A World at Arms (211 page)

33
ADAP
, E, 3, Nos. 153, 181.

34
Maximilian von Weichs, “Erinnerungen über die Sommer-Offensive 1942 im Ostfeldzug,” BA/MA, Nachlass Weichs, N 19/17, f. 18; Kurt Zeitzler, comments on a paper by Gotthard Heinrici Dn Stalingrad, “Unternehmen Fischreiher, Hitlers weitfliegende Plane," so Dec. 1953, BA/MA, Nachlass Zeitzler, N 63/15, f. Is-12; KTB OKW, 1942, I: 66.

35
See
DRuZW,
6: 95 Iff; Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 276–78, 449–50; Forster, “Strategische Uberlegungen,” p. 96 and n 9, 10; Paulus Papers, BA/MA, N 372/10, f. 85; Zeitzler, “2 Jahre Chef des Gen.St.d.H. im 2. Weltkrieg” [circa 1953], N 63/18, f. 43, and his statement of 19 May 1946 in N/63/1, f. 39–40; Heiber (ed.),
Hitlers Lagebesprechungen,
pp. 11–12, 14–16. The stenographers were provided by the Reichstag, the German parliament, which had met for the last time in April of that year.

36
Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 352–54.

37
Ibid., pp. 357–58.

38
Ibid., pp. 382–91;
DRuZW,
6: 962ff.

39
Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
pp. 363–70. A detailed account in Louis C. Rotundo (ed.),
Battle for Stalingrad: The
1943
Soviet General Staff Study
(Washington: Pergamon-Brassey,

40
Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 391–95; Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
pp. 383–86.

41
Note Zeitzler’s post-war comments in his Nachlass, BA/MA, N 63/15, f. 10–11. The latter type of transfer would provide the basis for the German counter-offensive at Kharkov in Feb.-Mar. 1943.

42
A serious study of the air force field divisions remains to be written. See Egon Denzel,
Die Luftwaffenfelddivisionen, 1942–1945, sowie die SÖnderoerbiinde der Luftwaffe im Kriege, 1939–1945
, 3d ed. (Neckargemtind: Vowinckel, 1976); Werner Stang, “Zur Geschichte der Luftwaffenfelddivisionen der faschistischen Wehrmacht,”
Zeitschrift für
der Luftwaffenfelddivisionen der faschistischen Wehrmacht,”
Zeitschrift für

43
Text in Domarus,
Hitler,
2: 1916, 1937–38. On the details of the fighting inside Stalingrad, see Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
pp. 391–93, 402–22, 431–45. A major contribution of Bernd Wegner’s account in
DRuZW,
6, appears to me to be his demonstration of the fact that even if the German 6th Army had taken Stalingrad, its supply situation was so deperate that there was no way for it to hold on through the winter. It should be noted that because of the extended street fighting, most of the army’s horses were pulled out in October so that neither adequate supply nor rapid withdrawal or breakout would have been possible thereafter (R.L. Di Nardo,
Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism: Horses and the German Army of World War II
[New York: Greenwood, 1991], p. 60).

44
Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 108–19.

45
Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 440–45; Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
pp. 374–76, 388–93, 422–31, 445–53.

46
On “Mars,” see Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 445–47;
DRuZW.,
6: 999 n 164. This is a subject on which the new openness in the former Soviet Union may shed more light.

47
On June 4, 1942, Hitler made a brief visit to Finland for Mannerheim’s 75th birthday. Bernd Wegner (ed.), “Hitler’s Besuch in Finnland: Das geheime Tonprotokoll seiner Unterredung mit Mannerheim am 4. Juni 1942,” 11Z 41 (1993), 117–37; Michael Berry,
[Chiba] to Helsinki, 4 Sep. 1942, copy of No. 686 to Tokyo, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 26032). A very important study of operation “Nordlicht” is that of Andreas Hillgruber.

48
Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 421–22;
DRuZW,
6: 902–3.

49
Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 96–98; Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 408–23;
DRuZW,
6: 903–6.

50
Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad,
p. 383.

51
Ibid., pp. 381–82; Ziemke,
Moscow to Stalingrad,
pp. 398–408; Glantz, pp. 88–95;
DRuZW,

52
On this subject, the most useful English language introduction remains Armstrong, which combines a general survey with the reprinted texts of portions of many of the partisan warfare studies of the War Documentation Project, all now declassified. There is an excellent summary in Ziemke,
Moscow to Sta/ingrad,
chap. 10.

53
This is the main burden of the studies of early partisan bands in the Ukraine and the north Caucasus by John Armstrong and Alexander Dallin respectively.

