A World at Arms (209 page)

88
On the acoustic torpedo, see Hinsley, 3/1: 222–23. There was much debate about sharing this secret with the Japanese. it was eventually decided in favor of giving it to them; relevant documents in NA, RG 457, SRGL 1032, log8, SRA I Ilg O; War Dept. G-2, “Magic” Far Eastern Summary No. 183 of 19 Sep. 1944, No 337, Naval Section, No.
347 of 2 Mar. 1945; of 3 Feb. 1945; KTB Skl A 53, 15 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/56, f. 261. Another part of the German fall 1943 offensive was the establishment of a small automatic weather broadcasting station in Canada, see Alec Douglas, “The Nazi Weather Station in Labrador,”
Canadian Geographia
101 (Dec. 1981/Jan. 1982), 42–47.

89
On the FX 1400 glide–bomband the HS 293 rocket, see Wagner,
Lagevorträge,
p. 511; Hinsley, 3/1: 47, 337–42.

90
“Ansprache an Oberbefehlshaber 8.6.43,” BA/MA, RM 7/97, f. 518–21.

91
Waas; “Eine Besprechung über den U-Boot-Krieg”; Hinsley, 3/1: 239, 244–45, Appendix 11; Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 503–28. Note that on May 1, 1945, the COMINCH warned that the new Type XXI submarines could appear in the North Atlantic in May; see NA, RG 457, SRMN 30, p. 118. See also Douglas,
Creation of a National Air Force,
pp. 600ff.

92
Waas, p. 692, estimates a steel equivalent of thirty tanks per V-Boat. By this reckoning, the 170 Type XXI boats ordered “cost” the Germans 5100 tanks.

93
Hinsley, 3/1: 239–40.

94
Ibid., pp. 46–51, Appendix II; Op-20-G, “Technical Intelligence from Allied C[ommunications] I[intelligence],” Vol. 4 of “Battle of the Atlantic”, NA, RG 457, SRH-025, pp. 1467–69; Japanese naval attaché Berlin No. N Serial 233 of 26 May and N Serial 235 of 28 May 1944, SRNA 1450–54. Allied intelligence profited particularly from the report on a 29 Aug. 1944 inspection of a Type XXI submarine in Danzig; Japanese naval attache Berlin Nos. 420 of 12 Sep. and 423 of 13 Sep. 1944, SRNA 2414–17,2420–22; cf. Beesly,
Very Special Intelligence,
p. 254.

95
Hinsley, 3/1: 312-14.

96
Note Beesly, pp. 246–47; Morison,
US Naval Operations,
10: 317–19,327. In the summer of 1944 Hitler also abandoned his 1942 project of having submarines refuel airplanes so that they could bomb New York; see KTB Skl A 35, 16 July 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/38, f. 310–11; “Personliches Kriegstagebuch des Generals der Flieger [Werner] Kreipe als Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe für die Zeit vom 22,7,-2. 11. 1944,” entry for 21 Aug. 1944, Center for Military History, P-069.

97
jacobsen and Dollinger,
Zweite Weltkrieg,
3: 154; Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 501–3, 506; Morison, 10: chaps. 9–12.

98
See the interesting report on morale as of Dec. 1943 written by a V-Boat commander of Austrian background captured that month; CNO, Op-16-z, Spot Item No. 286, in FDRL, Map Room, Box 167, Naval Aide, Germany; and the comments in Gottfried Hoch, “Zur Problematik der Menschenführung im Kriege, Eine Vntersuchung zur Einsatzbereitschaft der deutschen U-Boot-Besatzungen ab 1943,” in Vito Housselle
et al.
(eds.),
Die Deutsche Marine
(Herford: Mittler, 1983), p. 199.

99
Morison, I: 290–91, derides these projects. More dramatic and successful was the capture

100
On this project, see the summary in Bernard Fergusson,
The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations
(New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961), pp. 145–46,287,289, 298–99; documents in PRO, CAB 120/840, AIR 20/4546, PREM 3/216/2–6; FDRL,

101
Very useful is by Y’Blood,
Hunter-Killer.

102
John J. Mc Donald,
Howard Hughes and the Spruce Goose
(Blue Ridge Summit, Penn.: Tab Books, 1981); Charles Barton,
Howard Hughes and his Flying Boat
(Fallbrook, Calif.: Aero Publishers, 1982).

103
Charles P. Stacey,
Canada and the Age of Conflict, Vol. 2: 1921–1948, The Mackenzie King Era
(Toronto: Vniv. of Toronto Press, 1981), pp. 230–31,325. 104 Morison,
US Naval Operations,
1: 198.

104
Morison,
US Naval Operations,
1: 198.

105
Roosevelt to Secretary of the Navy, 9 Feb. 1942 and 22 Feb. 1943, FDRL, PSF Box I I, CF Navy 1940–42, and CF Navy 1943. A tiny number of Black seamen was commissioned in March 1945, there is a summary in the obituary of one of them in
New York Times,
11 Jan. 1992.

