Find, Fix, Finish (33 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
In February 2002, two months after the failed raid, Saleh reiterated his commitment to fighting terrorism and warned his countrymen, “We will strike with an iron fist anyone who is involved in terrorism. We will not tolerate kidnappings and bombings.” But Saleh never authorized another mission to capture the men. Instead, his government attempted to convince the tribes to surrender al-Harethi, promising he would be kept outside of US custody and would be considered innocent until proven guilty.
35
The tribes went on the offensive, saying in a joint statement that they were not sheltering al-Harethi and warning against allowing the US into their territory: “The involvement of any foreign force, especially the United States of America, in what is being circulated about a possibility of a military strike against specific areas will, for sure, be a grave strategic mistake and does not come in the frame of fighting terrorism.”
36
35
The tribes went on the offensive, saying in a joint statement that they were not sheltering al-Harethi and warning against allowing the US into their territory: “The involvement of any foreign force, especially the United States of America, in what is being circulated about a possibility of a military strike against specific areas will, for sure, be a grave strategic mistake and does not come in the frame of fighting terrorism.”
36
To complicate matters further, the Yemeni government now believed that the wanted man and his colleagues were moving in and out of the Empty Quarter, or Rub’ al-Khali, a massive desert straddling the borders of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.
37
Covering a quarter of a million square miles—an area larger than France—the Empty Quarter is virtually uninhabited. “If that is where they are, looking for them is like trying to find a needle in a haystack,” commented one local governor.
38
The fact that the Saudi-Yemen border straddles the Empty Quarter was also problematic, since it could allow movement between the two countries without much detection. In fact, the car al-Harethi was traveling in when he was killed possessed Saudi license plates.
39
37
Covering a quarter of a million square miles—an area larger than France—the Empty Quarter is virtually uninhabited. “If that is where they are, looking for them is like trying to find a needle in a haystack,” commented one local governor.
38
The fact that the Saudi-Yemen border straddles the Empty Quarter was also problematic, since it could allow movement between the two countries without much detection. In fact, the car al-Harethi was traveling in when he was killed possessed Saudi license plates.
39
The Yemeni government’s thwarted attempts to finish al-Harethi clearly revealed that certain sections of the country were beyond the reach of the nation’s security forces. It was at this point that President Saleh signaled his willingness to accept greater US assistance and a more robust (but secret) American presence.
40
Yemen’s ungoverned spaces allowed terrorist groups to organize, raise funds, recruit, train, and operate in relative security. Saleh understood that if a second attack on the US were to link back to Yemen’s terrorist safe havens and its inability to control its own territory, the consequences could be significant. The Rubicon was crossed; the decision was made, and the US moved in.
40
Yemen’s ungoverned spaces allowed terrorist groups to organize, raise funds, recruit, train, and operate in relative security. Saleh understood that if a second attack on the US were to link back to Yemen’s terrorist safe havens and its inability to control its own territory, the consequences could be significant. The Rubicon was crossed; the decision was made, and the US moved in.
The 2002 strike on al-Harethi became a crude blueprint for how the US could penetrate foreign safe havens through multilateral engagement without explicitly violating sovereignty or putting US troops at risk. Yemeni government cooperation was critical to both fixing the target and avoiding serious legal questions in the wake of his elimination. At the same time, engagement with local assets—the tribal members who described al-Harethi’s whereabouts to the US ambassador—contributed crucial intelligence. This two-pronged effort demonstrated the seriousness of US intent and ultimately reinforced, rather than undermined, the importance of diplomacy and liaison relationships. Both governments enjoyed their greatest successes in late 2002 and early 2003. In addition to supporting the strike on al-Harethi, Yemen arrested two wanted militants in April 2003, attacked an al-Qaeda hideout in June, and continued to arrest suspects in the USS
Cole
bombing. To foster this cooperation, the US provided almost $100 million in counterterrorism aid to Yemen
41
and encouraged Yemeni officials to recruit local tribal chiefs as informants on al-Qaeda, referring to them as “sheikhs against terror.”
42
Cole
bombing. To foster this cooperation, the US provided almost $100 million in counterterrorism aid to Yemen
41
and encouraged Yemeni officials to recruit local tribal chiefs as informants on al-Qaeda, referring to them as “sheikhs against terror.”
