Luftwaffe Fighter Aces (14 page)

The composition of a Circus was typically up to 24 Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons, each of twelve aircraft, protecting a few bombers. Preceding the main formation were three target support wings at high altitude, each three squadrons strong. Their task was to sweep the sky clear of opposition along the route of the main force and over the target. To make life difficult for the defenders, all three wings closed on the target from different directions and at different times.

The main force usually consisted of half a dozen Blenheim or Stirling bombers flying at about 12,000ft, surrounded by nine or ten squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes. The composition varied from time to time, but in the early days was more or less as follows. The close escort squadron was split on either side of the bombers, about 3,000ft out and either level or a little higher. Beneath came the low escort squadron, split like the close escort squadron on both sides but 1,000ft lower than the bombers. Behind and about 1,000ft above the close escort squadron was the medium escort squadron, which in turn was covered by the
high escort squadron, astern and a further 1,000ft higher. These four squadrons made up the escort wing. Still higher came three squadrons of the escort cover wing, astern of and stacked up to 4,000ft above the highest squadron of the escort wing, stepped up into the sun. Still higher were the three squadrons of the high cover wing, again stacked up into the sun over 7–8,000ft. The entire formation ranged from 11,000ft up to between 25,000 and 26,000ft.

Nor was this all. Two or three squadrons of the forward support wing met the bombers at the French coast on the way out, while the rear support wing, generally two squadrons strong, provided a reception committee over mid-Channel. The total number of British fighters in a typical Circus often exceeded the combined strength of
JG 2
and
JG 26.
It was a difficult and dangerous nut for the defenders to crack.

Not that the German fighters ever attempted to match strength with strength. As previously noted, the
Gruppen
rather than the
Geschwader
were the primary fighting units, and these were widely scattered. The three
Gruppen
of Galland’s
JG 26
were based at Moorseele (later Wevelghem) in Belgium, and at St Omer and Abbeville in France.
JG
2, commanded from February to July 1941 by Wilhelm Balthasar, basically covered the area south of the Seine although one
Gruppe
was occasionally used to reinforce the north. Among other things, it was responsible for protecting the German naval bases at Cherbourg and Brest. The latter in particular was beyond Circus range, but it was often the target for serious daylight bombing raids escorted by Spitfires with long-range tanks, especially when German capital ships were in harbour,

Circus No 1 was flown on 10 January 1941, but the build-up was slow and by mid-June the tally had only reached fourteen. This gave the Germans time to piece together a radar detection and reporting system in the area. It was neither as good nor as comprehensive as the British network, but it did its job in a generally workmanlike manner. British radar already reached a considerable distance into France provided the aircraft under surveillance were at high altitude, and consequently this became the first air campaign in which radar tracking and ground control were available to both sides.

The task of the
Jagdflieger
on the Channel was to provide a modicum of air defence while remaining in being as an effective force. One
or sometimes two
Gruppen
would be sent against a Circus , with the remainder held back to cover contingency situations. Inevitably the defenders were heavily outnumbered by the teeming hordes of British fighters in almost every case.

Some commentators have likened Circus operations to the Battle of Britain in reverse, citing the German defensive fight against odds. In point of fact there is little similarity. The German fighters were not defending their homeland against devastating attacks by swarms of bombers. While the targets chosen by the British were relatively important to the Germans, they were hardly vital to the future conduct of the war. The bomb loads carried by the British were never enough to inflict really serious damage, nor were any German civilians killed on the ground. While the air fighting itself was a deadly affair, the
Jagdflieger
could afford to be fairly circumspect about the manner in which they engaged.

The general principle was to inflict maximum damage at minimum risk. Whenever possible (and on most occasions it was, owing to the relative lack of defensive urgency), the
Jagdflieger
sought the advantage of height before attacking. Small formations nibbled at the flanks of the Circus as a distraction before other units launched steep diving attacks. It was not expected that the bombers could be attacked every time: only the most skilled leaders could succeed in breaking through the massed Spitfires and Hurricanes, and then not always.

In practice the huge number of British fighters was often a disadvantage, as they got in each other’s way, adding greatly to the confusion. By contrast, once a few Germans became embroiled in the mêlée, they could take shots of opportunity without having to worry overmuch about positive identification. Aircraft quality was also a factor. The Hurricane, by now completely outclassed at the high altitudes where most combats took place, remained in service for some time, although it was gradually withdrawn in favour of the Spitfire. The superb Bf 109F outperformed the Spitfire I and II in certain areas, although it could still not match the British aircraft in a turning fight and was thus forced to continue the hit-and-run tactics developed during the previous summer. A more formidable opponent was the Spitfire VB, which entered service from February 1941. Armed with two 20mm Hispano cannon and
four .303in machine guns, the Mark VB was essentially a Spitfire I with a more powerful engine.

Commentators on the formative years of the
Luftwaffe
often give the impression that, once selected, the Bf 109 was to be the only single-engine fighter in that service. This is far from the truth. Design work on the FW 190 commenced in 1938 and the first prototype flew on 1 June 1939—well before the outbreak of war.

Powered by a 14-cylinder BMW radial engine, the FW 190 was an extremely rugged aircraft, far more so than the rather delicate Bf 109. Unlike the Messerschmitt fighter, it had a single-piece sliding canopy, giving a first-class all round view from the cockpit, while the slightly nose-down level-flight attitude gave a good view forward. The seat was semi-reclining, with a high heel-line which gave the pilot good g-resistance.

