Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (51 page)

By 13 July the problem on the flanks was becoming precarious. The continued progress at the centre of the front, where Hoth's and Guderian's forces were strongest, could not be matched by
Kuntzen's LVII Panzer Corps (19th Panzer Division) in the north, which was too weak to make any headway (see
Map 6
).
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In the south the problem was even more pronounced. The
Pripet marshes formed a substantial natural barrier with Army Group South and, facing stiff resistance, Rundstedt's forces had no chance of keeping pace with Bock's advance and thereby covering his flank. Accordingly, it was here on 13 July that
Timoshenko's offensive for the first time gained a worthy measure of success against the
dispersed and weakened German forces. The Soviet
21st Army proved the most successful, assaulting across the Dnepr River in the south and forcing the Germans out of
Rogachev and
Zhlobin. At the same time another corps of 21st Army thrust deep into the German rear towards Bobruisk with the 232nd Rifle Division advancing 80 kilometres and seizing bridges across the
Beresina and Ptich Rivers. The drive was soon checked by Weichs's
2nd Army, which was forced to commit its reserves to help restore the situation. Rogachev and Zhlobin were also re-taken within a week, but the collective effort stalled Weichs's progress east and ultimately delayed his relief of Guderian's panzer forces.
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Timoshenko's offensive was also causing trouble further north where Schweppenburg's
XXIV Panzer Corps was attempting to expand its bridgehead south of
Mogilev. Of Schweppenburg's two panzer divisions, the
3rd Panzer Division was so exhausted, according to its Chief of Staff, that he requested support from the corps reserve.
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This left the
4th Panzer Division to bear the brunt of attempts by the Soviet
13th and
4th Armies to lift the German siege at Mogilev. The result was much confused fighting with field units often unsure who was encircling whom. The Soviets also fought with a profound show of strength in artillery and anti-tank guns, exacting a great toll on the 4th Panzer Division's panzer regiment.
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According to the divisional war diary, already on 13 July the regiment had only ‘about 24 vehicles available’.
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One former officer of the 4th Panzer Division recalled after the war:

If enemy resistance up to that time had been stiff in places but not so well organized, in the area south of Mogilev, we now had to defend against well-led counterattacks in divisional strength. Between 10 and 14 July several times we were forced to change over to a defence with open flanks and in all directions.
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In fact the divisions of the Soviet 13th and 4th Armies, both scarred veterans of the previous battles further west, were well below their nominal divisional strength. Guderian also assumed greater numbers after the war when he wrote of Timoshenko's offensive and attributed no fewer
than 20 divisions to the attack on his southern flank.
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Actually the Soviet divisions in both armies numbered fewer than 3,000 men each and, although they did not achieve their objective of relieving Mogilev
, their success is best understood by the impression they made on the Germans.
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It was not the numerical strength of the Soviet armies that caused the 4th Panzer Division such difficulties, but more the division's own reduced manoeuvrability over the swampy terrain, physical fatigue, material losses and the fact that it was operating alone over an extensive battlefield without adequate flank protection. In other words, even a Soviet offensive launched with badly depleted forces was now encountering a German enemy on a far more even playing field, where the deadly German formula of concentrated strength and firepower, together with high battlefield mobility, was much less evident
. Clearly a watershed was being reached, the character of the war was changing, and it was not just evident in 4th Panzer Division
, but across the breadth of Army Group Centre and, indeed, the whole eastern front. The fighting was transforming the German war machine from a fine instrument into a blunt weapon, whereby the opposing armies were increasingly locked together in confused and ever more bloody encounters. The declining German ability to dictate the terms of battle added to the ‘fog of war’ prevailing on the battlefield and, according to one account, left command and control of operations at times in turmoil.

