Goebbels: A Biography (125 page)

1.
TB, 22 January 1940.

2.
TB, 6 February 1940.

3.
TB, 28 January 1940. See also 4, 5, 7, and 8 March 1940.

4.
TB, 20 March 1940.
ADAP
D IX, no. 1, Aufzeichnung des Gesandten Schmidt über die Unterredung; Kershaw,
Hitler. 1936–1945
, 396ff.

5.
TB, 19/20 March 1940;
BK
, 18 March 1940, 1: They were not going to respond to rumors about the meeting; also 19 March 1940, 2.

6.
TB, 29 December 1939;
BK
, 28 December 1939, 3.

7.
TB, 13 January 1940.

8.
TB, 25 January 1940.

9.
TB, 15 March 1940. At the end of December Hitler had already referred to the removal of a class of “west European” leaders by the Bolsheviks (TB, 29 December 1939).

10.
TB, 16 March 1940.

11.
TB, 21 March 1940. See also
BK
, 9 January 1940 as well as 5 and 16 January 1940, according to which Goebbels had adopted a more benign attitude toward the anticommunist literature. However, see BAK, ZSg 101/15, 1 February 1940, Anweisung no. 224: “Representations of Russian life must not be allowed to create
the impression among the German public that we want a kind of ideological amalgamation and that it is as if we were simply adopting and imitating Bolshevist ideology.”

12.
TB, 12 April 1940.

13.
Longerich,
Propagandisten
, 139. During this period there are repeated complaints in the diaries about the relationship with the Foreign Ministry: 23 January 1940: The AA was trying to “lure [editors] away” by offering higher salaries; see also 1 February 1940; 12 March 1940: The AA was wanting to “tempt [his able officials] away” also: 12, 16, and 19 January, 6, 7, 8, 13, 16, and 17 February, 3, 22, and 30 March, also 3, 5, and 6 April 1940.

14.
TB, 9 January 1940; and 5, 12, 23, 25, and 28 January 1940.

15.
BK
, 18 March 1940, 10: “Der Minister betont nochmals, daß über deutsche Kriegsziele in der deutschen Presse überhaupt nichts erscheinen darf.” Ibid. 6 May, 1 and 10 June 1940, 6; BAK, ZSg 102/29, TB of 5 November 1940: Reflections on the “future organization of Europe and the world” were “inappropriate”; see also Longerich,
Propagandisten
, 69ff.

16.
TB, 14, 15, and 18 November 1939.

17.
TB, 17 November, 12 December 1939; see also 7 November 1939.

18.
TB, 13 December 1939;
BK
, 12 December 1939, 1, corresponding instruction to Fritzsche; see also TB, 21 and 24 December 1939.

19.
TB, 21 and 22 December 1939; BAK, ZSg 102/19, 20 December 1939, Verstärkung der Plutokratiepropaganda; ibid.: BAK, ZSg 109/6, VI 5 December 1939, 2. E, no. 1, 7 December 1939, 1. E, no. 2, 20 December 1939, no. 1;
BK
, 23 December 1939, 3.

20.
TB, 21 and 23 December 1939;
BK
, 2 February 1940, 3; BAK, ZSg 109/8, VI, 2 February 1940, no. 6: “Alle kommentarfähigen Zeitungen haben bis spätestens Dienstag einen Aufklärungsartikel über den Begriff ‘Plutokratie’ zu bringen.” Also BAK, ZSg 109/9VI, 27 March 1940, no. 2.;
VB
(B), 3 February 1940: “Was ist Plutokratie? Eine deutliche Antwort geschichtlicher Tatsachen.”

21.
BAK, ZSg 109/7, VI, 13 January 1940; Longerich,
Davon
, 154.

22.
TB, 26 January 1940; Umbreit, “Der Kampf um die Vormachtstellung in Westeuropa,” 251. The incident had occurred on 10 January. When, as a result, the Belgian and Dutch armed forces were placed on alert Hitler did not consider it necessary to inform Goebbels of the reasons for the postponement (TB, 16 January 1940). Apart from the intelligence leak, weather conditions also played a part in the decision to postpone the offensive. See also Reuth,
Goebbels
, 439f.

23.
OKH had worked out the final plan for “Sickle Cut” by 24 February; Umbreit, “Kampf,” 254ff. Originally the attack was planned for mid-April (ibid., 283).

