Find, Fix, Finish (32 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
This message conveyed the US belief that the international rules had changed: the United States would no longer accept sovereignty as inviolable, and terrorists in safe havens would be eliminated with or without the help of local governments. Undoubtedly, this was intended to send a powerful message to spur new cooperation from foreign governments previously reticent to comply with US demands. Countries as diverse as Russia, Uzbekistan, and Mongolia contributed aid and assistance to US counterterrorism efforts, and Yemen, Sudan, and Pakistan, which had tolerated terrorist groups within their borders, began to reevaluate their positions. However, the international system was not going to change overnight, and America’s new unbounded position changed nothing about the reality on the ground. All politics is local—even in the roughest patches of the globe.
The ambitious global reach of the project quickly illuminated its limitations: the US, while powerful, still needed to negotiate with small, poor nations for access, intelligence, and aid. As time went by, progress became caught up in the process of diplomatic communiqués, negotiation, and compromise. The US had changed, but the rules that governed international behavior in the world were still firmly in effect.
THE LAST RIDE OF SALIM AL-HARETHIIn late 2002, Bush administration officials wanted concrete, public examples of success in the new fight against al-Qaeda and the so-called global war on terror; the strike in Yemen against Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi seemed a prime example. Al-Harethi had been a major player in the 2000 attack on the USS
Cole
that killed seventeen American sailors and, at the time of his death, was a senior al-Qaeda operative.
Cole
that killed seventeen American sailors and, at the time of his death, was a senior al-Qaeda operative.
The US and Yemen had worked together to track al-Harethi but had to wait until intelligence revealed his exact location. As before, America found him through a smart combination of intelligence resources—including a dramatic secret mission by the US ambassador to Yemen, who traveled into the desert with intelligence officials to bribe Yemeni tribe members for information on his whereabouts. The move was risky; Yemeni officials were infuriated that the US had undertaken a “diplomatic journey” to speak to the local tribesmen on their own,
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but the information seemingly proved useful.
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but the information seemingly proved useful.
With information on his general location, the US fixed al-Harethi by tracking his satellite phone.
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Al-Harethi was well aware of US capabilities—he reportedly had five phones on him when he was killed.
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He was already on a high-value target list, and some believed that al-Harethi was probably on his way to an operation.
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Empowered to act, a CIA officer across the Bab-el-Mandeb strait at a
base in Djibouti flew a Predator over Yemeni airspace, tracked the car carrying al-Harethi away from populated areas, and then, with prior approval, fired its lethal payload and incinerated al-Harethi and his passengers with a single Hellfire missile.
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Al-Harethi was well aware of US capabilities—he reportedly had five phones on him when he was killed.
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He was already on a high-value target list, and some believed that al-Harethi was probably on his way to an operation.
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Empowered to act, a CIA officer across the Bab-el-Mandeb strait at a
base in Djibouti flew a Predator over Yemeni airspace, tracked the car carrying al-Harethi away from populated areas, and then, with prior approval, fired its lethal payload and incinerated al-Harethi and his passengers with a single Hellfire missile.14
Pictures of the aftermath show only a heavy black stain in the sand; Yemeni security officials attempted to identify the corpses and then took them to a military hospital in Sana’a to collect DNA, which they then shipped to the US.
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From the American perspective, it was a brilliant success: not only had no US personnel been put at risk, but all six passengers in the car—including one US citizen—were most likely enemy combatants.
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From the American perspective, it was a brilliant success: not only had no US personnel been put at risk, but all six passengers in the car—including one US citizen—were most likely enemy combatants.
Senior (and unnamed) US officials began notifying the media the day after the strike and, not coincidentally, the day before the 2002 congressional midterm elections. When questioned, Donald Rumsfeld refused to confirm or deny any US role in the death of al-Harethi but commented that “it would be a very good thing if he were out of business.”
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Meanwhile, Yemeni press and government officials reported only that al-Harethi and the others had been killed when their car exploded in remote Marib province, and claimed the car had been carrying explosives that had detonated accidentally.
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The following day, however, Wolfowitz seemed to confirm US involvement in an interview with CNN, saying that the hit was “a very successful tactical operation” and emphasizing that the US must continue to act against terrorist safe havens. “We have just got to keep the pressure on everywhere we’re able to and we’ve got to deny the sanctuaries everywhere we’re able to, and we’ve got to put pressure on every government that is giving these people support to get out of that business.”
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The Yemeni government remained silent for weeks, however, before finally confirming that the strike had in fact been a joint operation, later saying improbably that the US had acted at their request.
