Quitting (previously published as Mastering the Art of Quitting) (27 page)

 

No
tes

Chapter One: The Psychology of Persistence

It's pretty hard to overstate:
Carston Wrosch et al., “The Importance of Goal Disengagement in Adaptive Self-Regulation: When Giving Up Is Beneficial,”
Self and Identity
2 (2003): 1–20.

One, called
intuition
:
Daniel Kahneman, “A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality,”
American Psychologist
85, no. 9 (September 2003): 692–720. See also Daniel Kahneman,
Thinking, Fast and Slow
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 20 ff.

The human brain is wired to respond to the near win:
R. L. Reid, “The Psychology of the Near Miss,”
Journal of Gambling Behavior
2, no. 1 (1986): 32–39.

A British study on gambling:
Henry Chase and Luke Clark, “Gambling Severity Predicts Midbrain Response to Near-Miss Outcomes,”
Journal of Neuroscience
30, no. 18 (2010): 6,180–6,187.

availability heuristic
, is another mental proclivity:
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability,”
Cognitive Psychology
4 (1973): 207–232.

psychologist Scott Plous:
Psychology of Judgment and Decision-Making
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 121.

escalation of commitment:
Barry M. Staw, “The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action,”
Academy of Management Review
6, no. 4 (October 1981): 577–587.

The
above-average effect
:
Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin, and Lee Ross, “The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self versus Others,”
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
28, no. 3 (March 2002): 369–381; Justin Kruger, “Lake Wobegon Be Gone! The ‘Below-Average Effect' and the Egocentric Nature of Comparative
Ability Judgments,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
77, no. 2 (1999): 221–232.

We tend to be overconfident:
David Dunning, Dale W. Griffin, James D. Mikojkovic, and Lee Toss, “The Overconfidence Effect in Social Prediction,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
58, no. 4 (1990): 568–581; Robert P. Vallone, Dale W. Griffin, Sabrina Lin, and Lee Ross, “Overconfident Prediction of Future Actions and Outcomes by Self and Others,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
58, no. 4 (1990): 582–591.

Writing in the
Harvard Business Review
:
Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman, “Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives' Decisions,”
Harvard Business Review
(July 2003), 56–63.

Studies show that a manager:
William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, “The Status Quo Bias in Decision-Making,”
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
1 (1988): 7–59.

The fancy name for that is the
sunk-cost fallacy
:
Ibid., 37.

As Nobel Prize winners Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky:
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,”
Econometrica
47, no. 2 (March 1979): 263–291.

How sensitive people are to losses:
Daniel Gilbert,
Stumbling on Happiness
(New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 51–52. His example is based on George F. Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec, “Preferences for Sequences of Outcomes,”
Psychological Review
100, no. 1 (1993): 91–108.

Researchers have found that when problems:
Nils B. Jostmann and Sander L. Koole, “When Persistence Is Futile,” in
The Psychology of Goals
,
ed. Gordon B. Moskowitz and Heidi Grant (New York: Guilford Press, 2009), 337–361.

“The slowness of consciousness suggests”:
Daniel M. Wegner,
The Illusion of Conscious Will
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 57.

There's the influence of
priming
:
Tanya L. Chartrand and John A. Bargh, “The Chameleon Effect: The Perception-Behavior Link and Social Interaction,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
76, no. 6 (1999): 893–910.

Other experiments, especially those conducted by John A. Bargh:
John A. Bargh and Tanya L. Chartrand, “The Unbearable Automaticity of Being,”
American Psychologist
54, no. 7 (July 1999): 462–479.

For example, in one experiment:
John A. Bargh, Mark Chen, and Lara Burrows, “Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Actions,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
71, no. 2 (1996): 230–244.

Bargh and his colleagues:
Aaron C. Kay, S. Christian Wheeler, John A. Bargh, and Lee Ross, “Material Priming: The Influence of Mundane Physical Objects on Situational Construal and Competitive Behavior Choice,”
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process
93 (2004): 83–96.

the “ultimatum game”:
Ibid., 88.