24.
Maier and Stegemann, “Die Sicherung der europäischen Nordflanke,” 203ff.

25.
TB, 7, also 8 and 9 May 1940 (quotation).

26.
Maier and Stegemann, “Die Sicherung,” 197. In December 1939 Hitler agreed to an investigation by OKW of the possibility of an invasion of Norway in December 1939, in February 1940 appointed General Falkenhorst to head a special staff that had been formed in the meantime and on 1 March 1940 signed the directive “Weserübung” (Weser Excercise). On the background, see Bohn,
Reichskommissariat Norwegen
, 15ff.; Gemzell,
Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien;
Loock,
Quisling, Rosenberg und Terboven
, 518ff.

27.
TB, 9 and 10 April 1940.

28.
On the military details of the operation, see Hubatsch,
“Weserübung”;
Ottmer,
“Weserübung.”

29.
TB, 10 April 1940;
VB
(B), 10 April 1940, “Memorandum der Reichsregierung.”

30.
BK
, 10 April 1940, 1; TB, 10 April 1940.

31.
TB, 11 April 1940.

32.
TB, 12 and 13 April 1940;
BK
, 11 April 1940, 1.

33.
TB, 14 April 1940;
BK
, 13 April 1940, 2 and 3.

34.
On the first problems, see TB, 11 and 12 April 1940, but optimistic on 13 and 14 April 1940.

35.
TB, 14 and 15 April 1940; Hubatsch,
“Weserübung,”
110ff.

36.
BK
, 16 April 1940, 1, 17 April 1940, 19 April 1940, 1; TB, 16 and 17 April 1940.

37.
TB, 17 April 1940.

38.
TB, 19 April 1940.
VB
(B), 15 April 1940, reports on the battle near Narvik, but does not mention the German casualties;
VB
(B), 19 April, “Heldenhafter Kampf vor Narvik” (headline).

39.
TB, 21 April 1940.

40.
Loock,
Quisling
, 366ff.

41.
TB, 26 April 1940. See also 25 April 1940: “In the ministerial briefing I speak up again for Quisling. We mustn’t oppose him so long as the Führer supports him. I don’t want any member of the Ministry to do that.”
BK
, 26 April 1940, 1: “The Quisling issue has to be put on the back burner for the time being […].”

42.
TB, 28 April 1940.

43.
“But we want to give him another chance” (TB, 9 May 1940); “he should be dropped” (25 May 1940). Goebbels received Quisling at the beginning of July: “A
völkisch
-Germanic dreamer, more of a professor than a political fighter. I don’t really believe he can lead a country. But his heart’s in the right place and ideologically he’s OK” (6 July 1940). “He should remain in Norway and lead the party. That’s OK. If he can get his way then fine, if he can’t then it’s his own fault” (22 July 1940). “Quisling will now secure the influence he deserves after all.” (24 September 1940).

44.
Maier and Stegemann, “Die Sicherung,” 219. TB, 26, 27, 28, and 30 April, 1 and 5 May;
BK
, 29 April 1940, 1, Propaganda should emphasize the “hardships and difficulties” of the German troops, similarly 30 April 1940, 2, and 30 May 1940, 1.

45.
Maier and Stegemann, “Die Sicherung,” 219.

46.
TB, 5 May 1940: “That really annoys the Führer.”

47.
BK
, 7 May 1940, 1.

48.
TB, 7 May 1940.

49.
TB, 10 May 1940.

50.
TB, 11 May 1940.

51.
ADAP
D IX, no. 214 (Belgium and the Netherlands) and no. 215 (Luxemburg). On Goebbels’s role in the war in the West, see Reuth,
Goebbels
, 445ff.

52.
TB, 11 May 1940; Umbreit, “Kampf,” 285.

53.
TB, 11, 12, and 13 May 1940; Ueberschär,
Freiburg im Luftkrieg, 1939–1945
, 88ff.

54.
BK
, 10 May 1940, 2.

55.
BK
, 11 May 1940, 3.

56.
TB, 11 May 1940.

57.
TB, 3 May, very similar on 18 June 1940.

58.
See, for example, TB, 15 September 1940 and 19 November 1941.

59.
On the military course of the war in the West, see Umbreit, “Kampf,” 284ff.

60.
TB, 22 May 1940.

61.
TB, 14, 15 May 1940;
BK
, 12 May 1940, 3.

62.
TB, from 18 May onward almost daily entries on the work of the radio stations.
From 17 May onward every day the minutes of the ministerial briefings contain detailed instructions for the work of the secret radio stations. On the secret radio stations, see Boelcke,
Die Macht des Radios
, 171ff.