106
Morison, I, chap. 8; Roskill,
War at Sea,
2: 61–62, 75.

107
Charles A. Jellison,
Besieged: The World War II Ordeal of Malta,
1940–1942
(Hanover, N.H.: Univ. Press of New England, 1984); Kreis,
Air Base Defense
, pp. 113-35. When in April 1942 the London government saw, or thought it saw, signs that the governor of the island, Lt.Gen. Sir William Dobbie, might be thinking of surrendering or in any case was buckling under the pressure, Field Marshal Gort was sent instead. Whatever Gort’s deficiencies as head of the BEF in 1940, no one ever had any doubts about his steadfastness as a fortress commander, and he was clearly no longer needed at Gibraltar (Jellison, pp. 212-14; Bryant,
Turn of the Tide
, pp. 305-6).

108
Santoni,
Ultra siegt im Mittelmeer,
passim.

109
Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1: 87;
ADAP
, E, 4, Nos. 80, 85; “Stand der Heizollage der deutschen und italienischen Kriegsmarine Anfang April 1942," BA/MA, RM 6/76, f.78–81; German naval attach– Rome, “Italienische Urteile zu Admiralstabsbesprechungen in Garmisch,” 23 Jan. 1942, BA/MA, PG 45923, Case 19/3.

110
This is made particularly clear by the map in Ch’i,
Nationalist China,
p. 75.

111
Note JP(44) 54 (Final), War Cabinet Joint Planning Staff, “Appreciation on Move of Japanese fleet,” 24 Feb. 1944, PRO, AIR 8/1277.

112
USSBS,
Transportation,
p. 1.

113
Ibid., p. 2.

114
Ibid., p. 54.

115
The most useful table is that in ibid., p. 47. it should be noted that some of the sinkings were caused by British and Dutch submarines, Australian, British, and Russian planes, and, of course, by marine casualties.

116
Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee,
Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses
during World War II by All Causes
(Washington: GPO, 1947), pp. vii-viii.

117
On the sinking of the
Shinano
on Nov. 29, 1944, see Captain Joseph F. Enright with James F. Ryan,
Shinano! The Sinking of Japan’s Supership
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1987); on the sinking of the
Ashigara
on June 8, 1945, see Alistair Mars,
British Submarines at War, 1939–1945
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1971), pp. 227–29. on the sinking of the
Ashigara
on June 8, 1945, see Alistair Mars,
British Submarines at
War,
193()-1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1971), pp. 227–29.

118
See Boyd, “Japanese Submarine Force,” p. 33.

119
Kahn,
Codebreakers,
pp. 579–85 on the Japanese, 586–94 on the Americans. As Drea repeatedly shows in
MacArthur’s Ultra
, the breaking of the code used for transport shipping aided the Allies enormously.

120
There is no history of American blockade measures, and hence Volume 2 of the British official history, William N. Medlicott
The Economic Blockade,
serves, in effect, as the only general account for both countries.

121
Ibid., pp. 165–69,435–45.

122
Ibid., pp. 433–35, 669–72.

123
Wittmann,
Schwedens Wirtschajisbeziehungen,
pp. 263–73, 278–79.

124
Note the 1943 documents of the German navy detailing its thoughts on the disadvantages of a war with Sweden, in BA/MA, RM 7/162, f. 120–32.

125
A semi–official apologia is Wilhelm M. Carlgren,
Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second
World War,
trans. by Arthur Spencer (New York: St. Martin’s, 1977). The study of Sweden’s economic relations with Germany by Klaus Wittmann has a very strong pro-Swedish and anti-Allied bias, but the material presented in it fully supports my interpretation.

126
Wittmann, pp. 361–69; Oshima’s No. 940 of 16 Aug. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 42045–46.

127
Wittmann, pp. 354–60.

128
Ibid., pp. 372–73 (Wittmann himself, however, does not share this view).

129
Ibid., pp. 380–8 I.

130
Ibid., p. 377.

131
Ibid., pp. 384–90.

132
Statistics on Swedish exports to Germany are in ibid., pp. 243, 248, 359; Medlicott,
Economic Blockade,
2: 665–66.

133
ADAP
, E, 2, Nos. 245, 278; 3, No. 1 I; Klaus-Jörg Ruhl,
Spanien im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Franco, die Falange und das “Dritte Reich”
(Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1975), pp. 157–65; Memorandum by Weizsäcker, “St.S. Nr. 199,” 26 Mar. 1943, AA, St.S., “Aufzeichnungen über Diplomatenbesuche,” Bd. 13, fro 290549–51.

134
Although dated in some ways, Herbert Feis,
The Spanish Story: Franco and the Nations at
War
(New York: Knopf, 1948), remains important; see esp. chaps. 24–26.

135
Ruhl,
Spanien
, pp. 233–42; Oshima’s No. 427 of 7 May 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 57894–95; Donovan to Roosevelt, 24July 1944, FDRL, PSF Box 168, OSS Reports 15–29 July 1944.

136
Some statistics in Medlicott,
Economic Blockade,
2: 667. Chaps. 10 and 19 recount the negotiations and activities in detail. Most of the smuggling from Latin America appears to have been done via Spanish ships as well.