54
John A. Armstrong,
Ukrainian Nationalism,
1939–1945 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1955).

55
The most famous of these partisan bands, those of Aleksei F. Fyodorov, Sidor A. Kovpak, Alexander Saburov, and M. 1. Naumov, all operated in 1942–43 in essentially this fashion and did have some success in organizing local partisans in the northern Ukraine (Armstrong,
Partisans,
pp. 113–16).

56
See the excerpts from Gerhard L. Weinberg, “The Partisan Movement in the Yelnya-Dorogobuzh Area of Smolensk Oblast,” in ibid., pp. 444–57.

57
Note that by Sep. 7, 1942 the British had realized that the main German effort was at Stalingrad (Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 103–6).

58
George F. Howe,
Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West
(Washington: GPO,

59
Y’Blood,
Hunter-Killer,
pp. 13–26.

60
Note the report of the Japanese Minister to Vichy to Tokyo No. 454 of 12 Nov. 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 28229–31. The landing did, however, put an end to Vichy interference with the flights of British planes from Gibraltar to West Africa for the Takoradi route (see documents in PRO, AIR 8/691). On Churchill’s interest in the building up and subsequent running down of that route see AIR 8/483. There is a general history of the route prepared by the Air Historical Branch in AIR 41/32.

61
This misassessment is especially striking since the Americans, as the OSS reports to President Roosevelt show, were reading the diplomatic telegrams of the Vichy French embassy in Washington, and the British had obtained the code of the Vichy French naval attaché there (H. Montgomery Hyde,
Cynthia
[New York: Dell, 1966], chap. 8).

62
The most comprehensive account is Funk,
The Politics of Torch.
See also Howard,
Grand Strategy,
4: chaps. 7–9; Howe,
Northwest Africa,
chaps. 3–4; David A. Walker, “OSS

63
There is a most interesting account of the fighting in Morocco evidently written in Nov. or Dec. 1942 by a high French staff officer at General Nogues’s headquarters, in PRO, WO
106/2703.
The intent there was obviously to fight, with a readiness to quit when clearly beaten by the Americans. See also Robert O. Paxton,
Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps under Marshal Pétain
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. WO
106/2703.
The intent there was obviously to fight, with a readiness to quit when clearly beaten by the Americans. See also Robert O. Paxton,
Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps under Marshal Pétain
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ.

64
Note Roosevelt’s comments to Morgenthau, 17 Nov. 1942, FDRL, Morgenthau Presidential Diary,s: 1193–94.

65
Paxton,
Parades and Politics,
pp. 358–61; Krautkramer, “Vorgeschichte,” p. 212; Raeder’s answers to Assmann’s question of 28 Aug. 1944, “Moglichkeiten eines Ausgleichs mit
Frankreich,” BA/MA, PG 71826; Assmann memorandum, “Die Rolle des Admirals Darlan” [1944?], BA/MA, III M 502/1; Assmann to Raeder, 28 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, III

66
Note the Japanese reaction, Tokyo to Vichy Circular No. 2054 of 11 Nov. 1942, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 27877. For a German appreciation of Darlan’s switch, see “Die Rolle des Admiral Darlan,” n.d., probably 1944, BA/MA, III M 502/1. des Admiral Darlan,” n.d., probably 1944, BA/MA, III M 502/1.

67
On the situation in Tunisia, see Paxton,
Parades and Politics,
pp. 363–71; on the

68
Howard,
Grand Strategy:
174–79. This uproar also led to the writing of William L. Langer’s book,
Our Vichy Gamble
(New York: Knopf, 1947), with U.S. Government

69
Hinsley, 2:
British Intelligence, 464–66.

70
John D. Millett,
The Army Service Forces: The Organization and Role of the Army Service

71
See the letter of General Kenneth Anderson to Brooke, 16 Nov. 1942, Liddell Hart

72
On this issue I cannot agree with Jukes,
Hitler’s Sta/ingrad Decisions,
pp. 97, 103. Since Hitler made decisions on several important issues in those days, his failure to make such decisions concerning the situation in the Stalingrad area seems to me to be due more to his unwillingness to make those particular decisions than to his location at the time.

73
Hinsley, 2:
British Intelligence,
486-91. Salewski,
Seekriegsleitung,
2: 251understates

74
See Howe,
Northwest Africa,
Appendix B, p. 683; Santoni,
Ultra,
chaps. 6–7; Kreis,
Air
Base Defense,
pp. 169–73, for details. On British recognition of the Axis success in supplying Tunisia in Jan.-Feb. 1943, see Hinsley, 2: 573–77.