63.
TB, 21 and 22 May 1940.

64.
TB, 30 May 1940 as well as 1 and 2 June 1940;
BK
, 30 May 1940, 1, and 7; BAK, ZSg 109/11, VI of 29 May 1940, 8, as well as 30 May 1940, 1, and 31 May 1940, 6. On the implementation, see
VB
(N), 29 May 1940, “Feige Mörder als ‘Ankläger’ ”; 30 May 1940, “Deutscher Fliegeroberst schändlich von Franzosen mißhandelt”; 31 May 1940, “Gefangene grausam gequält und ermordet”; 1 June 1940, “Französische Tobsucht”; 2 June 1940, “Der Zusammenbruch des französischen Nationalismus.”

65.
TB, 5 June 1940.

66.
TB, 21 August 1935: “Torgler has written a book attacking communism. Führer is interested in it”; 25 January 1937: “Torgler is given a salary of 800 Mk per month by the Führer. He is to work on academic matters but not appear in public.” In spring 1941, however, Hitler told Goebbels surprisingly that he believed that Torgler had organized the Reichstag fire, which Goebbels refused to believe (TB, 9 April 1941).

67.
TB, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 June 1940;
BK
, 2 and 8 June 1940, 2 (on the employment of the communists); during June there are repeated references to the secret radio stations in the minutes of the ministerial briefings
(BK)
. There is no further information on this activity in Podewin and Heuer,
Ernst Torgler
.

68.
Umbreit, “Kampf,” 302ff.

69.
TB, 15 June 1940.

70.
TB, 18 June 1940.

71.
BK
, 18 June 1940, 1.

72.
BK
, 16 June 1940, 1.

73.
TB, 20 June 1940;
BK
, 19 June 1940, 1, and 20 June 1940, 1 and 3.

74.
TB, 22 June 1940.

75.
TB, 22 and 23 June 1940;
BK
, 21 June 1940, 1 and 22 June, 1.

76.
Umbreit, “Kampf,” 316ff.

77.
TB, 23 June 1940;
BK
, 22 June 1940, 1.

78.
TB, 30 June 1940; the conversation took place in Scheveningen.

79.
TB, 1 July 1940.

80.
TB, 2 and 3 July 1940.

81.
Reuth,
Goebbels
, 454. See Kershaw,
Hitler. 1936–1945
, 407; Thamer,
Verführung und Gewalt
, 647f.; Steinert,
Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen
, 136f. But see also Below,
Als Hitlers Adjutant
, 237: “In Berlin following the successful campaign I noted, particularly among so-called educated circles, a very pessimistic mood. The campaign in the West left behind a mixture of fear, incomprehension and reluctant admiration.”

82.
Discussion of the program with Hitler: TB, 3 and 4 July 1940; on the preparations, see in general also the entries for 5 and 6 July. BAB, R 55/20007, Arbeitsplan betr. Rückkehr des Führers aus dem Felde und Reichstagssitzung, 3 July 1940.

83.
BAB, R 55/20007, Arbeitsplan.

84.
VB
(B), 6 July 1940.

85.
BAB, R 55/20007, Arbeitsplan.

86.
UWW
, August 1940, Alfred Günther (Berlin), “Die Reichshauptstadt empfängt den Führer,” 90f.

87.
VB
(B), 7 June 1940 (also for the previous paragraphs); see also the plan “Abschnittsweise
eingeteilt Blumenstreuen von Fahrzeugen aus in der Zeit von 14:45 bis 15:00 Uhr.”

88.
TB, 7 July 1940.

1.
VB
(B), 20 July 1940, “Die monumentale Rede Adolf Hitlers.” On the preparation for and impact of the Reichstag speech, see TB, 9, 10, and 20–24 July 1940.

2.
TB, 25 July 1940.

3.
TB, 25 July 1940.

4.
TB, 26 July, 1 August 1940.

5.
TB, 5 August 1940. Führer directive no. 17 of 1 August 1940 for the command of the air and sea wars against England, in Hubatsch,
Hitlers Weisungen
, no. 17. On Goebbels and the air war against Great Britain, see Reuth,
Goebbels
, 457ff.