137
Ibid., chaps. 11 and 20. The statistics on p. 668 also refer to the transit shipment of sisal (for making rope) from the Portuguese colonial empire. There is extensive documentation and material on German worry that Japan’s occupation of Portuguese Timor and the refusal to allow the Portuguese administration there to function would lead the Lisbon government to cut off wolfram supplies. Examples of intercepted Japanese documents in NA, RG 457, SRDJ 26652–54, 47636–37, 47762–63, 47917–18. See also OKM, “Niederschrift über die Besprechung zwischen dem kaiserlichen japanischen Vizeadmiral Abe und dem Chef des Stabes der Seekriegsleitung Vizeadmiral Meisel am 21.12.1943,” 24 Dec. 193, BA/MA, RM 7/254, f. 208-10; KTB Ski A 53, 19 Jan. 1944, RM 7/56, f. 332–33.

138
The issues can be followed in Medlicott,
Economic Blockade,
2: chaps. 7 and 17. As for the other neutrals, numerous documents are published in the relevant volumes of
ADAP
and
FRUS.

139
See Önder,
Türkische Aussenpolitik,
pp. 190–91, on the negative British reaction to the Turkish effort to acquire Aleppo from the French mandate of Syria. Deringil (
Turkish Foreign Policy
), maintains a discreet silence on the subject of Turkish territorial aspirations.

140
On the Turkish ore delivery agreement of Oct. 9, 1941, see Önder, pp. 130–31, 154–55

141
The British minutes are published in ibid., pp. 274–96; a full account of Churchill’s visit in Gilbert,
Churchill,
7: 316–25.

142
Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/2: 43n, takes a very charitable view. Kahn
(Codebreakers,
pp. 451–52) correctly notes that the most important British cables were sent using one–time pads so that matching a code text with a clear text would provide no clues for any other message - the great advantage of the one–timepad. What is not clear is whether other codes were compromised. The “Cicero” affair is reviewed in Chapter 10.

143
A full account in Medlicott,
Economic Blockade,
2: chaps. 8 and 18; some statistics on p. 666. See also Önder,
Türkische Aussenpolitik,
pp. 212, 227–28, 232–37.

144
Michaux, “Rohstoffe aus Ostasien,” p. 486.

145
Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 349; Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 190–91; Beesly,
Very Special Intelligence,
p. 231; Medlicott, 2: 170–72; NA, RG 457, SRDJ 114015–180, passim; Earl of Selborne (Minister of Economic Warfare) to First Lord of the Admiralty, 18 Mar. 1942ff, PRO, AIR 19/343.

146
Salewski, 2: 350–55; Roskill,
War at Sea,
2: 182–84; Medlicott, 2: 446–48; documents in PRO, AIR 8/1746 and PREM 3/74/3; Admiralty to COMINCH, 25 June 1942, NA, RG 457, SRMN 35, pp. 1–2; Oshima to Tokyo No. 822 of 27 June 1942, SRDJ 2444–45, Tokyo to Berlin No. 717 of 26 Sept. and No. 744 of 9 Oct. 1942, SRDJ 26694, 27012–15.

147
Salewski, 2: 352–54; Hinsley, 2: 540–47;
ADAP
, E, 5, No. 258; Michaux, pp. 494–97; Beesly, pp. 231–32; Roskill
War at Sea,
2: 273–76; Oshima to Tokyo Nos. 103, 105, 106 of 23 Jan. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 30741–43, and No. 194 of 13 Feb. 1943, SRDJ 31543-44; Japanese military attache Berlin to Tokyo No. 439 of 29 July 1943, SRA 03655–56.

148
Salewski, 2: 355–57; Beesly, pp. 232–33; Medlicott,
Economic Blockade,
2: 448–52; Morison,
US Naval Operations,
10: 226–28; Lewin,
American Magic,
chap. 9; Hinsley, 3/1: 247–52; Roskill, 2: 408–1 I; Wagner,
Lagevortäge,
p. 570; Michaux, pp. 499–503; intercepts of Japanese documents in NA, RG 457, SRDJ 43045, 43765, 45497–99, 45622; SRA 01238, 01278; SRNA 603–6.

149
Salewski, 2: 357–59; KTB Skl A 53, 6 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/56, f. 87–88. This does not mean, of course, that vast quantities were not lost; see the reference to the 200 Ib bale of cured rubber floating ashore at the special American HF/DF station set up on Jan Mayen Island to locate German weather reporting stations on Greenland; “U.S. Naval Supplementary Radio Station on Jan Mayen Island, November 1943-December 1945,” NA, RG 457, SRH 299, p. 12.

150
Salewski, 2: 353–55; Michaux, p. 498; Martin Brice,
Axis Blockade Runners of World War
II
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1981), pp. 129–34; Berlin to Tokyo No. 38 of 15 Apr. 1943 and No. 152 of 25 May 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 39059, 37063; OKW, HKW (Gross) report for Keitel,s June 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/224.