Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
Find, Fix, Finish (29 page)
After several visits to Pakistan Zazi encountered the demon of modern American life: massive credit card debt. Between April and August 2008, he opened twelve credit card accounts and his expenses, reported as $1,108, exceeded his paltry $800 monthly income.
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The following March, Zazi declared bankruptcy, citing some $51,000 in credit card debt .
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He would later tell a US court that it was during this time—the spring and summer of 2008—he “conspired with others to travel to Afghanistan to join the Taliban and fight against the US military and its allies.”
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The following March, Zazi declared bankruptcy, citing some $51,000 in credit card debt .
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He would later tell a US court that it was during this time—the spring and summer of 2008—he “conspired with others to travel to Afghanistan to join the Taliban and fight against the US military and its allies.”
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On August 28, 2008, according to customs and border protection records, Zazi and a few others flew to Peshawar on Qatar Airlines Flight 84 from Newark via Geneva and Doha.
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Peshawar was no more stable than it had been when the family departed years before.
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Peshawar was no more stable than it had been when the family departed years before.
There, as Zazi would later tell US authorities, he and a few others attended a terrorist training camp and “received instructions from al-Qaeda operatives on subjects such as weapons and explosives,” according to prosecutors.
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They had intended to join the Taliban to fight US-led forces in Afghanistan, Zazi claimed, but met with an al-Qaeda recruiter soon after arrival.
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Al-Qaeda personnel had then brought Zazi and his associates to Waziristan, where they trained with a variety of weapons and Zazi received additional explosives training. After agreeing to conduct suicide attacks in the US, they discussed possible targets, including subway trains.
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They had intended to join the Taliban to fight US-led forces in Afghanistan, Zazi claimed, but met with an al-Qaeda recruiter soon after arrival.
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Al-Qaeda personnel had then brought Zazi and his associates to Waziristan, where they trained with a variety of weapons and Zazi received additional explosives training. After agreeing to conduct suicide attacks in the US, they discussed possible targets, including subway trains.
Zazi made other friends during his time. Although the source and details of the incident are unclear, Zazi may have met with US citizen Bryant Neal Vinas, along with other al-Qaeda members, to discuss potential attacks.
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In 2009 Vinas pled guilty to conspiring to murder US nationals, providing material support to al-Qaeda, and rendering expert advice and assistance—including providing al-Qaeda information about the Long Island Rail Road. He described for the FBI what instruction in al-Qaeda terrorist training camps in Pakistan entailed. Between March and July 2008, Vinas, like Zazi, trained in Waziristan, taking three courses with ten to twenty students each. The first course introduced students to the staple of terrorists worldwide, the AK-47. The second class dealt with explosives; in fifteen days, students learned to make and test suicide belts and to handle explosives comfortably. The final class dealt with rocket-propelled grenades.
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In 2009 Vinas pled guilty to conspiring to murder US nationals, providing material support to al-Qaeda, and rendering expert advice and assistance—including providing al-Qaeda information about the Long Island Rail Road. He described for the FBI what instruction in al-Qaeda terrorist training camps in Pakistan entailed. Between March and July 2008, Vinas, like Zazi, trained in Waziristan, taking three courses with ten to twenty students each. The first course introduced students to the staple of terrorists worldwide, the AK-47. The second class dealt with explosives; in fifteen days, students learned to make and test suicide belts and to handle explosives comfortably. The final class dealt with rocket-propelled grenades.
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Although the exact timing remains unclear, intelligence officials allege that a representative of al-Qaeda’s then number 3, Shaykh Said, contacted Zazi. One of Zazi’s associates would later tell law enforcement officials that Zazi and two others had met with both Saleh al-Somali, one of al-Qaeda’s major international operations planners, and Rashid Rauf, the operative responsible for planning the 2006 thwarted transatlantic airliner plot.
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Before he departed the camp and left Pakistan, Zazi e-mailed himself a summary of what he had learned and provided al-Qaeda with money and computers.
