By contrast, the carriers and their escorts of World War II were able to project offensive power over the entire globe. From the North Cape to the islands of the Central Pacific, carrier-based aircraft dominated the greatest naval war in history. Along the way, they helped nullify the threat from Germany’s U-boats and other enemy submarines, as well as sweeping the seas of enemy ships and aircraft. While the eventual Japanese surrender may have been signed aboard the battleship
Missouri
in Tokyo Bay, it occurred in the shadow of a sky blackened by hundreds of carrier aircraft flying overhead in review. Called “Halsey’s Folly,” the flyover was the final proof of the real force that had ended the second global war of this century. Despite the claims of Air Force leaders who pronounced navies worthless in an era of nuclear-armed bombers, when the next shooting conflict erupted in Korea, it was carrier aircraft that covered the withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter and the amphibious landings at Inchon. They then dropped into a role that would become common in the next half-century, acting as mobile air bases to project combat power ashore.
Despite the best efforts of the former Soviet Union to develop a credible “blue-water” fleet during the Cold War, the U.S. Navy never lost control of any ocean that it cared about. One of the big reasons for this was the regular presence of carrier battle groups, which took any sort of “home-court advantage” away from a potential enemy. Armed with aircraft that were the match of anything flying from a land base, and flown by the best-trained aviators in the world, the American carriers and their escorts were the “eight-hundred-pound guerrillas” of the Cold War naval world. This is a position that they still hold to this day. However, their contributions have taken on a deadly new relevance in the post-Cold War world.
One of the tragic truths about America’s winning of the Cold War was that we did it with anyone who would help us. This meant that the U.S. frequently backed any local dictator with a well-placed air or naval base and a willingness to say that Communism was bad. The need to contain the ambitions of the Soviet Union and their allies took a front seat to common sense and human rights. The result was a series of alliances with despots ranging from Ferdinand Marcos to Manuel Noriega. However, there was a war to win and we did win it. The price, however, is what we are paying today. Around the world, Americans are being asked to please pack up their aircraft, ships, and bases and please take them home. We should not be offended; we did it to ourselves. The continuing legacy of squalor in places like Olongapo City in the Philippines and other “outside the gate” towns was more than the emerging democracies of the post-Cold War era could stand. When you add in our continued interference in the internal politics of the countries that hosted our bases, it is a wonder that we have any friends left in the world as the 20th century ends.
Our poor foreign policy record aside, the United States and our allies still have a number of responsibilities in the post-Cold War world. This means simply that to wield military force in a crisis, we now have just a few options. One is to ask nicely if a friendly host nation might allow us to base personnel, aircraft, and equipment on their soil so that we can threaten their neighbors with military force. As might be imagined, this can be a tough thing to do in these muddled times. George Bush managed to do it in the Persian Gulf in 1991, but Bill Clinton failed in the same task in 1997 and 1998. Even with a dictator like Saddam Hussein, most regional neighbors would rather tolerate the bully than risk the death and destruction that occurred in Kuwait in 1990 and 1991. This leaves just two other credible options; to base military power at homeland bases or aboard sovereign flagged ships at sea. The first of these options means that fleets of transport ships and aircraft must be maintained just to move them to the place where a crisis is breaking out. It also takes time to move combat aircraft and ground units to the places where trouble may be brewing. This is why having units forward-based aboard ships is so incredibly important to us these days.
Time in a crisis is more precious than gold. As much as any other factor, the time delay in responding to a developing conflict determines whether it results in war, peace, or a distasteful standoff. While we may never know for sure, there is a good chance that Saddam Hussein stopped at the Saudi border in 1990 because of the rapid flood of U.S. and coalition forces into the Kingdom. However, it would be a tough act to duplicate today. One of the benefits of our military buildup in the late years of the Cold War was the ability to do both of these things well. Along with lots of continental-based forces with excellent transport capabilities, we usually had a number of carrier and amphibious groups forward-based to respond to crises. However, these rich circumstances are now just happy memories.
Today the U.S. Navy considers itself lucky to have retained an even dozen carrier battle groups, along with their matched amphibious ready groups. By being able to keep just two or three of these forward-deployed at any time, the United States has managed to maintain a toehold in places where it has few allies and no bases. The recent confrontation with Iraq over United Nations weapons inspectors, had it led to war, would have been prosecuted almost entirely from a pair of carrier groups based in the Persian Gulf. With the 1990/91 allied coalition splintered over each country’s regional interests, almost nobody would allow U.S. warplanes and ground forces onto their soil. This is a 180° change from 1990/91, when the majority of Allied airpower was land-based.
This brings us back to the three words at the beginning of this introduction: presence, influence, and options. Naval forces generally provide presence. Carrier groups, though, dominate an area for hundreds of miles/ kilometers in every direction, including near-earth space. While a frigate or destroyer impresses everyone who sees it, a carrier group can change the balance of military and political power of an entire region. A weak country backed by an American carrier group is going to be much tougher to overthrow or invade for a local or regional rogue state or warlord. That is the definition of international presence these days. Finally, there is the matter of options.
