The French Way (62 page)

66
. USIA,
French Public Opinion on Economic Summit Issues.
Opinion was divided over applying restrictions on high-tech trade.

67
. For an insider's scathing account of the summit, see Dumas,
Affaires étrangères
, 81-95. A sharp analysis of the European position over sanctions is Holly Wyatt-Walter,
The European Community and the Security Dilemma, 19791992
(New York: St. Martin's, 1997), 76-81.

68
. Védrine,
Les Mondes
, 297®

69
. James Goldsborough, “Warfare among the Allies,”
New York Times
, 20 July 1982, A23.

70
. Claude Julien, “Une diplomatie écartelée,”
Le Monde diplomatique
, August 1982, 1, 9; Claude Briançon, “Gazoduc,”
Libération
, 18 July 1982, 9.

71
. Schultz,
Turmoil and Triumph
, 145.

72
. Blinken,
Ally versus Ally
, 105.

73
. The quotations from Mauroy's office and from Védrine are in Védrine,
Les Mondes
, 220-22.

74
. Favier and Martin-Rolland,
La Décennie Mitterrand
, 1:263.

75
. Claude Cheysson, quoted in Védrine,
Les Mondes
, 221.

76
. Ibid., 225.

77
. Blinken,
Ally versus Ally
, 109.

78
. IFOP, November 1981, cited in Fritsch-Bournazel, “France: Attachment,” 90.

79
. SOFRES poll, November 1982, reported in Hastings and Hastings, eds.,
Index to International Public Opinion, 1983-1984
, 201.

80
. Louis Harris poll, September 1982, cited in Fritsch-Bournazel, “France: Attachment,” 97.

81
. Attali,
Verbatim
, 1:692.

82
. Védrine,
Les Mondes
, 243.

83
. Ronald Reagan,
The Reagan Diaries
(New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 156.

84
. Attali,
Verbatim
, 1:693. Attali said he didn't tell Mitterrand of this threat out of fear that the French president would immediately break off negotiations and bring on the most serious crisis in Franco-American relations since France left the integrated command of NATO in 1966.

85
. Officials later clarified that France was not partner to the Geneva talks and had no obligation for Japan's defense.

86
. Favier and Martin-Rolland,
La Décennie Mitterrand
, 1:279.

87
. Maurice Delarue, “La déclaration de Williamsburg…,”
Le Monde
, 31 May 1983, 1, 6.

88
. Védrine,
Les Mondes
, 247.

89
. Ibid., 175, 179.

90
. Attali,
Verbatim
, 1:85.

91
. Ibid., 1:697.

92
. USIA,
West European Opinion of the U.S. Remains More Favorable…
, 13 November 1987, USIA, Research Memorandum, National Archives, RG 306, box 7, 1987; Smith and Wertman,
U.S.-WestEuropean Relations
, 116-18.

93
. Smith and Wertman,
U.S.-West European Relations
, 116-18.

94
. Opinion progressed from good versus bad ratio of 30:51 in 1982 to 40:38 in March 1984 and then to 43:27 in November 1985; SOFRES polls, reported in Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip Hastings, eds.,
Index to International Public Opinion, 1984-1985
(N ew York: Survey Research Consultants International/Greenwood, 1986), 232, and Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip Hastings, eds.,
Index to International Public Opinion, 1985-1986
(N ew York: Survey Research Consultants International/Greenwood, 1987), 223.

95
. Smith and Wertman,
U.S.-West European Relations
, 125.

96
. It was reported that the French would have backed a more serious effort at removing Ghadafi and objected to a “pin prick.” For the reputed French tough talk, see Bernard Guetta, “Les grandes manœuvres du Président Reagan,”
Le Monde
, 23 April 1986, 1-2; and William Safire, “Vive le Pinprick,”
New York Times
, 18 April 1986, A35. For a well-informed contemporary account of French policy, see Michel Colomès, Kosta Christitch, and Jean Joulin, “Reagan: objectif Kadhafi,”
Le Point
, 21 April 1986, 27-34.

97
. Jacques Chirac,
Mémoires: chaque pas doit être un but
, vol. 1 (Paris: NiL Éditions, 2009), 344.