42
The systemic problems facing Yemen were deeper than simply running down a few top terrorists, however, and the US quickly realized that enhanced liaison relationships do not guarantee effective action against terrorist threats. Some already believed that some Yemeni officials were actively supporting al-Qaeda and other militant groups, even after 9/11 and despite their pledges of support to the US. In April 2003, for example, ten suspects held in the bombing of USS
Cole
simultaneously escaped from a Yemeni prison, an event so implausible that it suggested official involvement. The same year, President Saleh announced plans to release 146 militants with suspected ties to al-Qaeda as long as they “pledged to respect the rights of non-Muslim foreigners living in Yemen or visiting it.” At one point, some 8 percent of foreign-born fighters in Iraq fighting US and Iraqi forces hailed from Yemen, despite the country’s small population, according to captured al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) records.
43
Cole
simultaneously escaped from a Yemeni prison, an event so implausible that it suggested official involvement. The same year, President Saleh announced plans to release 146 militants with suspected ties to al-Qaeda as long as they “pledged to respect the rights of non-Muslim foreigners living in Yemen or visiting it.” At one point, some 8 percent of foreign-born fighters in Iraq fighting US and Iraqi forces hailed from Yemen, despite the country’s small population, according to captured al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) records.
43
In 2005, US officials were further stunned to learn that Abdul Majid al-Zindani, whom both the UN and the US had designated as a terrorist with ties to bin Laden, had traveled to a conference in Mecca as part of President Saleh’s official delegation. A year later, twenty-three accused terrorists again escaped from a jail in Sana’a.
44
Some of these individuals would later coalesce into al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) and then morph into the much more lethal al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) group. By 2008 the situation became so dangerous that the US embassy was forced to close its doors, after the building was attacked twice with rocket-propelled grenades, automatic rifles, and car bombs.
45
44
Some of these individuals would later coalesce into al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) and then morph into the much more lethal al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) group. By 2008 the situation became so dangerous that the US embassy was forced to close its doors, after the building was attacked twice with rocket-propelled grenades, automatic rifles, and car bombs.
45
Yemen’s terrorist activity began to spill out of its borders. On Christmas Day 2009, an AQAP suicide bomber, Nigerian national Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, tried to detonate explosives in his undergarments aboard a Northwest Airlines flight between Amsterdam and Detroit. Several months later, in late October 2010, AQAP tried to smuggle explosives aboard cargo planes in order to detonate them over US airspace. A tip-off from Saudi intelligence thwarted this operation.
Publicly, the US voiced support for Yemen and the US-Yemeni relationship, but sharp words of warning were packaged with the praise. In January 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised the Yemeni government for its efforts, but also said it was “time for the international community to make it clear to Yemen that there are expectations and conditions on our continuing support for the government.”
46
46
Realizing that this constituted a dramatic escalation, President Saleh responded by declaring “open war” on al-Qaeda and sending thousands of soldiers to battle the group in the provinces, amid fears that the organization would attack Yemen.
47
In return, the US continued to increase military aid to Yemen from $70 million in 2009
48
to $150 million in 2010,
49
and worked with local authorities to launch air strikes and raids against al-Qaeda sites in Yemen.
47
In return, the US continued to increase military aid to Yemen from $70 million in 2009
48
to $150 million in 2010,
49
and worked with local authorities to launch air strikes and raids against al-Qaeda sites in Yemen.
The fierce fighting within Yemen during the spring and summer of 2011, during which Saleh was badly wounded and fled from Sana’a, showed that fighting al-Qaeda in Yemen had become a headache for the US and raised uncertainty about who is really in charge of the increasingly fractured nation. AQAP seemed to be gaining actual territory in addition to ideological control over certain parts of the nation. Although the US scored some successes in late September 2011, killing both US-BORN cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and AQAP online magazine (
Inspire
) editor Samir Khan in a dual drone strike, whether the old and now new front on the war on terror will ultimately prove fruitful for America’s counterterrorism strategy remains up in the air.
BACK TO THE FUTURE: SOMALIA AND SALEH ALI SALEH NABHANInspire
) editor Samir Khan in a dual drone strike, whether the old and now new front on the war on terror will ultimately prove fruitful for America’s counterterrorism strategy remains up in the air.
