
Ibid., pp. 166–67; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 554, 637; Kahn,
Seizing Enigma,
pp. 211–13, 262–63, 263–64. The word “apparently” is used because much of the material on German code–breaking in World War II remains closed to research.

41
On this, see Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaufklärung,
pp. 171–73; järgen Rohwer, “‘Special Intelligence’ und die Geleitzugsteuerung im Herbst 1941,”
Marine-Rundschau, 75
(1978),711–19; Rohwer and Jäckel,
Kriegswende,
pp. 97–99; Kahn,
Seizing Enigma,
chap. 13.

42
On this episode, see Morison,
US Naval Operations,
1: chap. 6; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 228–29; Roskill,
War at Sea,
2: 93–106; Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaufklärung,
p. 158. A major study of the whole disaster is Michael Gannon,
Operation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of Germany’s First U-Boat Attack along the American Coast in World War II
(New
York: Harper & Row, 1990). A major result of the American navy’s great defeat was the building of pipelines to carry petroleum products from the fields and ports of the American southwest and south to the northeast; the most important of these, “Big Inch,” was constructed in just under a year, Aug. 1942 to July 1943; see James A. Clark and Michael T. Halbouty,
The Last Boom
(New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 266–71. In the Caribbean, German submarines also shelled the refineries and oil storage facilities in the Dutch West Indies (Morison, 1: 145; Combined Intelligence Committee, “Scale of Attack on Bermuda, The West Indies and the Guianas,” 22 June 1942, NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 1417, File 6900, Germany-General). On the Canadian aspect of this German submarine operation, see W.A.B. Douglas,
Creation of a National Air Force; The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force,
Vol. 2 (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press. 1986), PP.486-g2. Box 1417, File 6900, Germany-General). On the Canadian aspect of this German submarine operation, see W.A.B. Douglas,
Creation of a National Air Force; The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force,
Vol. 2 (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press. 1986), PP.486-92 .

43
The statistics, which cannot be regarded as absolutely precise, are based on the table in Morison, 1: 413–14.

44
See Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 179,229–30,233,548–49,551; Kahn,
Seizing Enigma,
p. 210, chaps. 17–18.

45
Kahn,
Codebreakers,
p. 23.

46
On this issue, see Hinsley, 2: Appendix 19, esp. p. 748.

47
Ibid., pp. 749–51.

48
Ibid., pp. 229,683; Morison,
US Naval Operations,
1: 129,312–13; Kahn,
Seizing Enigma
, chap. 22. The German navy had first practiced refueling at sea during operations connected with the Spanish civil war; see Paul Zieb,
Logistische Probletne der Kriegsmarine (Neckargemünd: Vowinckel, 1961), pp. 83-85.

49
Roskill,
War at Sea,
2: 107.

50
Hinsley, 2: 232.

51
Hitler’s comments to Field Marshal von Bock, the Commander-in-Chief of the armies scheduled to participate, on June I, 1942, in the von Bock Diary, BA/MA, N 22/13, f. 88–89. Hitler at that point believed that submarines had sunk 900,000 tons in May; the correct figure was just under 600,000 with another 100,000 lost due to other causes (Hinsley, 2: 485). See also KTB Skl A 29, 18 Jan. 1942, RM 7/32, f. 300–2.

52
On the PQ 17 disaster and its impact on relations between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, see Hinsley, 2: 213–23; Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 48–50; Roskill,
War at Sea,
2: 134–45; Beesly,
Very Special Intelligence,
pp. 129–46; Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 428–30; Morison,
US Naval Operations,
1: 179–92; Beaumont,
Comrades in Arms,
pp. 108–10, 128–31; Villa,
Unauthorized Action,
pp. 114–17;
DRuZW,
6: 413–17. German intelligence on the course of the battle can be found in OKM, Skl Chef MND III, “Bericht Nr. 27/42,” 9 July 1942, NA, RG 457, SRS 548, Vol. 11.

53
Hinley, 2: 227.

54
Schofield,
Russian Convoys,
chap. 8; Morison, 1: 360–65.

55
The best account in Michael Howard,
Grand Strategy,
Vol. 4, chap. 13.

56
The text is in ibid., pp. 21–22. See also Saward,
“Bomber” Harris,
pp. 186–87.

57
The full text of the “Pointblank” directive is in Howard,
Grand Strategy,
pp. 623–24. See also Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate,
The Army Air Forces in World War II
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1948–58), 2: 305–6.

58
Roskill,
War at Sea,
2: 35 I-53; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 563, 753–56.

59
Howard, p. 625.

60
The U.S. navy’s perception of the course of the war against the U-Boats from I Sep. 1942 to 1 May 1945 can be followed in the bi–weekly COMINCH “Biweekly U-Boat Trends,” reports Nos. 1–65 in NA, RG 457, SRMN 030.