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Meanwhile, Yemeni press and government officials reported only that al-Harethi and the others had been killed when their car exploded in remote Marib province, and claimed the car had been carrying explosives that had detonated accidentally.
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The following day, however, Wolfowitz seemed to confirm US involvement in an interview with CNN, saying that the hit was “a very successful tactical operation” and emphasizing that the US must continue to act against terrorist safe havens. “We have just got to keep the pressure on everywhere we’re able to and we’ve got to deny the sanctuaries everywhere we’re able to, and we’ve got to put pressure on every government that is giving these people support to get out of that business.”
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The Yemeni government remained silent for weeks, however, before finally confirming that the strike had in fact been a joint operation, later saying improbably that the US had acted at their request.
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Unsurprisingly, many of the same elements of the strike that US officials extolled as groundbreaking made it the subject of condemnation. First, the strike had occurred in the territory of a state not involved in armed conflict with the United States, and was therefore criticized as a violation of national sovereignty. Yemeni opposition parties immediately denounced both the attack and the government’s refusal to condemn it: “Yemen’s silence in this regard confirms an official collusion to squander national sovereignty and the blood of Yemenis.”
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Second, although the Yemeni government would eventually and reluctantly suggest that it had a hand in the strike, the symbolic violation fueled anti-US sentiment within the country. Third, critics alleged that the US operation, by eliminating al-Harethi without due process, set a dangerous precedent by which any country could justify targeting its enemies throughout the world. Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh suggested it was “a summary execution that violates human rights.” Lindh added that “even terrorists must be treated according to international law, otherwise any country can start executing those whom they consider terrorists.”
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Second, although the Yemeni government would eventually and reluctantly suggest that it had a hand in the strike, the symbolic violation fueled anti-US sentiment within the country. Third, critics alleged that the US operation, by eliminating al-Harethi without due process, set a dangerous precedent by which any country could justify targeting its enemies throughout the world. Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh suggested it was “a summary execution that violates human rights.” Lindh added that “even terrorists must be treated according to international law, otherwise any country can start executing those whom they consider terrorists.”
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Back in the US, most of the American public, including those aware of this new way of conducting foreign policy, seemed to shrug off the strike, either not realizing the implications or just accepting that the rules against fighting terrorism had changed. Still, some people raised troubling questions about how a “finishing” policy could be distinguished from an assassination.
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Even if the US president authorized al-Harethi’s elimination—a new legal justification in itself—the five other people in the car had not undergone any sort of rudimentary legal process before being incinerated by US ordnance. There was also the question of how the US government applied the term “enemy combatant,” since in Yemen almost anyone could possess murky “links to terrorism.” Furthermore, there was no effort to prove that the others were actively engaged in combat or posed an immediate threat when they were killed.
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Even if the US president authorized al-Harethi’s elimination—a new legal justification in itself—the five other people in the car had not undergone any sort of rudimentary legal process before being incinerated by US ordnance. There was also the question of how the US government applied the term “enemy combatant,” since in Yemen almost anyone could possess murky “links to terrorism.” Furthermore, there was no effort to prove that the others were actively engaged in combat or posed an immediate threat when they were killed.
These questions became even more pointed in the case of Kamal Derwish, the American citizen who had been one of the passengers in the car. US officials claimed they had the authority kill Derwish under a secret finding signed by President Bush immediately after 9/11, authorizing CIA to pursue al-Qaeda members around the world, not specifically excluding US citizens. “I can assure you that no constitutional questions are raised here,” said national security adviser Condoleezza Rice after the strike. “[The president] is well within the balance of accepted practice and the letter of his constitutional authority.”
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The US also stressed that the CIA had not known Derwish was in the car and therefore had not targeted him specifically.
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The US also stressed that the CIA had not known Derwish was in the car and therefore had not targeted him specifically.
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Any hand-wringing over the death of this American citizen at the time was likely muted by the arrest of the so-called Lackawanna Six, a group of young Yemeni Americans who had participated in a training camp in Afghanistan; Derwish was probably their ideological mentor as well as their recruiting agent.
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For the purposes of establishing a precedent in the new kind of war, the US had succeeded without much blowback. The strike had successfully penetrated one of the world’s safe havens—hundreds of miles away from the front lines in Afghanistan—and proved that the US could truly combat terrorists globally.
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For the purposes of establishing a precedent in the new kind of war, the US had succeeded without much blowback. The strike had successfully penetrated one of the world’s safe havens—hundreds of miles away from the front lines in Afghanistan—and proved that the US could truly combat terrorists globally.