The Russians did not confine themselves to opposing the frontal advance of our Panzer Divisions. They further attempted to find every suitable occasion to operate against the flanks of the wedges driven in by our motorised elements, which, of necessity, had become extended and relatively weak…Situations were sometimes so confused that we, on our side, wondered if we were outflanking the enemy or whether he had outflanked us.
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In spite of Halder's continual optimism in the progress of the campaign, the slowing pace of the advance was becoming steadily more evident, causing Hitler to voice his concerns to his chief military adjutant Colonel
Schmundt. ‘The Führer’, Schmundt told Hoth on 13 July, ‘is somewhat worried that the panzer groups in the current battle may expend themselves before the coming wide-ranging operations.’ According to Schmundt, Hitler also remarked: ‘The Russian is a colossus and strong’,
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causing the dictator to reassert his intention to turn
Guderian's panzer group south into the Ukraine to seize the harvest. Hoth's panzer group would be expected to conserve its strength by awaiting the arrival of the infantry and later continuing the drive on Moscow.
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As a result of
Hitler's heightened fears,
Halder and
Brauchitsch again appeared at Hitler's headquarters on 13 July with a summary of the campaign that once again exuded a sanguine confidence. Halder stated that the enemy front was in places ‘thin’ and held by forces of ‘questionable strength’. He then reviewed the various sectors along the eastern front, expressing no hint of concern and even concluding that the attack on Guderian's southern flank was not worthy of any significant consideration, save that Guderian must protect his own flank. Halder also matter-of-factly observed that the main offensive along the Orscha–Vitebsk axis towards Smolensk ‘was planned as a pincer movement, but for the most part is taking place as a frontal assault’.
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It is hard to know to what degree Halder's buoyant assessment reflected his own deluded understanding of events, and what was calculated to impress Hitler with the goal of maintaining the dictator's trust in the strategic direction of the OKH. From discussions of the previous day (12 July), Halder was aware of Hitler's renewed apprehension, particularly for the north. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that he now presented to Hitler Heusinger's hastily devised plan aimed at alleviating those fears and resolving any looming threat to the flanks. In the presentation of this plan, Halder deliberately ignored the fact that the main drive would still be centred on Smolensk and not on the flanks. In fact, Halder now gave Hitler the impression that his intention was to halt the drive on Moscow in favour of operations to the north-east and south-east of Smolensk, although his diary entry from the previous day makes clear that these new operations were to be conducted alongside continued thrusts around Smolensk. In all likelihood Halder's portrayal was nothing more than a ruse, telling Hitler what he wanted to hear, for in practice no new orders to this effect were forwarded to the panzer groups and the advance, with the bulk of the two panzer groups, continued unabated towards
Smolensk. In all probability Halder did not foresee this fraudulent dishonesty as any great risk, for he doubtless also believed that the German armies were on the verge of breaking through the remaining elements of the Red Army and thereby prompting the collapse of the Soviet front.
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At the conclusion of Halder's presentation Hitler expressed his approval of the submitted plans and then went on to reiterate the importance of crushing the remaining Soviet military strength over a further
advance to the east. To this end, Hitler made special reference to elements of Hoth's armoured group assisting Leeb in the north, but the details were left to the army. This underscored Halder's perceptive understanding of Hitler's anxieties, and his cunning ability to manipulate reports to appease them, while maintaining the bulk of forces at the centre of Bock's
front.

On the subject of
Moscow, Hitler stated that the Soviet capital was to be subjected to a ‘terror air raid’ which, interestingly, he justified in part ‘to disprove enemy propaganda which speaks of exhaustion of the German offensive capabilities’.
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Yet, even Hitler's own characterisation of the Soviet state, according to Schmundt, as a strong colossus, suggests such enemy protestations were hardly fictional works of propaganda without any basis in
fact. Certainly
Bock was more aware of the diminishing strength of his motorised forces and when Halder's instruction reached him on 13 July, stating that operations would need to be extended towards the north and south, in addition to the ongoing eastward push at the centre of the front, Bock reacted with indignation. The army group commander immediately drove to 4th Panzer Army's headquarters to discuss the matter with
Kluge and pressed his view that: ‘If the armoured groups now fly apart to the south, east and north, it means forgoing the exploitation of our success.’
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Bock was quickly becoming aware that as the drain on the army group's motorised forces grew, the orders of the higher command demonstrated little corresponding awareness of this fact. Consequently, overly ambitious orders were being issued without the sober remedial of sound judgement.