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If it wasn’t already tracking him, the US was certainly paying attention, especially given the kinds of subjects that were discussed and the personalities involved. Furthermore, information from a separate British investigation known as Operation Pathway—a counterterrorism case that fell apart in April 2009 after an assistant British police commissioner was photographed leaving the prime minister’s office holding top secret documents in plain sight—gave American officials confirmation that they had discovered a person of real interest.
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If it wasn’t already tracking him, the US was certainly paying attention, especially given the kinds of subjects that were discussed and the personalities involved. Furthermore, information from a separate British investigation known as Operation Pathway—a counterterrorism case that fell apart in April 2009 after an assistant British police commissioner was photographed leaving the prime minister’s office holding top secret documents in plain sight—gave American officials confirmation that they had discovered a person of real interest.
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Returning to New York City from his adventures and training in Pakistan, Zazi journeyed westward to sprawling exurban Aurora, Colorado.
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Zazi would later tell law enforcement officials that he moved to Aurora because it was cheaper than New York.
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“Life is a little bit easier there,” he had been told by a relative. “The living is cheaper.”
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Zazi also had family members in Aurora, and he would live with them until July 2009.
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Zazi would later tell law enforcement officials that he moved to Aurora because it was cheaper than New York.
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“Life is a little bit easier there,” he had been told by a relative. “The living is cheaper.”
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Zazi also had family members in Aurora, and he would live with them until July 2009.
During this time, Zazi applied in Denver for a license to drive an airport shuttle. After passing a background and driving record check conducted by the Colorado Bureau of Investigation, he started work in April at the Denver International Airport.
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Other drivers noted he was friendly and hardworking. “He talked to everyone,” recalled one of his coworkers.
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After he finished ferrying tourists and businessmen to their rental cars, Zazi set about gathering the primary materials for his bomb. Zazi searched online for sellers of hydrochloric acid, book-marking several sites that discuss its safe handling, and searched websites for other explosive chemicals.
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Other drivers noted he was friendly and hardworking. “He talked to everyone,” recalled one of his coworkers.
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After he finished ferrying tourists and businessmen to their rental cars, Zazi set about gathering the primary materials for his bomb. Zazi searched online for sellers of hydrochloric acid, book-marking several sites that discuss its safe handling, and searched websites for other explosive chemicals.
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Zazi’s e-mailed instructions specified that acetone can be found in nail polish remover and hydrogen peroxide in salon products. So the hardworking shuttle driver headed to a local hair salon. Surveillance videos later showed Zazi buying six bottles of a hair care product containing highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide in July and August 2009, returning to one store a few times to purchase twelve 32-ounce bottles of another hydrogen peroxide product. When one store employee commented on the volume of materials he was buying, he jokingly replied, “I have a lot of girlfriends.”
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Three other people associated with Zazi also bought acetone and peroxide products in the Denver metropolitan area during the summer of 2009.
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Three other people associated with Zazi also bought acetone and peroxide products in the Denver metropolitan area during the summer of 2009.
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That July, his parents followed Zazi west to Aurora and moved into his apartment complex, severely restricting his ability to experiment at home.
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So in late August he checked into a local hotel where he could test his chemical compounds removed from his family’s prying eyes.
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So in late August he checked into a local hotel where he could test his chemical compounds removed from his family’s prying eyes.
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On September 6 and 7, Zazi again stayed in the same hotel in Aurora. When the FBI surreptitiously searched the room, testing for explosives and chemicals, acetone residue was revealed in the vent above the stove where some of the chemicals in the bomb-making instructions were likely heated. While he was in the hotel, Zazi began contacting—although it is unclear how—a confederate for help mixing explosive ingredients. Zazi’s requests became increasingly urgent and he emphasized that he needed an immediate response.
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The day before he drove to New York City, Zazi searched online for a home improvements store in a zip code for Flushing, Queens, where he would be able to purchase muriatic acid, a diluted form of hydrochloric acid.