In 2002, a Pentagon consultant told journalist Seymour Hersh that the program of targeted killings would not last long. “You might be able to pull it off for five or six months,” he believed, but then the intelligence would eventually prove wrong and civilians would get killed. “And then they [the operators] will get hung.”
50
But the consultant’s dire predictions have not yet come to pass; in fact, targeted killing has become a favorite tool in the counterterrorism operations toolbox, executed through overhead drone strikes and small, lethal Special Forces operations.
50
But the consultant’s dire predictions have not yet come to pass; in fact, targeted killing has become a favorite tool in the counterterrorism operations toolbox, executed through overhead drone strikes and small, lethal Special Forces operations.
On September 14, 2009, US Special Forces prepared to launch yet another find-fix-finish operation, this time in southern Somalia. Their target was Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a Kenyan citizen wanted in connection with the 1998 African embassy bombings and the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya. Nabhan, already wanted in Kenya, had been hunted by the US since 2006, who considered him one of the “big three” al-Qaeda members enjoying refuge in chaotic neighboring Somalia. The mission to finish Nabhan was groundbreaking; Special Forces had not conducted operations in the country since the early 1990s. By this point, however, Special Forces had been operating against terrorist targets around the world for eight years, fostering a new culture and outlook, and they were determined to get their man.
Of Yemeni descent, Nabhan (a.k.a. Abu Yousef al-Nabhani) was born in Mombasa, Kenya, in 1979.
51
Details of his early life are sketchy; he reportedly grew up in Mombasa’s Majengo slum and received a primary education through several years of high school.
52
According to a biography of his life published on a jihadist website, he married a woman from one of the city’s nearby villages.
53
By 1998, he had left Mombasa for Afghanistan with Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, an al-Qaeda member who would assist in the attacks against the US embassies later that year.
54
He later served as a guard at the al Farouq camp at the time of the 1998 US cruise missile strikes, launched as a part of Operation Infinite Reach in retaliation for al-Qaeda’s bombing of the US embassies.
55
51
Details of his early life are sketchy; he reportedly grew up in Mombasa’s Majengo slum and received a primary education through several years of high school.
52
According to a biography of his life published on a jihadist website, he married a woman from one of the city’s nearby villages.
53
By 1998, he had left Mombasa for Afghanistan with Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, an al-Qaeda member who would assist in the attacks against the US embassies later that year.
54
He later served as a guard at the al Farouq camp at the time of the 1998 US cruise missile strikes, launched as a part of Operation Infinite Reach in retaliation for al-Qaeda’s bombing of the US embassies.
55
How close Nabhan was to al-Qaeda prior to 9/11 remains uncertain, although some reports call him one of the first members of al-Qaeda’s East Africa cell.
56
Although many news sources would later claim he was somehow connected with the US embassy bombings in Africa, US officials never publicly fingered him for the attack, as they did many of the other perpetrators. Even vague allegations of a connection to the attacks would not surface prior to 2002.
57
Some sources have claimed that Nabhan served as a go-between for Fazul Abdullah Mohammed—at the time the secretary of al-Qaeda’s Kenyan leader Wahid el Hage—and bin Laden and others propose that Nabhan may also have been a trainer at the camps by this point.
58
His jihadist biography even claims that he trained the “19 Heroes of Manhattan Battle: Muhammad Atta and his companions” and helped forge their documents.
59
There is no corroboration of this claim, however.
56
Although many news sources would later claim he was somehow connected with the US embassy bombings in Africa, US officials never publicly fingered him for the attack, as they did many of the other perpetrators. Even vague allegations of a connection to the attacks would not surface prior to 2002.
57
Some sources have claimed that Nabhan served as a go-between for Fazul Abdullah Mohammed—at the time the secretary of al-Qaeda’s Kenyan leader Wahid el Hage—and bin Laden and others propose that Nabhan may also have been a trainer at the camps by this point.
58
His jihadist biography even claims that he trained the “19 Heroes of Manhattan Battle: Muhammad Atta and his companions” and helped forge their documents.
59
There is no corroboration of this claim, however.