61
On this issue, see the JIC(43) Final, War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, “Axis Strength 1943,” II Feb. 1943, p. 6, PRO, CAB 119/55, which is now entirely confirmed by the record.

62
On the Battle of the Atlantic in the spring of 1943 and the turn in May, see Rohwer,
Geleitzugschlachten;
Beesly,
Very Special Intelligence,
chap. I I; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 547–72; Morison,
US Naval Operations,
I, chap. 14; Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaujklärung,
pp. 164–66, 177–90; Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 293–308. There is an excellent National pp. 164–66, 177–90; Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 293–308. There is an excellent National Archives “Guide to the Microfilmed Records of the German Navy, 1850–1945,” NO.2: “Resources Relating to U-Boat Warfare, 1939–1945” (Washington: NARA, 1985). Note that at the height of the battle, Roosevelt was in the Map Room asking about the situation, FDRL, Map Room Box 195, Log la, 10 and 13

63
See Churchill’s Personal Minute M 363/3 to Secretary of State for War, 27 May 1943: “Now that shipping is the stranglehold upon all military operations, it should be a matter of loyalty to the nation to economize by every possible means.” PRO, WO 259/77.

64
Hinsley, 2: 554–55; Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaujklärung,
pp. 191–92.

65
Rohwer and Jäckel, pp. 128–30, 145; Kahn,
Seizing Enigma,
pp. 202–3, 205–7, 213, 260–62;
DRuZW,
6: 356–58. Note the earlier German self–congratulationin KTB Skl A 34, 18 Jan. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/37, f. 332. For a critique of Dönitz’s reluctance to face facts collected by his own intelligence service, see Weichold to Rohwer, 10 June 1959, Nachlass Weichold, BA/MA, N 316/101. Salewski (2: 301) notes Dönitz’s pre-occupationwith Tunisia at this time.

66
See the table in Rohwer and Jäckel,
Funkaujklärung,
p. 165.

67
Morison,
US Naval Operations,
1: 290–96; Canada’s role in Douglas,
Creation of a National Air Force,
chap. 16.

68
U.S. War Production Board,
Industrial Mobilization for War; History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies,
1940–1945
(Washington: GPO, 1947), p. 962.

69
Note Rome to Tokyo Nos. 132 and 143 of 28 Feb. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 32092–93, 32542–44;
ADAP
, E, 5, Nos. 148, 158.

70
See Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Hans Dollinger (eds.),
Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Bildern und Dokumenten,
3 vols. (Wiesbaden: Lowit, 1963), 2: 192; Sadkovich, “Understanding Defeat,” p. 49.

71
Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 376–80; Santoni,
Ultra siegt im Mittelmeer,
234–40; Josef Schröder,
Italiens Kriegsaustritt
1943 (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1969), pp. 274–80, 302–13. On Japan’s interest, see
Kido Diary,
9 Sep. 1943, p. 366; Tokyo to Oshima Nos. 690, 698, and 773 of 9 Sep. and 1 Oct. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 42854, 43225, 43735; Oshima’s reports Nos. 1054, 1070, 1111 of 9, 11, and 18 Sep. 1943, SRDJ 42858, 42935, 43290; Japanese naval attache Stockholm No. 296 of 10 Sep. 1943, SRA 2988; Tokyo to Vatican for Hidaka No. 159 of 1 Dec. 1943, SRDJ 51140–41.

72
This point is well made and documented in Carl Boyd, “The Japanese Submarine Force and the Legacy of Strategic and Operational Doctrine Developed between the World Wars,” in Larry Addington
et al.
(eds.),
Selected Papers from the Citadel Conference on War and Diplomacy
1978 (Charleston, S.C.: The Citadel Development Foundation, 1979), pp. 27–40, which is also heavily drawn upon in the following account.

73
See Oshima Nos. 104 and 107 of 24 Jan. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 31266–67, 31342–43 (no German record of this Hitler-Oshima conversation has been found);
ADAP
, E, 5, No. 150,6, No. 53; Seekriegsleitung to OKW/WFSt, “556/43 g.K.Chefs.,” 22 Feb. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/254, f. 45–47; Skl, “Indopazifischer Raum (Vortrag vor Ob.d.M. am 2. Marz 1943),” ibid., f 62–70; KTB Skl A 42,8 Feb. 1943, RM 7/45, f. 126; Theo T. Y’Blood,
Hunter-Killer: U.S. Escort Carriers in the Battle of the Atlantic
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983), pp. 215–16. am 2. Marz 1943),” ibid., f 62–70; KTB Skl A 42,8 Feb. 1943, RM 7/45, f. 126; Theo Michaux, “Rohstoffe aus Ostasien: Die Fahrten der Blockadebrecher,”
Wehrmissenschaftliche Rundschau
5 (1955), 497–98; St.S., No. 82 of 5 Feb. 1943, AA, St.S., “Japan,” Bd. 11, fr. 17135–36. On the sinking of one of the two submarines turned over to Japan (RO 501, ex U-1224) on 13 May 1944 during her trip to Japan see William T. Y’Blood,
Hunter-Killer: U.S. Escort Carriers in the Battle of the Atlantic
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983), pp. 215–16.