6.
TB, 7 August 1940.

7.
TB, 7–10 August 1940. From the entry for 8 August it is clear that the raid was planned for the following day.

8.
TB, 12–15, 17, and 19 August 1940; Collier,
The Defence of the United Kingdom
, 183ff., 456f.

9.
TB, 16–25 August 1940; on the continuation of the raids, see 26, 29, and 30 August, 1, 3, 4, and 5 September; Collier,
Defence
, 203ff., 458ff.

10.
TB, 27 August 1940; Mehner (ed.),
Die geheimen Tagesberichte der Deutschen Wehrmachtführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1945
, 26 August 1940 for Berlin: “No bombing of built-up areas.” On the (unauthorized) raid on London, see Maier, “Die Luftschlacht um England,” 386.

11.
TB, 29 August 1940. Further raid or air raid warning: 31 August, 1 September; Daily reports, 29 August–1 September.

12.
TB, 6 September 1940. On the background, see daily reports, 4 September 1940, notes on particular raids on hydrogenation plants near Stettin, a total of 105 enemy incursions and 17 deaths. See also 8 September 1940: “The Führer gives orders: Code word: Lodge. That means the most massive raid.” On the first raids on London, see also TB, 7, 9, and 10 September 1940. On the command situation, see Führer directive for attacks on the population and the air defenses on large English cities including London of 5 September. Quoted in Maier, “Luftschlacht,” 386.

13.
TB, 4 and 5 September 1940.

14.
TB, 11 September (all quotations). On the catastrophic effects of the bombing, see also entries from the days that followed.

15.
TB, 5–7 September 1940.

16.
TB, 10 September 1940. See also 12, 13, 18, 19, and 25 September. BAK, ZSg 102/27, 10 September 1940: “The raids on Berlin are to be more strongly emphasized than hitherto.” 18 September 1940: “The continued British raids on Germany may be dealt with again and again in the German press.” TB, 20 September: “The press is instructed to take a much tougher line than hitherto. We must dramatize the whole thing much more.”

17.
VB
(B), 11 September 1940, headline over a page of photos; also 14 September, “Englands Schuldkonto wächst weiter.”

18.
TB, 24 June 1940.

19.
Maier, “Luftschlacht,” 389. On 14 September Hitler had told the commanders-in-chief that the preconditions for Sealion did not yet exist. On 17 September Hitler had ordered the postponement of Sealion “until further notice.” Klee,
Das Unternehmen “Seelöwe,”
205; Schramm (ed.),
Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab)
, vol. 1, 19 September 1940, Hitler’s directive for the disbanding of the concentrations of ships in the “jumping off harbors.”

20.
Bormann circular of 27 September 1940, published in Dabel,
KLV
, 7; on the KLV, see also Kock,
“Der Führer sorgt für unsere Kinder,”
76ff.

21.
TB, 28 September, 1, 2, and 4 October 1940.

22.
TB, 29 November 1935 and 26 May, 4, 10, 19, and 22 June, 2–4, 8 July, 22 October 1936. Goebbels soon gave up his original idea of initially leaving Lippert in his position of City President and putting in a “representative figure” as Oberbürgermeister alongside him; see in particular 22 June.

23.
TB, 22 May, 27 June 1936.

24.
Engele and Ribbe, “Berlin in der NS-Zeit (1933–1945),” 974ff.; Gesetz über die Verfassung und Verwaltung der Reichshauptstadt Berlin vom 1. Dezember 1936,
RGBl
. 1936 I, 957; see also TB, 13 and 15 December 1935, 27 November, 2 December 1936;
Regierung Hitler
, vol. 3, no. 194, Kabinettssitzung vom 1. Dezember 1936.

25.
TB, 6 August 1938. Soon afterward a festival in the stadium organized by Lippert appeared to him “absolute rubbish,” and he considered a report submitted by Lippert on future construction in Berlin as “completely inadequate” (19 and 28 August 1938).

26.
TB, 7 October, 3 December 1938, 16 and 22 June 1939.

27.
TB, 8 May 1940; on the countermeasures that were initiated, see
BK
, 6 May 1940, 5, and 7 May 1940, 6.

28.
TB, 8 and 14 March, 30 April, 8 May, 21 June 1940.

29.
TB, 19, 20, and 27 July 1940.

30.
TB, 31 August 1940; 6 September 1940: According to this Speer wanted Goebbels to become City President. In November 1941 Goebbels brought the unresolved problem once again to Hitler’s attention (TB, 22 November 1941). In October 1942 he briefly thought of the Oberbürgermeister of Wiesbaden, Mix (TB, 4 and 6 October 1942).

