A World at Arms (213 page)

146
Forster,
Stalingrad,
pp. 121–30, has a good summary.

147
Rolf-Dieter Müller, “Die deutschen Gaskriegsvorbereitungen 1919–1945,”
MGM
27,
No. I (1980), p. 44.

148
Ibid., pp. 44–45.

149
The first accurate launch of an A-4 over 120 miles took place on 3 Oct. 1942 (Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
3/1: 357ff).

150
See Olaf Groehler, “Die ‘Hochdruckpumpe’ (V-3)-Entwicklung und Misere einer ‘Wunderwaffe’,”
Militärgeschichte
5, No. 16 (1977), 738–44. (This weapon is the model for the “Supergun” developed for Iraq by a Canadian arms technician in the 1980s.)

151
Hinsley, 3/1: 362–63.

152
Ibid., pp. 370ff. On the question of these weapons, Churchill’s favorite scientific advisor, Lord Cherwell, turned out to be completely wrong (see ibid., pp. 373–74, 386, 397, 398, 400–1,410–11).

153
Brooke Diary, 29 June 1943, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers.

154
Note the censorship analysis of letters to German prisoners of war held by the British in
the Middle East in Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East, “Brief Digest of British M.E.F. Military Censorship Fortnightly Summary of Prisoner of War Correspondence Covering Examination Period May 5th - May 18th, 1943,” 27 May

155
Hinsley, 2: 521–23; Boog,
Luftwaffenj Uhrung,
p. 141. On the basis of captured German documents, the Western Allies had a summary of the German air force program for 1943 by July 6, 1943 (ibid., Box 1482, File 991o-General Western Front).

156
See the British Air Intelligence report of 1 Mar. 1944, “The G.A.F. and the London

157
Note Forster, “Strategische Oberlegungen,” pp. 95 n 2, 97.

158
See Scheidt Papers, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, B 2, S 266, pp. 272, 299–300; Kempf,

159
See n 127, above. Important documents are in BA, R 43 II, 985b, 985C, 986, 1987a,

160
An initial study in Manfred Messerschmidt and Fritz Wüllner,
Die Wehnnachtjustiz im
Dritten Reich: Zerstörung einer Legende
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987). An analysis of the death sentence statistics is in chap. 5. The statistics have been challenged but not convincingly.

161
Glantz,
Soviet Military Deception,
pp. 148–54; Volkogonov,
Stalin,
chap. 47. Note the comments of Morishima in
Kido Diary,
3 Mar. 1943, pp. 352–53.

162
Anna M. Cienciala, “The Activities of Polish Communists as a Source for Stalin’s Policy Towards Poland in the Second World War,”
International History Review
7 (1985), 133-

163
Terry,
Poland’s Place in Europe,
pp. 335–36; Joanna K. M. Hanson,
The Civilian Population
and the Warsaw Uprising of
1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982),

164
Cienciala, p. 136.

165
Terry, pp. 337–38. For the British and U.S. governments getting full information on the correct background of Katyn, see O’Malley to Eden NO.51 of 24 May 1943, C 6160/258/55, Foreign Office Print, sent by Churchill to Roosevelt 13 Aug. 1943 and initialled by the latter, FDRL, PSF Box 53, Great Britain, Churchill 40–43 (published in Kimball,
Churchill and Roosevelt,
2: 389–419).

166
See Stafford,
Britain and European Resistance,
pp. 133–36

167
On the death of Sikorski, see esp. PRO, AIR 8/779, which points to troubles in the controls as decisive. Sabotage of these by a Soviet agent cannot, in my judgement, be ruled out. See also Brooke Diary for 5 and 15 July 1943 as well as earlier entries, all very favorable to Sikorski (Liddell Hart Centre). The comments of General Mason Macfarlane, then British commander at Gibraltar, are in his 18 July 1945 notes at the Imperial War Museum, MM 30.

168
Hinsley,
British Intelligence,
2: 615; Brooke Diary, 9 Dec. 1942, Bryant,
Turn of the Tide,
p. 531; documents 31 July 1942 - 28 Apr. 1943 in War Dept., G-2, File, NA, RG 165,

169
Kettenacker, “Alliance,” pp. 446–47.

170
Ibid., pp. 447–50. Eden was here advocating precisely the policy Chamberlain had adopted toward Hitler’s Germany. He had General Sir P. Le Q Martel recalled as head of the British military mission to Moscow for taking too hard a line with the Russians. See the
latter’s “Notes on Important and Unknown Features in 1943 on the Russian Front,” PRO, CAB 106/323.

171
See Hinsley, 2: 624 and Appendix 22; 3/1: 191. The Western Allies generally received very little intelligence from the Russians in return; see ibid., 2: 618–20.