Similar experiments, as well as brain scans:
John A. Bargh et al., “The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of Behavior Goals,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
81, no. 6 (2001): 1,014–1,027; John A. Bargh and Ezequiel Morsella, “The Unconscious Mind,”
Perspectives on Psychological Science
3, no. 1 (2003): 73–79; John A. Bargh and Julie Y. Huang, “The Selfish Goal,” in
The Psychology of Goals
, ed. Gordon B. Moskowitz and Heidi Grant (New York: Guilford Press, 2009), 127–150.

“once they are put into motion”:
John A. Bargh and Tanya L. Chartrand, “The Unbearable Automaticity of Being,”
American Psychologist
54, no. 7 (July 1999): 473.

“ironic processes of mental control”:
Daniel M. Wegner, “Ironic Processes of Mental Control,”
Psychological Review
101, no. 1 (1994): 34–51.

“The mind actually appears to search”:
Wegner,
The Illusion of Will
, 141.

Wegner and others initially showed:
The original experiment reported in Daniel M. Wegner, David J. Schneider, Samuel R. Carter III, and Teri L. White, “Paradoxical Effects of Thought Suppression,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
53, no. 1 (1987): 5–13; Daniel M. Wegner, “You Can't Always Think What You Want: Problems in the Suppression of Unwanted Thoughts,”
Advances in Experimental Psychology
25 (1992): 193–225.

Chapter Two: Unsuccessful Quitting

Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci:
Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci,” Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions and New Directions,”
Contemporary Educational Psychology
25 (2000): 54–67.

“The most basic distinction is between intrinsic motivation”:
Ibid., 55.

“Extrinsic motivation has typically”:
Ibid.

As John A. Bargh and his colleagues':
John A. Bargh and Ezequiel Morsella, “The Unconscious Mind,”
Perspectives on Psychological Science
3, no. 1 (2003): 73–79.

Andrew J. Elliot and Todd M. Thrash:
Andrew J. Elliot and Todd M. Thrash, “Approach-Avoidance Motivation in Personality: Approach and Avoidance Temperaments and Goals,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
82, no. 5 (2002): 804–818; Andrew J. Elliot and Todd M. Thrash, “Approach and Avoidance Temperament As Basic Dimensions of Personality,”
Journal of Personality
78, no. 3 (June 2010): 865–906.

The distinction between these two motivations:
Andrew J. Elliot, “A Hierarchical Model of Approach-Avoidance Motivation,”
Motivation and Emotion
29 (2006): 111–116.

“avoidance motivation is limited”:
Ibid., 115.

“avoidance motivation is designed to facilitate”:
Ibid.

Psychologists Robert Emmons and Laura King:
Robert A. Emmons and Laura King, “Conflict Among Personal Stirrings: Immediate and Long-Term Implications for Psychological and Physical Well-Being,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
54, no. 6 (1988): 1,040–1,048.

Chapter Three: Quitting As an Art

Goal disengagement takes place:
Here and elsewhere, the definition of the components of disengagement are derived from Nils B. Jostmann and Sander L. Koole, “When Persistence Is Futile: A Functional Analysis of Action Orientation and Goal Disengagement,” in
The Psychology of Goals
, ed. Gordon B. Moskowitz and Heidi Grant (New York and London: Guilford Press, 2009), 337–361. Especially helpful is their table 13.2, p. 347.

Daniel Wegner explains:
Daniel M. Wegner,
The Illusion of Conscious Will
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 141.

Wegner and his colleagues:
Daniel Wegner,
White Bears and Other Unwanted Thoughts: Suppression, Obsession, and the Psychology of Mental Control
(New York and London: Guilford Press, 1994), 65–69.

“If we wish to suppress a thought”:
Ibid., 70.

Ego depletion
is the term:
Roy F. Baumeister, Ellen Bratslavsky, Mark Muraven, and Dianne M. Tice, “Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
74, no. 5 (1998): 1,253–1,265.