98
. Dumas,
Affaires étrangères
, 320-21.

99
. Judith Miller, “America's Ire Leaves the French in a Pique,”
New York Times
, 1 May 1986, A9.

100
. Survey data is from “Gallup Poll finds the French Approve of U.S. Raid on Libya,”
New York Times
, 20 April 1986, 14; and Smith and Wertman,
U.S.West European Relations
, 205-11.

101
. Jérôme Dumoulin, “Libye: la loi de la guerre,”
L'Express
, 18-24 April 1986, 36.

102
. Marc Kravetz, “Autopsie d'une guerre annoncée,”
Libération
, 16 April 1986, 3; André Fontaine, “Une lutte de longue haleine,”
Le Monde
, 16 April 1986, 1, 3.

103
. Mitterrand explains his reasons for opposing SDI in Mitterrand,
Réflexions
, 50-66. See also Rachel Utley,
The French Defense Debate: Consensus and Continuity in the Mitterrand Era
(London: Macmillan, 2000), 118-22. For the European response to SDI see Robert E. Osgood, “The Implications of SDI for U.S.-European Relations,” in
SDI and U.S. Foreign Policy
, ed. Robert W. Tucker, George Liska, Robert E. Osgood, and David P. Calleo, SAIS Papers in International Affairs no. 15 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987), 59-100; and David P. Calleo, “SDI, Europe, and the American Strategic Dilemma,” in the same volume, 101-26.

104
. Jacques Isnard, “M. Mitterrand au salon du Bourget,”
Le Monde
, 1 June 1985, 24.

105
. Pierre Favier and Michel Martin-Rolland,
La Décennie Mitterrand
, vol. 2,
Les
Epreuves
(Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1991), 300.

106
. François Mitterrand, quoted in Dumas,
Affaires étrangères
, 246.

107
. Reagan,
Reagan Diaries
, 322.

108
. Favier and Martin-Rolland,
La Décennie Mitterrand
, 2:307.

109
. Robert Solé, “M. Reagan relance les recherches…,”
Le Monde
, 25 March 1983, 1.

110
. Védrine,
Les Mondes
, 367.

111
. USIA,
West Europeans Expect Little from the November Meeting…SDI Research
, 21 October 1985, Office of Research, USIA, National Archives, RG 306, USIA, Regular and Special Reports, 1983-87, box 6, Briefing Papers; Pais, “Plus ça change,” 6.

112
. USIA,
West European Attitudes on the Eve of Geneva
, 13 November 1985, Office of Research, USIA, National Archives, RG 306, USIA, Regular and Special Reports, 1983-87 box 6, Briefing Papers. On continuing French skepticism toward Gorbachev and the USSR, see USIA,
West European Opinion of the U.S. Remains More Favorable
…, 13 November 1987, Office of Research, USIA, National Archives, RG 306, USIA, Regular and Special Reports, 198387, box 7, 1987 Research Memoranda.

113
. John Morrison, “Chirac Calls on Western Europe…,”
International Herald Tribune
, 3 December 1986, 1.

114
. Jean-Pierre Joulin, “Reykjavik: la douche islandaise,”
Le Point
, 20 October 1986, 35-37; Michel Tatu, “Washington et Moscou…,”
Le Monde
, 16 October 1986, 1-3.

115
. Chirac,
Mémoires
, 367-68.

116
. Utley,
French Defense Debate
, 128. The former head of policy planning, Thierry de Montbrial, cautioned Washington against succumbing to Gorbachev's pressure for “complete denuclearization” because Moscow's aims had not changed; it still wanted to consolidate its grip on Eastern Europe and extend its hegemony over the entire continent. Thierry de Montbrial, “Security Requires Caution,”
Foreign Policy
71 (1988): 87, 98.

117
. François Mitterrand, “La stratégie de la France,” interview with Jean Daniel,
Le Nouvel Observateur
, 18-24 December 1987, 23-26.