172
Richard C. Lukas,
Eagles East
(Tallahassee, Flo.: Florida State Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 171–72; Herring,
Aid to Russia,
pp. 88–97.

173
Lukas, pp. 173–74; Beaumont,
Comrades in Arms,
pp. 142–47; Herring, pp. 97ff.

174
See Prime Minister’s Personal Minute D 134/3 of 19 July 1943, PRO, AIR 8/1077.

175
There is a very useful file of key documents on the “Rankin” plan, 26 Apr. - 15 Dec. 1943, in PRO, WO 106/4245.

176
See W.P.(42) 580, “Air Policy: Note by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence,” Dec. 1942, PRO, CAB 120/10.

177
Saward,
“Bomber” Harris,
pp. 93–95; Webster and Frankland,
Strategic Air Offensive,
2:
chap. 10,4: Annex 1. For Churchill’s pressure to keep up the volume of bombs dropped, see his Personal Minute 387/3 to the Chief of the Air Staff (Portal) of 16 June 1943, in PRO, CAB 120/292.

178
On the dam raid, see Saward, pp. 197–200; Paul Brickhill, The
Dam Busters
(New York: Ballantine, 1955). On the use of “window” (strips of aluminum foil) in connection with the Hamburg raid, see Hinsley, 2: 518–19; Brooke Diary, 23 June 1943 (Liddell Hart Centre). On the Hamburg raid in general, see Boog,
Luftwaffenführnng,
pp. 135–36; the Hamburg raid, see Hinsley, 2: 518–19; Brooke Diary, 23 June 1943 (Liddell Hart Centre). On the Hamburg raid in general, see Boog,
Luftwaffenführnng,
pp. 135–36;

179
See the documents in PRO, AIR 8/1146.

180
Saward, pp. 207–8.

9: THE HOME FRONT

1
This is a major theme of
DRuZW,
5/1. See also Alan S. Milward,
War, Economy and Society
1939–1945 (Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1977), pp. 220–21; Ludolf Herbst,
Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschafi: Die Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda
/939–1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982). There is a very helpful comparison in Mark Harrison, “Resource Mobilization for World War II: The U.S.A, U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938–1945,”
Economic History Review
2d ser., 41 (1988), 171–92.

2
The best account remains Steinert,
Hitler’s War.

3
The post-war argument that the murderers had no choice but to carry out their grisly orders or suffer the direst penalties themselves was effectively demolished by prosecutors in the Federal Republic of Germany. See David H. Kitterman, “Those Who Said ‘No!’: Germans Who Refused to Execute Civilians during World War II,”
Gemzan Studies Review
11 (1988), 241–54; Jehuda L. Wallach, “Befehlsnotstand: A Matter of Fact or Subterfuge,” in Haim Shamir (ed.), France and Germany in an Age
of Crisis,
1900–1960:
Studies in Memory of Charles Bloch
(Leiden: Brill, 1990), pp. 162–68. An especially dramatic example of a battalion commander inviting any of his men who did not wish to participate in mass slaughter of Jews to step aside is described by Christopher R. Browning, “One Day in Jozefow: Initiation to Mass Murder,” in Peter Hayes, ed.,
Lessons and Legacies: The Meaning of the Holocaust in a Changing World
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1991), pp. 200–1; added detail in the same author’s
Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland
(New York: Harper Collins, 1992).

4
See Ludwig Volk (ed.), “Clemens August Graf von Galen: Schweigen oder Bekennen? Zum Gewissensentscheid des Bischofs von Munster im Sommer 1941,”
Stimmen der Zeit
194 (1976), 219–24. Complete documentation in Peter Loffler (ed.),
Bischof Clemens
August Graf von Galen: Akten
,
Briefe und Predigeen
1933–46, Vol. 2, 1939–1946 (Mainz: Mathias-Grunwald, 1988).

5
FDR Letters,
2: 1220. The text of Galen’s denunciation of Gestapo terror is in FDRL, PSF Box 70, Vatican, Myron C. Taylor 1941.

6
Wolfgang Diewerge (ed.),
Feldpostbrie Je aus dem Osten: Deutsche Soldaten sehen die Sowjetunion
(Berlin: Limpert, 1941), p. 38.

7
Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, “Wie geheim war die ‘Endlosung’?”
Miscellanea: Festschrift für Helmut Krausnick
, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1980), pp. 131–48. Both in his public speeches and their officially published texts, Hitler’s numerous references to his prediction of Jan. 30, 1939, that in any future war the Jews of Europe would be exterminated, now being implemented, was post-dated to Sept. I, 1939, presumably to reinforce the concept of its being connected with the war Gust as his October 1939 order for the “euthanasia” program was predated to Sept. I, 1939).