31.
Kershaw,
Hitler. 1936–1945
, 415;
Halder, Kriegstagebuch
, vol. 2, 31 July 1942, 46ff.; Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht 1939–1945
, 126ff.; Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie
, 223ff.

32.
TB, 9 August 1940.

33.
TB, 15 August 1940.

34.
TB, 24 August 1940;
BK
, 22 August 1940, 9, and 23 August 1940, 10; BAK, ZSg 102/26, 22 August 1940: “The press must in all circumstances exercise restraint when it comes to discussing the Soviet Union. It would be completely wrong to have a cultural exchange between Germany and Soviet Russia in the daily papers.” “No relations [between] the two systems.”

35.
See Michalka,
Ribbentrop und die deutsche Weltpolitik
.

36.
ADAP
D XI, no. 252, Bericht Militärattaché Rom, 28 October 1940. According to this Marshall Badoglio had told him on 23 August that Italy would take no action against Greece unless it was compelled to do so by actions taken by the Greeks or by Britain.

37.
TB, 5 September 1940.

38.
TB, 27 September 1940: “Discussed Ciano’s visit with the Führer. The pact is
going to be signed.” Thus the propaganda media were geared to the great event only on short notice:
BK
, 27 September 1940, 1; BAK, ZSg 109/15, VI, 27 September 1940, 1;
ADAP
D XI, no. 118, Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940.

39.
TB, 6 October 1940.
ADAP
D XI, no. 249. Hitler’s conversation with Mussolini at the Brenner pass on 4 October 1940, Schmidt note from the same day.

40.
ADAP
D XI, Nr. 63, Ribbentrop’s conversation with Súñer on 16 September 1940, Note of 17 September 1940; no. 66, Hitler’s conversation with Súñer on 17 September, Note from the same day; no. 67, Ribbentrop’s conversation with Súñer 17 September. Note from the same day; no. 97, Schmidt note, 26 September, concerning the conversation between Ribbentrop and Súner on the same day; no. 117, Hitler’s conversation with Súner on 27 September, note of 28 September 1940. Detwiler,
Hitler
, 37ff.

41.
TB, 19 September 1940; Detwiler,
Hitler, Franco und Gibraltar
, 30ff.

42.
ADAP
D XI, no. 220, Hitler’s meeting with Franco, 23 October 1940 in Hendaye, undated note; no. 221, Ambassador Schmidt, note of 23 October 1940 concerning the conversation between Súñer and the RAM in Hendaye on the same day Tag. Detwiler,
Hitler
, 56ff.

43.
TB, 31 October 1940.

44.
TB, 4 December 1940; see also 15 November 1940, on the occasion of a further visit to Germany by Súñer.

45.
Detwiler,
Hitler
, 85;
OKW KTB
, 1, 8 December 1940, Report of the Abwehr chief.

46.
TB, 19 December 1940.

47.
ADAP
D XI, no. 212, Schmidt note, 22 October 1941 concerning the conversation between Hitler and Laval on the same day; no. 227, Schmidt, note of 24 October 1941 concerning Hitler’s conversation with Pétain on the same day.

48.
TB, 24 October 1940.

49.
TB, 25 October 1940. After his return Hitler gave him a general account of his impression of Pétain (TB, 31 October 1940).

50.
TB, 29 October 1940.

51.
Jäckel,
Frankreich in Hitlers Europa
, 105ff.

52.
ADAP
D XI, no. 246, Schmidt note on the conversation between Hitler and Mussolini in Florence, 28 October 1940.

53.
TB, 29 October 1940.

54.
On the background, see TB, 10 and 17 July (first information concerning the plan to send troops to Romania), 9 October (concerning troop movements), 14 October 1940 (military mission). See also König,
Kooperation als Machtkampf
, 32.

55.
TB, 20 and 23 December 1940 and 15 January 1941. By repeatedly giving the date of the impending intervention as January 1941—in fact it was planned for March—he was able to refer to the provision of German units in Romania. On the preparations for the war in the Balkans, see in particular
OKW KTB
I, p. 204, Briefing of Hitler by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and by the Chief of the Army General Staff, 5 December 1940; I, p. 224: Deployment directive for the 12th Army, Operation Marita and Directive no. 18, 12 November 1940, also no. 20, 13 December 1940 (Hubatsch,
Hitlers Weisungen);
Vogel, “Das Eingreifen Deutschlands auf dem Balkan,” 422ff.