What is clear is that Nabhan participated in a series of attacks that made him one of the most wanted terrorists in East Africa, setting off a local manhunt within Kenya. At 8:00 AM on November 28, 2002, two or three suicide bombers drove a Mitsubishi Pajero toward the Israeli-run Paradise Hotel, accelerated, and rammed the car through the front entrance.
60
Several dozen tourists had just checked in, and the resulting explosion demolished much of the structure, killing three Israelis and eleven Kenyans and injuring eighty more.
61
At roughly the same time, two shoulder-launched Strela 2 surface-to-air missiles were aimed at an Israeli-owned Boeing 757 as it took off for Tel Aviv from Mombasa. The missiles narrowly missed their target, leaving its 261 passengers shaken but unharmed.
62
60
Several dozen tourists had just checked in, and the resulting explosion demolished much of the structure, killing three Israelis and eleven Kenyans and injuring eighty more.
61
At roughly the same time, two shoulder-launched Strela 2 surface-to-air missiles were aimed at an Israeli-owned Boeing 757 as it took off for Tel Aviv from Mombasa. The missiles narrowly missed their target, leaving its 261 passengers shaken but unharmed.
62
The US, Kenya, and Israel immediately condemned the attacks, and the countries each began their own separate investigations. Although an obscure Lebanese group initially claimed responsibility, Israeli and Kenyan officials agreed that al-Qaeda was behind the attacks.
63
Al-Qaeda later claimed responsibility, and most of the suspects eventually named were somehow linked to that group.
64
63
Al-Qaeda later claimed responsibility, and most of the suspects eventually named were somehow linked to that group.
64
In the months following the bombing, officials would publish the name of only one individual in connection to the investigation—Nabhan—as he had left behind the most direct evidence of involvement. Kenyan investigators traced the purchase of the green all-terrain Mitsubishi used in the bombing back to Nabhan, and soon arrested his mother and brother.
65
Subsequent interrogations led investigators to Nabhan’s seventeen-year-old wife, Fatuma Saleh, who had disappeared along with their young child before the bombing and was found living with her parents on Lamu, a small, laid-back tourist island near the Somali border. Saleh claimed that Nabhan had instructed her to return to her parents shortly before the bombing. She did not know her husband’s whereabouts but suggested that he might have gone to Somalia.
65
Subsequent interrogations led investigators to Nabhan’s seventeen-year-old wife, Fatuma Saleh, who had disappeared along with their young child before the bombing and was found living with her parents on Lamu, a small, laid-back tourist island near the Somali border. Saleh claimed that Nabhan had instructed her to return to her parents shortly before the bombing. She did not know her husband’s whereabouts but suggested that he might have gone to Somalia.
She pointed authorities to a home in Mombasa where neighbors reported having seen a car like the one used in the attack. Investigators found bomb materials in the home and concluded on the basis of this evidence that Nabhan and two other suspects had resided there four months prior to the bombing to construct the car bomb.
66
Authorities also concluded that Nabhan was one of the two individuals who had fired missiles at the Israeli airplane as it departed Kenyan airspace.
67
66
Authorities also concluded that Nabhan was one of the two individuals who had fired missiles at the Israeli airplane as it departed Kenyan airspace.
67
Nabhan’s wife further revealed to Kenyan police that her husband had called her on December 11 and told her he was in Baidoa, a city in southern Somalia.
68
Kenyan authorities later discovered that Nabhan had been seen in a town near the border soon after the attacks but were frustrated in attempts to track him further.
69
Their investigation took a turn for the comical after it was discovered that the Kenyan police might have arrested both Nabhan and an accomplice four months before the attacks but then lost track of them.
68
Kenyan authorities later discovered that Nabhan had been seen in a town near the border soon after the attacks but were frustrated in attempts to track him further.
69
Their investigation took a turn for the comical after it was discovered that the Kenyan police might have arrested both Nabhan and an accomplice four months before the attacks but then lost track of them.
Other books
Jake: The Sinner Saints #3 by Adrienne Bell
El ladrón de tumbas by Antonio Cabanas
Faces by Martina Cole
Hell Ship by David Wood
Red Cells by Thomas, Jeffrey
The Governor's Lady by Norman Collins
Kiss & Die by Lee Weeks
Cutest Couple by Kate Davies