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TRACKING ZAZI41
Zazi was clearly under physical surveillance by this time. Whether by upgrade or new addition, Zazi’s threat status was at a level high enough that concerns were brought to the White House’s attention, and his status became the subject of a memo within the President’s Daily Briefing (PDB).
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In this case, the FBI applied for a “roving wiretap” via the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
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This wiretap would have allowed agents to monitor any phone or electronic communication associated with Zazi. If he had switched phones, for example, they would have been able to continue surveillance of the new phone without a new warrant.
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In this case, the FBI applied for a “roving wiretap” via the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
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This wiretap would have allowed agents to monitor any phone or electronic communication associated with Zazi. If he had switched phones, for example, they would have been able to continue surveillance of the new phone without a new warrant.
Originally used to target the mob, roving wiretaps were expanded to include surveillance of international terrorist suspects under the authority of the FISA Court by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (a.k.a. the USA-PATRIOT Act, or just “the Patriot Act”). In 2002, General Hayden argued that countering evolving national security concerns required more flexible legal tools, as terrorists could shift modes of communication just as quickly and easily as criminals. “We’ve gone from chasing the telecommunications structure of [the USSR] a slow-moving, technologically inferior, resource-poor nation-state, to chasing a communications structure in which an al-Qaeda member can go into a storefront in Istanbul and buy for $100 a communications device that is absolutely cutting edge, and for which he has had to make no investment for development.”
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Although Congress had originally intended the roving wiretap provision to “sunset” at the end of 2005, it has been renewed repeatedly.
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Although Congress had originally intended the roving wiretap provision to “sunset” at the end of 2005, it has been renewed repeatedly.
The history of electronic surveillance post-9/11 also illuminates the disastrous political repercussions of ignoring checks and balances in the system. In late December 2005, a political firestorm erupted regarding electronic surveillance, but, surprisingly, it had little to do with the Patriot Act’s controversial provisions. Rather, the
New York Times
broke the story that President Bush authorized the NSA to conduct a warrantless electronic surveillance program that completely circumvented the FISA process and the courts.
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In the wake of these revelations, the White House admitted that the program allowed international communications of individuals with suspected connections to foreign terrorist organizations including al-Qaeda to be targeted without FISA warrants.
New York Times
broke the story that President Bush authorized the NSA to conduct a warrantless electronic surveillance program that completely circumvented the FISA process and the courts.
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In the wake of these revelations, the White House admitted that the program allowed international communications of individuals with suspected connections to foreign terrorist organizations including al-Qaeda to be targeted without FISA warrants.
The very fact that the legal and political challenges remain years after the public learned of the program, however, provides a warning to future administrations seeking to circumvent US law. Many of the program’s original detractors continue to argue that the program was illegal, and lawsuits challenging the FISA Amendments Act remain in the courts.
Still, it was the physical, not electronic, surveillance that set off the high-speed chase across the country for Najibullah Zazi. He later claimed that he was heading to New York City to resolve issues surrounding his coffee cart,
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and his family insisted that he chose to drive in order to see the country.
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A plausible story, perhaps, if the US hadn’t been hot on his trail.
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and his family insisted that he chose to drive in order to see the country.
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A plausible story, perhaps, if the US hadn’t been hot on his trail.
As the FBI agents following Zazi’s car neared New York City, they brought New York’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the NYPD’s Counterterrorism Division in on the case.
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For many, this simple fact is one of the most striking in Zazi’s case. After all, the relationship between the FBI and NYPD has not always been based on mutual admiration. In fact, the two organizations fought legendary turf battles in the years prior to—and immediately following—9/11.
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For many, this simple fact is one of the most striking in Zazi’s case. After all, the relationship between the FBI and NYPD has not always been based on mutual admiration. In fact, the two organizations fought legendary turf battles in the years prior to—and immediately following—9/11.