In Bock's discussion with Kluge the two Field Marshals were in complete agreement and so the army group commander instructed his Chief of Staff, Major-General
Hans von Greiffenberg, to relay his dissatisfaction to Halder and press the need for a concentrated thrust eastwards with all the remaining resources under his command. Leaving nothing to chance, Bock also followed this up with a similarly-worded telegram to the OKH. That evening Bock elaborated in his diary on the problem:

I consider diverting elements of Panzer Group Hoth to the north while elements continue to march east to be futile. Because of the tremendous wear and tear on their equipment, the panzer groups are only still an effective striking force if employed in unison. I consider employing individual panzer corps to operate alone pointless, their fighting strength has become too low.
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Halder's reply exemplified his desire to placate Bock's concerns while maintaining his insistence on turning elements of Hoth's panzer group
north to aid Leeb. The swing north was described as taking place ‘in the course of its forward movement’, which, as Bock complained, was so loosely worded as to allow one to interpret it as he might
wish.
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Yet it was not as though Halder was ignorant of the declining state of the panzer forces. In addition to the concerns expressed by Bock, on 13 July Halder received a briefing from General
Walter Buhle in which he was told that the panzer divisions were on average down to 50 per cent strength and the personnel losses had now exhausted the field replacement battalions.
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With the next stage of the German offensive becoming an increasingly open question, the field commanders too began debating the competing options, which, as
Blumentritt stated, resulted in ‘sharp exchanges of opinion’.
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Bock did not mince words about the importance of an unhindered drive on Moscow with all the strength that could be mustered. Kluge on the other hand, in spite of having agreed with Bock's views on 13 July, was already advocating a new position by the following morning. According to the 3rd Panzer Group's war diary, when Kluge appeared on the morning of 14 July he declared that, of the three options at hand (southern, eastern and north-eastern), ‘the southern would be the best, as there one could capture the strongest enemy forces, whereas Moscow would be a more political objective’.
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Kluge's Chief of Staff confirmed after the war that in the dispute, Kluge ‘was inclined to prefer Hitler's strategic concept’.
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Blumentritt also noted Kluge's keen interest in Napoleon's campaign of 1812, reading General Armand de Caulaincourt's account ‘with the greatest attention’.
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This may have cautioned him, in the same fatalistic way it did Hitler, about treading the same path towards Moscow. Kluge's propensity for vacillation and at times agreeable subservience, especially in the presence of higher authority, soon earned him the nickname ‘Clever Hans’ (
Der kluge Hans
) and was to become decidedly more evident in later campaigns and the plot to assassinate
Hitler.
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Weichs likewise advocated the drive south and maintained this position even after the war when the generals found it convenient to blame the loss of the war on Hitler's diversion from Moscow.
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Guderian has been said to have unreservedly favoured the push towards
Moscow,
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but there is evidence for some doubt. During a visit to Panzer Group 2 by
Bock and Kesselring on 14 July, Guderian was away at the front and his place was taken by his Chief of Staff who, in the course of discussions, stated: ‘The commander of the panzer group [Guderian] believes that the turn to the south and the link-up with panzer group Kleist should not be started after reaching the area around Smolensk, rather it should be carried out later from the Oka sector.’
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Guderian later expressed a more emphatic commitment towards the seizure of Moscow, but his degree of devotion remains unknown, especially given his sudden about-face before Hitler in late August.
Hoth, like Bock, was fixated by Moscow and saw little merit in rival alternatives for his panzer group. On 13 July, while acknowledging the difficulties of the campaign, he nevertheless advised that ‘the last vehicle be set in the direction of
Moscow’.
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