In the deepest heart of every politician, there is a love of options. Having choices in a tough situation is every politician’s greatest desire, and carrier groups give them that. It is one of the oddities of national politics that until they become President or Prime Minister, politicians frequently and publicly view large military units like carrier groups as a waste of taxpayer money. However, let the politicians hit the top of a nation’s political food chain, and they sing another tune entirely. It is almost a matter of national folklore that every Chief Executive will, at some time in their Presidency, ask those four famous words: “Where are the carriers?” It certainly has been the case since Franklin Roosevelt haunted the halls of the White House. Today, in fact, the use of forward-deployed forces afloat may be the only option open to a national leader.
Understanding aircraft carriers and their associated aircraft and battle group escorts is not an easy task. Focusing only on the flattop is like tunnel vision, since the carrier’s own weapons are purely defensive and quite short-ranged. To fully understand what effects a carrier group moving into your neighborhood is going to have, it is necessary to look beyond the carrier’s bulk and dig deeper. You must look into the embarked air wing with its wide variety of aircraft and weapons, as well as the escorts. These range from Aegis-equipped missile cruisers and destroyers, to deadly nuclear-powered attack submarines. Armed with surface-to-air missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles, they not only protect the carrier from attack, but have their own mighty offensive punch as well. To see it all takes a wider, deeper look than you are likely to find on the nightly news or in your daily newspaper. To do that requires that you spend time with people. Lots of people. These include the Navy’s leaders, who make the policy decisions and have the responsibility of keeping our Navy the best in the world. You also need to spend some time with the folks who build the ships, aircraft, and weapons that make the force credible and dangerous. Finally, you have to know the thousands of people who run the battle groups and sail them to the places where they are needed across the globe.
I hope as you read this book that you get some sense of the people, because it is they that are the real strength of the carrier groups, and our nation. While you and I stay home safe and warm in the company of our families and loved ones, they go out for months at a time to put teeth into our national policies and backbone into our words. It is they who make the sacrifices and perhaps pay the ultimate price. I hope you see that in these pages, and you think of them as you get to know the “heavy metal” of the U.S. Navy up close. If you do, I think that you will gain a real perspective on their difficult, but vital, profession.
—Tom Clancy
July 1998
Naval Aviation 101
“
Where are the carriers?”
Every
American President since
Franklin Delano Roosevelt
A
ircraft carriers stretch perceptions. First of all, they’re
big—bigger
than most skyscrapers—skyscrapers that can move across the sea at a better than fair clip. And yet, despite their great size, when you watch flight operations on the flight deck (usually as busy as a medium-sized municipal airport), you can’t help but wonder how so much gets done in such a tiny space. They not only stretch perceptions, they stretch the limits of the nation’s finances and industrial capacity; and they stretch credibility. It’s hard to find a weapon that raises more controversy.
Controversy has troubled naval aviation from the early days of the century, when primitive airplanes originally went to sea. At first, airpower was seen as a useless diversion of scarce funds from more pressing naval requirements like the construction of big-gun battleships. Later, after naval aviation became a serious competitor for sea power’s throne, bitter infighting arose between gunnery and airpower advocates. Today, as the acknowledged “big stick” of America’s Navy, the aircraft carrier is under attack from those who claim to have better ways to project military power into forward areas. Air Force generals plug B-2A stealth bombers with precision weapons (so-called “virtual presence”). Submariners and surface naval officers hawk their platforms carrying precision strike missiles. A good case can be made for all of these. Still, in a post-Cold War world that becomes more dangerous and uncertain by the week, aircraft carriers have a proven track record of effectiveness in crisis situations. Neither bombers nor “arsenal ships” can make that claim.
Question:
What makes aircraft carriers so effective?
The USS
George Washington
(CVN- 73) operating her embarked carrier air wing One (CVW-1). Battle groups based around aircraft carriers are the backbone of American seapower.
OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTO
Answer:
Carriers and their accompanying battle groups can move freely over the oceans of the world (their free movement is legally protected by the principles of “Freedom of Navigation”), and can do as they please as long as they stay outside of other nations’ territorial waters.
A nation’s warships are legally sovereign territories wherever they might be floating; and other nations have no legal influence over their actions or personnel. Thus, an aircraft carrier can park the equivalent of an Air Force fighter wing offshore to conduct sustained flight and/or combat operations. In other words, if a crisis breaks out in some littoral (coastal) region, and a carrier battle group (CVBG) is in the area, then the nation controlling it can influence the outcome of the crisis.
4
Add to this CVBG an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) loaded with a Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable (MEU (SOC)), and you have even more influence.
5
This, in a nut-shell, is the real value of aircraft carriers.
Such influence does not come without cost. Each CVBG represents a national investment approaching US $20 billion. And with over ten thousand embarked personnel that need to be fed, paid, and cared for, each group costs in the neighborhood of a billion dollars to operate and maintain annually. That’s a lot of school lunches. That’s a lot of
schools!
Add to this current United States plans to maintain twelve CVBGs. And then add the massive costs of the government infrastructure that backs these up (supply ships, ports, naval air stations, training organizations, etc.), as well as the vast commercial interests (shipbuilders, aircraft and weapons manufacturers, etc.) necessary to keep the battle groups modern and credible. And then consider that not all twelve battle groups are available at one time. Because the ships need periodic yard service and the crews and air crews need to be trained and qualified, only two or three CVBGs are normally forward-deployed. (There is usually a group in the Mediterranean Sea, another in the Western Pacific Ocean, and another supporting operations in the Persian Gulf region.)