Other good points were an ingenious gadget called the
Kommandgerät
, which automatically controlled propeller pitch, fuel, mixture, boost and engine revs and which thus reduced the pilot’s workload, as did the absence of any necessity to re-trim for different flight conditions. Beautifully balanced ailerons gave a rate of roll significantly faster than that of the aircraft’s main opponent, the Spitfire. Directional stability was good, longitudinal stability was neutral, while lateral instability contributed to its phenomenal agility in the rolling plane. At low and medium altitudes acceleration and climb rate were good, while the aircraft was exceptional in a dive.

Note:
The development of the FW 190A was a continuing process and many further subtypes entered service before the end of 1943. The same applied to the Spitfire, which was developed into high- and low-altitude variants. Therefore the figures in this table are no more than a guide.

Like any fighter, the FW 190 had its weak points. Wing loading was a trifle on the heavy side, giving the German fighter an unexceptional turn radius and rate. It was difficult to fly on instruments, and stalling characteristics were unforgiving. British test pilot Eric Brown, who flew a captured example, commented:

The stalling speed of the FW 190A-4 in clean configuration was 127mph and the stall came suddenly and without warning, the port wing dropping so violently that the aircraft almost inverted itself. In fact, if the German fighter was pulled into a g-stall in a tight turn, it would flick out on to the opposite bank and an incipient spin was the inevitable outcome if the pilot did not have his wits about him.

The figure of 127mph was the indicated air speed. The true air speed would be a good deal more in the thin air at high altitude. Stalling speed in a 6g turn would be 311mph true air speed at sea level. The nature of the high-speed stall was embarrassing enough at high altitude; at low level, where there was insufficient room to recover, it could be lethal, as many German pilots found to their cost. Consequently it constrained many from hard manoeuvres near the ground.

The first FW 190s to enter service were received by
II/JG 26
in July 1941, but the demands of conversion on to a new type, coupled with persistent engine problems, delayed its combat début to September. Even then, it was not until the early months of 1942 that the new fighter really began to make its presence felt, while not until April did
I/JG 26
trade in its Bf 109Fs for FW 190As. That same month also saw
JG 2
complete its re-equipment with the new fighter.

So formidable was the Focke-Wulf fighter that the RAF was forced on to the tactical defensive. As a stop-gap, the Spitfire IX was rushed into service. Basically it was a Spitfire V powered by the latest and more powerful Merlin engine with a two-speed, two-stage supercharger which
gave it comparable performance to the FW 190A below 25,000ft and a margin of superiority above this level. The German fighter retained its advantage in rate of roll, in the zoom climb and in the dive, but was generally equalled in all other departments. Leaving aside the surprise bounce, pilot skill became the deciding factor in any dogfight between the two. One major difficulty remained for the
Jagdflieger
pilot: externally the two Spitfire types were virtually indistinguishable. Until combat was joined, he was hard pressed to tell whether he was up against the inferior Mk V or the more potent Mk IX. See
Figs 14
and
15
.

In the first six months of 1941 air action on the Channel coast was desultory. Then, on 21 June, two Circuses were flown in a single day. Weather permitting, this was the shape of things to come, and from then on the pressure was unrelenting. Bitter fighting on this day saw British losses of five fighters and one bomber. This was a poor return for the
Jagdflieger,
who lost nine Bf 109s and six pilots. However, it was not long before the pendulum swung in the other direction.

The fact was that, judged purely on the grounds of attrition, the campaign on the Channel coast was a minor victory for the
Jagdflieger,
whose victory-to-loss ratio often exceeded 3:1. With so many aircraft milling around in the air, the confusion was great, and this inevitably led to overclaiming. It was partly this that led Fighter Command to continue what was a costly policy, as it obscured the fact that they were actually losing more aircraft than they shot down. For example, between 14 June and 4 July 1941 RAF Fighter Command claimed 214 victories. Actual German losses were 48 fighters destroyed and 33 damaged, with 32 pilots killed or taken prisoner and six wounded. Over the same period, British losses were 80 aircraft and 62 pilots. This general trend was perpetuated through 1941 and 1942, and well into the following year.

Reasons for the German success are not hard to find. The hard core of pilots in the two
Jagdgeschwader
were veterans: the leavening of new flyers from the training schools was a fairly small proportion of the whole, and these few were introduced to combat gradually. By contrast, Fighter Command had undergone a massive expansion. While to
a very high degree the squadron and flight commanders were old hands, the proportion of novices was far higher than in the German units. This was not helped by the RAF habit of resting their aces—a policy which, while it paid dividends in the long run, lowered fighting efficiency in the short term.

Finally, there was the question of tactics. Fighter Command did not take its first steps towards adopting the Finger Four formation as used by the Germans until the late summer of 1941. It took time to develop, and even then it was slow to catch on. The inferior
Idiotenreihe
fours in line astern of 1940 vintage was more often used, and this persisted even into 1943. Meanwhile the
Jagdwaffe
started flying in fours abreast, which offered advantages even over the Finger Four.

It was not readily apparent, but the
Jagdflieger
were paying a high price for what was to prove a transitory success. Many
Experten
added to their already impressive scores but others melted away in the crucible of battle. Gustav Sprick (31 victories) was shot down by Spitfires near Holque on 28 June. Wilhelm Balthasar also fell to Spitfires over Aire on 3 July; as
Kommodore
of
JG 2
he had added a further 11 to his total, bringing his final score to 40, plus seven in Spain. Rolf Pingel, who had scored four in Spain, was taken prisoner on 10 July, his total at 26. Fast-scoring Walter Adolph, with 28 victories in just 79 sorties, was shot down in his FW 190 on 18 September. Men such as these were not available for the crucial battles that lay ahead. Their loss in what was to a large degree a sideshow was a tragedy for the
Luftwaffe.