8
Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton,
Vichy France and the Jews
(New York: Basic Books, 1981).

9
There is now a careful examination of this matter in Jonathan Steinberg,
All or Nothing: The Axis and the Holocaust,
1941–1943 (London: Routledge, 1990).

10
Owen Chadwick, “Weizsäcker, the Vatican and the Jews of Rome,”
Journal of Ecclesiastical History
28 (1977), 179–99. The original idea appears to have been to murder the Jews of Rome in northern Italy, see Moellhausen (Rome) to Ribbentrop No. 192 of 6 Oct. 1943, AA, S1.S., “Italien,” Bd. 17, fr. 123580.

11
Randolph L. Braham,
The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary,
2 vols. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1981). Wallenberg’s activities were financed by the U.S. government. Note Donovan to Roosevelt, 17 Oct. 1944, FDRL, PSF Box 169, OSS Reports Oct. 1944.

12
“Auszug aus einem Bericht von einer dreiwochigen Fahrt in die Ukraine,” 28 June 1943, BA, Nadler, ZSg. 115/6, f. 154. The statistics, of course, refer not to the Ukraine as a whole but to the portions administered by the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.

13
An account in Max Weinreich,
Hitler’s Professors
(New York: Yiddish Scientific Institute-YIVO, 1946), pp. 219–35. Japanese Ambassador Oshima was most hesitant about accepting his invitation, see his tel. No. 614 to Tokyo of 22 June 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 62675–76. He was concerned that the racial policies proclaimed at the congress would conflict with those of Japan. One wonders what he would have thought of the special brothel planned for the attendees–with Polish and Ukrainian women excluded as racially inappropriate!

14
The systematic terrorization and killing of gypsies is surveyed in Sybil Milton, “Nazi Policies toward Roma and Sinti, 1939–1045,”
Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society,
Feb. 1992.

15
See “Rk 7723B, Betrifft: Eheschliessungen Deutscher mit Polen und Tschechen,” 16 June 1940, BA, R 431V1502a, f. 14.

16
Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Bormann Letters,
p. xx. See also Oron J. Hale (ed.), “Adolf Hitler and the Postwar German Birthrate,”
Journal of Central European Affairs
17 (1957), 166–73.

17
Bernd Wegner (ed.), “Auf dem Wege zur pangermanischen Armee: Dokumente zur Entstehung des III. (‘pangermanisches’) SS-Panzerkorps,”
MGM
(1980/2), p. 102.

18
Guderian did not think the huge estate finally offered to him was adequate: see Weinberg, “Zur Dotation Hitlers an Generalfeldmarschall Ritter von Leeb,” p. 99 n 20.

19
The best English-language study remains Edward L. Hornze,
Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1967); the most comprehensive recent survey is Ulrich Herbert,
Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des “Ausländer-Einsatzes” in
involvement of millions of Germans with the slave labor program, it has been something of a taboo in post-war German work. A good general summary in Milward,
War, Economy and Society,
pp. 221–28.

20
Herbert,
Fremdarbeiter,
pp. 127–28.

21
Ibid., pp. 336–40.

22
Note Hess to Rosenberg, 30 Jan. 1940, NG-I078, cited in Paul Seabury,
The Wilhelmstrasse
(Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of California Press, 1954), p. 181 n 40.

23
Walter Petwaidic,
Die autoritäre Anarchie
(Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1946). Note also Dieter Rebentisch,
Führerstaat und Verwaltung im Zweiten Weltkrieg
(Stuttgart: Steiner, 1981).

24
The best introduction is Jost Dülffer, Jochen Thies and Josef Henke,
Hitlers Stödte:

25
Ibid., p. 17.

26
Ibid., p. 20.

27
Very important is Bernhard Stasiewski, “Die Kirchenpolitik der Nationalsozialisten im Warthegau 1939–1945,”
VjZ
7 (1959),46–74. On the actual functioning of the Gestapo, see Robert Gellately,
Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1990).

28
A good source on internal German discussion of schemes for the post-war world is AA, Nachlass Renthe-Fink, Paket 5, Bd. 1–3.

29
On Italian, Japanese and Romanian urgings, see Berlin to Tokyo No. 80 of 19 Jan. 1943, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 30619–20; Madrid to Tokyo No. 458 of 13 May 1943, SRDJ 35839–41; Memorandum by Bismarck with a 15 Mar. 1943 covering note by Mackensen marked “cessat,” AA, Botschaft Rom (Quir.), Geheim, Bd. 51/2, fr. E 257522–24.