The Yemeni government’s eventual admission that it had requested US assistance and firepower undermined the most obvious argument that its sovereignty had been violated, since the operation threatened neither its territorial integrity nor political authority to police its own borders. But the question of whether self-defense provided sufficient justification for targeting substate actors in another sovereign state has not been clearly resolved, as most existing international law applies to state-to-state relationships. Colombia, Israel, Turkey, and the US, among other nations, have all attacked substate terrorist groups and have defended the legitimacy of such actions.
In al-Harethi’s case, US officials determined that the Yemeni government had failed to exert sovereignty over its own territory. In November 2001, one year before the drone strike, Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh had flown to Washington to meet with President Bush and discuss the problem. Fearing that Yemen would become the next Afghanistan, Saleh expressed his support for US counterterrorism policy and declared Yemen an ally of the US in fighting terrorism. As a “good first step” toward the development of this relationship, President Bush asked President Saleh to direct Yemeni forces to find al-Harethi and Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal, also wanted in connection with the USS
Cole
bombing. Stalling for time, President Saleh asked for patience, but more or less agreed to help.
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Cole
bombing. Stalling for time, President Saleh asked for patience, but more or less agreed to help.
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Saleh and the Yemeni government had to overcome difficult challenges in order to fulfill the US request. First, Yemen includes vast tracts of uninhabited or sparsely inhabited land where individuals can hide with some ease from government and its intelligence services. Second, the modern state of Yemen has been embroiled in conflict since unification between the northern and southern sections of the country; the settlement that ended the 1994 civil war was tenuous at best. Third, many of the country’s powerful tribes wield more authority than the central government and deny officials access to their territory when they see fit—even attempting to broker separate agreements with the US. As the American ambassador in 2004 remarked, “If the Yemeni tribes are with us, the terrorists can’t win. If they are with the terrorists, we can’t win.”
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Finally, although the government in Sana’a had declared its support of US counterterrorism efforts, the country had strong historic ties to some extremist groups—ties that did not disappear with an official declaration. Osama bin Laden’s father hailed from Yemen, and during the 1990s the Yemeni government had welcomed mujahideen returning from Afghanistan with open arms, allowing them to establish training camps and recruit fighters. Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al Gamaa al-Islamiyya, and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group had all found a degree of safety in Yemen.
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The Yemeni government probably knew al-Harethi was in Hosun al-Jalal, a village in Marib province, even though he was in hiding.
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He and his terrorist colleagues did not fit in and were “not very sociable,” according to Ali Saleh, the nephew of a man who rented one of them a house. “They did not pray at the mosque, they always seemed to be together, and the only times they would leave their homes would be to go buy food.” In November 2001, following Saleh’s meeting with Bush, the Yemeni government sent three officials to the village to ask the residents to turn over the men. When the residents asked the men to turn themselves in, they refused, and there was no follow-up.
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The officials claimed they did not have the power to detain al-Harethi since they could only act with the permission of local chiefs. Despite the fact that it was Yemeni territory, government officials risked provoking a violent retaliation by the locals if they acted against their wishes.
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He and his terrorist colleagues did not fit in and were “not very sociable,” according to Ali Saleh, the nephew of a man who rented one of them a house. “They did not pray at the mosque, they always seemed to be together, and the only times they would leave their homes would be to go buy food.” In November 2001, following Saleh’s meeting with Bush, the Yemeni government sent three officials to the village to ask the residents to turn over the men. When the residents asked the men to turn themselves in, they refused, and there was no follow-up.
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The officials claimed they did not have the power to detain al-Harethi since they could only act with the permission of local chiefs. Despite the fact that it was Yemeni territory, government officials risked provoking a violent retaliation by the locals if they acted against their wishes.
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President Bush next offered to send elite US troops to Yemen to face the tribal leaders, but Saleh refused, fearing that such an action might spark additional violence against the government.
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Instead, he decided to send in Yemen’s own special military forces.
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Unfortunately, Yemen’s tough tribal militias completely outmatched the Yemeni government troops. The Yemeni-led operation in December 2001 was a disaster. Government forces located al-Harethi in the village where he was hiding, but were beaten back by local village militias. Accounts vary as to whether the victors were actual followers of al-Harethi or simply tribe members angered by the government incursion.
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The Yemeni government had found and fixed al-Harethi but could not finish him.
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Instead, he decided to send in Yemen’s own special military forces.
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Unfortunately, Yemen’s tough tribal militias completely outmatched the Yemeni government troops. The Yemeni-led operation in December 2001 was a disaster. Government forces located al-Harethi in the village where he was hiding, but were beaten back by local village militias. Accounts vary as to whether the victors were actual followers of al-Harethi or simply tribe members angered by the government incursion.
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The Yemeni government had found and fixed al-Harethi but could not finish him.
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