74
U.S.
War Dept., G-2, “Magic Far Eastern Summary, Naval Section, No. 304, I Jan. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRS 287.

75
See Boyd, “Japanese Submarine Force,” pp. 31–32;
USSBS, The War against Japanese
Transportation, 1941–1945
(Washington: GPO, 1947), p. 63.

76
KTB Skl A 45, 23 May 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/48, f. 399; Skl, “Niederschrift über die Mai 1700 Vhr,” 31 May 1943, RM 7/254, f. 127–31; Tokyo to Berlin No. 476 of 5 July 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 39872; Oshima to Tokyo No. 731 of 6 July Ig43, SRDJ 39930–33.

77
Oshima’s report No.1138 of 24 Sep. 1943 on a conversation with Dönitz on 22 Sep., NA, RG 457, SRDJ 43444–46; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1: 220–22.

78
Michaux, “Rohstoffe aus Ostasien,” pp. 503–6; NA, RG 457, RG 232; Tokyo to Berlin Skl No. 67 of I June 1943, SRGL 720; Hinsley, 3–1: 218; Beesly,
Very Special Intelligence,
pp. 197–99; Morison,
US Naval Operations,
10: 303–4; Marder,
Old Friends, New Enemies,
2: 206–15, 250ff. A preliminary survey in Allison W. Saville, “German Submarines in the Far East,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
87, No.8 (Aug. 1961), 80-g2. The book by Hans Joachim Brennecke,
Haie im Paradies: Der deutsche U-Boot-Krieg in Asiens Gewässern, 1943–45
(2d ed., Herford: Kochler, 1967), is in fictional form, but the documents in it contain some interesting details.

79
Hinsley, 3/1: 229–31.

80
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, “Japanese Reaction to German Defeat,” 21 May 1945, NA, RG 457, SRH-075, pp. 5–7;
U.S.
War Dept., G-2, “Magic Far Eastern Summary,” No. 432, Naval Section, 9 May 1945, SRS 412.

81
See NA, RG 457, SRGL 1188–89; Chief of Naval Operations, ONI Attache Reports 1940–46, F-6-e # 24309-H, NA, RG 38; National Archives, “Records Relating to U-Boat Warfare 1939–45,” p. 62. On the revival of the French navy for participation in the Battle of the Atlantic and other operations on the side of the Allies, see Marcel Vigneras,
Rearming the French
(Washington: GPO, 1957), chap. 22.

82
On this question, see the intercepts of relevant Japanese messages of 7 Sep.-21 Dec. 1944, in NA, RG 457, SRNA 2350–51,2602–4,3553–4,3597–98; “Magic” Far Eastern Summaries No. 195 of 1 Oct. 1944 and No. 279 of 24 Dec. 1944.

83
This episode can be followed in the intercepted Japanese and German telegrams of 15 Feb.-16 May 1945, NA, RG 457, SRNA 4135–37, 4216–17, 4653–56, 4737–42, 4751–52, 4755–57, 4760–62, 4778, 4796–97, 4807–8, 4840, 4907; SRDJ 98570; SRGL 2843, 2847.

84
Wagner,
Lagevorträge,
pp. 420–25; Heinrich Waas, “Eine Besprechung über den Kriegsverlauf,”
Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht
38 (1987), 684–95.

85
The June 5 conference is in Wagner, pp. 507–1 I. Dönitz had prepared Hitler for the bad news on May 14 when he had argued for the invasion of Spain (which Hitler rejected as no longer feasible) as a means of recovering the initiative in both the U-Boat and North African campaigns (ibid., pp. 504–5).

86
Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
3: 357–63. The minimal efforts of the Luftwaffe are covered in ibid., 2: 498–500. Although Dönitz did not mention it, the loss of weather ships and stations by the German navy surely also played a major role (Kahn,
Seizing Enigma,
chaps. 12,14).

87
On the campaign in the Bay of Biscay, see Morison,
US Naval Operations,
10: 8g-92; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1: 214–17.