A number of these battles resulted from decisions made by New York City police commissioner Ray Kelly. In 2001, Kelly assigned one hundred detectives to the NYC JTTF.
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Small cells composed of special agents, linguists, law enforcement officers, detectives, and professionals from CIA and DHS, the JTTFs were the FBI’s self-proclaimed frontline against terrorism in the United States. The first was established in New York City in 1980, but the FBI now has over a hundred JTTFs all over the country.
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Small cells composed of special agents, linguists, law enforcement officers, detectives, and professionals from CIA and DHS, the JTTFs were the FBI’s self-proclaimed frontline against terrorism in the United States. The first was established in New York City in 1980, but the FBI now has over a hundred JTTFs all over the country.
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More controversial, however, were some of Commissioner Kelly’s other changes to the department. In 2001, he created an NYPD Counterterrorism Division and hired CIA’s deputy director of operations David Cohen to lead it. The CT division worked undercover to gather human intelligence in New York City, around the nation, and even internationally—a scope of operations traditionally claimed solely by the federal government. In 2002 Kelly proposed installing a classified information vault—a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF)—in NYPD headquarters. The physical structure was an obvious move by the NYPD to acquire information that only belonged to federal agencies. Unsurprisingly, NYPD’s aggressive posture and involvement with national and international issues rubbed many federal officials the wrong way.
Beyond the issue of perceived slights, information stove piping—one agency refusing to share information with a rival agency—has had real consequences. In 2003 the NYPD discovered that al-Qaeda operative Iyman Faris had twice traveled to New York City to case various targets during a news conference by Attorney General John Ashcroft.
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Faris would later be arrested for trying to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge, ludicrously, with a blowtorch. The FBI refrained from publicly criticizing the NYPD, most likely to avoid exacerbating the already tense situation. “The FBI today [in 2005] wants to be seen as cooperating with local officials,” said Jack Cloonan, a former agent assigned to the FBI’s bin Laden investigation. “The bureau cannot afford to take issue with the city and NYPD—at least not publicly.”
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Faris would later be arrested for trying to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge, ludicrously, with a blowtorch. The FBI refrained from publicly criticizing the NYPD, most likely to avoid exacerbating the already tense situation. “The FBI today [in 2005] wants to be seen as cooperating with local officials,” said Jack Cloonan, a former agent assigned to the FBI’s bin Laden investigation. “The bureau cannot afford to take issue with the city and NYPD—at least not publicly.”
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Relations have improved in recent years. FBI director Robert Mueller has worked to advance his relationship with his counterparts in NYPD.
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One law enforcement official told
Newsweek
that FBI and NYPD intelligence had worked together on two dozen important cases in the months preceding Zazi’s 2009 arrest.
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The Zazi case is further evidence of this improvement. The FBI not only notified local authorities and the NYPD of Zazi’s arrival in their jurisdictions but also requested and received assistance in tracking him, a critical step toward information sharing.
TO STRIKE OR TO DEVELOP53
One law enforcement official told
Newsweek
that FBI and NYPD intelligence had worked together on two dozen important cases in the months preceding Zazi’s 2009 arrest.
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The Zazi case is further evidence of this improvement. The FBI not only notified local authorities and the NYPD of Zazi’s arrival in their jurisdictions but also requested and received assistance in tracking him, a critical step toward information sharing.
By September 10, Zazi and his rental car had reached the suburban ennui of New Jersey. The NYPD and the FBI suspected he was dangerous but did not know what, exactly, was in the trunk of his car. Was it a bomb? Just twenty-five pounds of explosives could shred the car and create a lethal blast radius for any unlucky bystanders. David Cohen of the NYPD Counterterrorism Division was reportedly so worried by this case that he wanted to arrest Zazi immediately, an action that would have shut down the investigation of Zazi’s contacts and activities. “I don’t need to fuck around for two more weeks and learn one more fact,” Cohen allegedly told federal officials. “Sometimes the search for intelligence can get you killed.”
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