75
Rommel Papers,
p. 419. See also Admiral Wagner’s comments on Jan. 13, 1943, quoted

76
This point is clear from the internal German debate about whether or not to send the Mufti to Tunisia as the latter very much wanted;
ADAP
, E, 4, Nos. 181, 225, 267, 294, 11 Dec. 1942, Imperial War Museum, AL 1933, Canarisl Lahousen file, items 39 and 40; Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, 12 Dec. 1942, AA, St.S., “Aufzeichnungen über interne

77
Note Jodl’s views of Nov. 29, 1942, on strategy for 1943 in Forster, “Strategische Uberlegungen,” pp. 95–96. The recollections of General von Arnim, suddenly called on Dec. 3, 1942, from the defense of Rzhev to take over as commanding general of 5th Panzer Army, are in his memoirs, BA/MA, N 61/4, f. 1–4.

78
Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 493–98.

79
Howe,
North west Africa,
chaps. 15–17; Hinsley, 2: 504.

80
See Churchill’s Minute COS(42) 421(0) of 29 Nov. 1942 arguing that “July 1943 should be fixed as the target date” (PRO, AIR 8/878); his note as Minister of Defence COS(42) 42 9(0) of 3 Dec. 1942 calling for a landing in July or Aug. 1943 (ibid.); and his comments to the War Cabinet on 30 Nov. 1942 in WM(42) War Cabinet 162 (CAB 65/28). The redrafting of Churchill’s message to Roosevelt forwarding his 24 and 27. Nov. exchange with Stalin also shows the early hopes for a 1943 landing on the assumption that Tunisia would be taken by the end of Dec. 1942 and Libya by the end of Jan. 1943 with a landing in northern France in Aug. or Sep. 1943 (CAB 120/41 I). Cf. Bryant,
Turn
of the
Tide,
pp. 428–37. Similarly, the drafts of Roosevelt’s message to Prime Minister Curtin of in northern France in Aug. or Sep. 1943 (CAB 120/41 I). Cf. Bryant,
Turn
of the
Tide,
Australia on the return of the 9th Australian Division from the Middle East were changed to assume a final defeat of Rommel to “early in the year” instead of “the first of the year” between Nov. 23 and Dec. 2,1942; FDRL, Map Room Files Box 12, Miscellaneous Presidential Messages 1942. But see the documents in PRO, AIR 20/2471.

81
Formalized in a document JP(42) 1005 (Revise) (Final) of 10 Jan. 1943, PRO, CAB 119/55.

82
PM personal minute D 22R/2, PRO, CAB 120/411. It should be noted that Montgomery

83
See Dallek,
Roosevelt and Foreign Policy,
pp. 369–70. See also Roosevelt to Leahy, 7 Dec. 1942, FDRL, Map Room Box 167, Naval Aide, Warfare Northwest Africa.

84
On this point, see Hinsley, 2: 109–10.

85
This was the staff which came to be known by its initials as COSSAC. That the impetus to serious planning came from the
American
side and led to the creation of this staff and to its really getting to work is clear from the key files of the British DMO (Director of Military Operations), 22 Jan. 1943 - 3 July 1944, PRO, WO 106/4147–48; cf. WO 106/4243. It must, however, be noted that it was Brooke who on Mar. 11, 1943, asked General Sir Percy C. S. Hobart to take on the job of developing the floating tanks and other devices which would play such an important part in the invasion (Brooke Diary, 11 Mar. and 1 Apr. 1943, comment in 3/A/VIII, p. 656, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers).

86
On the Casablanca Conference, see Howard,
Grand Strategy,
4: chaps. 13–14; Morton,
Strategy,
pp. 376–86, 439–41. An appreciation by the Combined Intelligence Committee on “German Strategy in 1943” of 26 Jan. 1943 is in NA, RG 165, Entry 77, Box 1418, File 6900Germany.

87
There are, in addition to the numerous negative views of American generals in the published volumes of Brooke’s diary, many others which may be found in the diary and Brooke’s later notes; see entries for 16 and 19 Jan. 1943, notes 3/A/VIII, pp. 601, 609, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers.

88
See the letter of Lt.Col. Howkins of the Office of the War Cabinet to Major Davidson in the British Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, 23 Jan. 1943, PRO, CAB 119/59.

89
Note Lothar Kettenacker, “Die alliierte Kontrolle Deutschlands als Exempel britischer Herrschaftsausubung,” in Ludolf Herbst (ed.),
Westdeutschland
1945–1955 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986), p. 56, and
Krieg zur Friedenssicherung,
pp. 186ff.

90
Howard,
Grand Strategy,
4: 283. At the Trident Conference in May 1943, this attitude toward Italy was upheld again by Roosevelt and Churchill (ibid., pp. 456–57).