“acts of choice draw on the same limited resource”:
Ibid., 1,257. For another possible model of ego depletion, see Michael Inzlicht and Brandon J. Schmeichel, “What Is Ego Depletion? Toward a Mechanistic Revision of the Resource Model of Self-Control,”
Perspectives on Psychological Science
7, no. 5 (2012): 450–463.

Other experiments showed:
Ibid., 1,258–1,259. See also Mark Muraven, Dianne M. Tice, and Roy M. Baumeister, “Self-Control As Limited Resource: Regulatory Depletion Patterns,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
74, no. 3 (1998): 774–789.

Dylan D. Wagner and Todd F. Heatherton:
Dylan Wagner and Todd F. Heatherton, “Self-Regulatory Depletion Increases Emotional Reactivity in the Amygdala,”
Social, Cognitive
and Affective Neuroscience
(August 27, 2012). DOI:10/ 1093scan/nss082.

the
Zeigarnik effect
:
Roy F. Baumeister and John Tierney,
Willpower: Rediscovering the Greatest Human Strength
(New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 80–81.

the recent work of E. J. Masicampo and Roy Baumeister:
E. J. Masicampo and Roy F. Baumeister, “Consider It Done! Plan Making Can Eliminate the Cognitive Effects of Unfulfilled Goals,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
(June 2, 2011), advance online publication. DOI:10.1037/ 90024192.

In his seminal 1975 article, Eric Klinger:
Eric Klinger, “Consequences of Commitment to and Disengagement from Incentives,”
Psychological Review
82, no. 2 (1975): 1–25.

Dylan D. Wagner and Todd F. Heatherton:
Dylan Wagner and Todd F. Heatherton, “Self-Regulatory Depletion,”
Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
(August 27, 2012). DOI:10/ 1093scan/nss082.

experiments conducted by Kathleen D. Vohs, Roy F. Baumeister, and others:
Kathleen D. Vohs et al., “Engaging in Self-Control Heightens Urges and Feelings,” working paper.

“Ego depletion may not change”:
Ibid., 5.

“In other words, every eight hours”:
Daniel Gilbert,
Stumbling on Happiness
(New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 17.

“Americans of all ages expect”:
Ibid., 19.

Emily Pronin, Daniel Lin, and Lee Ross:
Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin, and Lee Ross, “The Bias Blind Spot: Perception of Bias in Self Versus Others,”
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
8 (2002): 369–381.

“We don't always see ourselves as
superior
”:
Gilbert,
Stumbling on Happiness
, 252.

Timothy Wilson and Daniel Gilbert delineate four aspects:
Timothy D. Wilson and Daniel T. Gilbert, “Affective Forecasting,”
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology
35 (2003): 346–411.

people tend to oversimplify:
Ibid., 348.

Researchers Julia Woodzicka and Marianne LaFrance first asked:
Julia A. Woodzicka and Marianne LaFrance, “Real Versus Imagined Gender Harassment,”
Journal of Social Issues
57, no. 1 (2001): 15–39.

the
impact bias
:
Wilson and Gilbert, “Affective Forecasting,” 351.

“the psychological immune system”:
Ibid., 380 ff.

psychologists Lauren B. Alloy and Lyn Y. Abramson:
Lauren B. Alloy and Lyn Y. Abramson, “Judgment of Contingency in Depressed and Non-Depressed Students: Sadder but Wiser?”
Journal of Experimental Psychology
108, no. 4 (1978): 441–485.

depressive realism
:
Some other points of view on the subject include David Dunning and Amber L. Story, “Depression, Realism, and the Overconfidence Effect: Are the Sadder Wiser When Predicting Future Actions and Events?”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
61, no. 4 (1981): 521–532; Lorraine G. Alan, Shepherd Siegel, and Samuel Hannah, “The Sad Truth About Depressive Realism,”
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
60, no. 3 (2007): 482–495.