56.
TB, 11 and 12 November 1940.

57.
TB, 14 November 1940.

58.
Kershaw,
Hitler. 1936–1945
, 447f.;
ADAP
D XI, nos. 325–329 concerning the conversations on 12 and 13 November.

59.
TB, 4 December 1940.

60.
OKW KTB
I, p. 208f., 5 December 1940.

61.
TB, 20 July 1940.

62.
TB, 25 July 1940.

63.
TB, 26 July 1940. Also 17 August 1940: “Later on we want to pack the Jews off to Madagascar. There they can create their own state.” See also Reuth,
Goebbels
, 455.

64.
BK
, 6 September 1940, 6.

65.
Longerich,
Politik der Vernichtung
, 278ff.

66.
Bormann minute of a conversation with Hitler on 2 October: docs. 172-USSR, in
IMT
39, 425ff.

67.
Halder KTB
, vol. 2, 4 November 1940.

68.
Longerich,
Politik der Vernichtung
, 285ff.

69.
TB, 18 March 1941.

70.
Published in Adler,
Der verwaltete Mensch
, 152.

71.
TB, 22 March 1941.

72.
TB, 21 March 1941.

73.
TB, 10, 12, 13, 16, and 28 January, 1 February 1940; see
BK
, 78.

74.
TB, 16 January, 21 February, 28 March 1940 (quotation); Diller,
Rundfunkpolitik
, 352f.

75.
Diller,
Rundfunkpolitik
, 351.

76.
Dussel,
Hörfunk
, 199ff.; TB, 23 and 28 April 1940, also 9 and 18 May 1940.

77.
Dussel,
Hörfunk
, 199.

78.
TB, 5 December 1940;
BK
, 20 December 1940, 4.

79.
TB, 30 September, 21 October 1939, 2 and 25 January 1940, 22 March, 23 April 1940; Moeller,
Filmminister
, 93f.

80.
TB, 29 October 1939, 21 November 1939. BAB, R 55/495, “Aufstellung Einnahmen.”

81.
TB, 7 and 14 November 1939; Moeller,
Filmminister
, 95; BAB, R 55/1352, Table for “Income,” notes only 67 films for 1940/41.

82.
Decree of 23 November 1939 (Albrecht,
Filmpolitik
, p. 526), which envisaged the submission of a treatment for every film: TB, 14 and 18 November 1939;
BK
, 3 November 1939, 12.

83.
Rosenberg,
Tagebuch
, 11 December 1939 (and 30 December 1939); see Reuth,
Goebbels
, 436.

84.
TB, 12 December 1939.

85.
TB, 19, 24, and 31 January, 28 February, 13 March 1941; Moeller,
Filmminister
, 227ff.

86.
TB, 23 and 25 April 1940;
BK
, 22 April 1940, 10, and 27 June 1940, 3.

87.
Minute, presumably of 23 April 1940, quoted by Albrecht,
Filmpolitik
, 143.

88.
Moeller,
Filmminister
, 238ff., and Barth,
Goebbels und die Juden
, 160ff.; Hollstein,
Jud Süß und die Deutschen;
Mannes,
Antisemitismus im nationalsozialistischen Spielfilm
.

89.
“Die Rothschilds”: TB, 13 March, 26 April, 7 and 23 July, 10 September 1940.

90.
Literature on
Jud Süss:
Tegel,
Jew Süss/Jud Süss;
Knilli,
Jud Süß
. TB, 5 and 18 January, 2 and 15 February, 26 April, 18 August (“Harlan-Film ‘Jud Süss.’ […] A really great and brilliant film. Just the kind of anti-Semitic film that we needed”), 6, 7, 10, and 25 September 1940 (on the premiere).

91.
Hornshoj-Moller,
“Der ewige Jude
.”; Mannes,
Antisemitismus
, 51ff.; Reuband, “ ‘Jud Süß’ and ‘Der Ewige Jude’ ”;
BK
, 3 September 1940, 8 (instructions for the preparation of the premiere); TB, 17 October 1939, also 5 and 6 October 1939.

92.
TB, 24, 28, and 29 October, 2, 11, and 28 November 1939, 9 and 12 January “Hitler demands changes,” 2 April, 8 May, 9 June, 11 October 1940.