118
. One poll, taken in 1987, showed more people thought Iran and Libya were more dangerous than the Soviet Union. See USIA,
Western Europeans Worried…Zero-option
, 17 November 1987, Office of Research, USIA, National Archives, RG 306, USIA, Regular and Special Reports, 1983-97, box 7, 1987 Research Memoranda.

119
. “L'effet Gorbachev,”
Le Monde
, 25 February 1988, 12.

120
. Smith and Wertman,
U.S.-West European Relations
, 89-90.

121
. Mitterrand, “La stratégie de la France,” 25.

122
. Lacouture,
Mitterrand
, 2:258.

123
. Jacques Attali,
Verbatim
, vol. 2,
Chronique des années 1986-1988
(Paris: Éditions Fayard, 1995), 272.

124
. Samuel Wells, “From Euromissiles to Maastricht: The Policies of Reagan-Bush and Mitterrand,” in
Strategic Triangle: France, Germany and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe
, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Georges-Henri Soutou, Stephen Szabo, and Samuel Wells (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), 299.

125
. Jacques Renard, “Quand l'Amérique doute de Reagan,”
L'Express
, 14-20 November 1986, 36.

126
. François Schlosser, “Reagan dans le guêpier,”
Le Nouvel Observateur
, 28 November-4 December 1986, 36-37.

127
. “Europe faults Reagan Talk,”
New York Times
, 15 November 1986, 5.

128
. Bernard Guetta, “M. Schulz se prononce contre de nouvelles livraisons…,”
Le Monde
, 18 November 1986, 2.

129
. Smith and Wertman,
U.S.-West European Relations
, 216-17.

130
. Whereas good opinion of Reagan hovered around 60 percent in 1985-86 it began to decline in mid-1986, falling to 48 percent by mid-1987. Meanwhile Gorbachev's good opinion rose steadily from 1985 so that by 1987 he ranked very close to the American president; see Brulé Ville Associés poll, March 1987, in “Opinion Roundup,”
Public Opinion
12, no. 1 (1989): 29.

131
. Dominique Moïsi, “French Foreign Policy: The Challenge of Adaptation,”
Foreign Affairs
67, no. 1 (1988): 155.

132
. USIA,
Opinion of Soviets in Industrialized Nations…
, 15 July 1988, USIA, Research Memorandum, National Archives, RG 306, box 4, 1988. The French ratio of approval versus disapproval was 68:18, compared to 65:24 for the West Germans and 70:27 for the British.

133
. USIA,
American Image in France Remains Positive
, 28 January 1988, USIA, National Archives, RG 306, USIA, Regular and Special Reports, 1988-89, box 4, 1988 Research Memoranda.

134
. Richard Burt, cited in Wells, “From Euromissiles to Maastricht.” See also Geir Lundestad,
The United States and Western Europe since 1945
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 231-32.

135
. See, for example, the op-ed piece by onetime Reagan official Robert Hormats, “A ‘Fortress Europe' in 1992,”
New York Times
, 22 August 1988.

136
. Wells, “From Euromissiles to Maastricht,” 303.

137
. Jacques Attali,
Verbatim
, vol. 3,
1988-91
(Paris: Éditions Fayard, 1995), 95.

138
. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft,
A World Transformed
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 74-78.

139
. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, quoted in Anand Menon,
France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, 1981-1997
(New York: St. Martin's, 2000), 122.

140
. Howorth, “Renegotiating,” 77.

141
. François Hauter, “Accord pour aider l'Europe de l'Est,”
Libération
, 17 July 1989, 3.

142
. The French favorable versus unfavorable ratio was 69:23, compared to 79:14 for the West Germans and 72:24 for the British. In France the average of favorable opinion for the United States during 1987-89 was 69 percent, compared to 54 percent for 1981-82; see Smith and Wertman,
U.S.-West Euro-

143
. Frédéric Bozo had access to archives of the president and the Quai d'Orsay among others for his study; see Frédéric Bozo,
Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Reunification
(New York: Berghahn, 2009), xxii. This work is a translation by Susan Emanuel of Bozo's
Mitterrand, la fin de la guerrefroide et l ‘unification allemande: de Yalta à Maastricht
(Paris : Éditions Odile Jacob, 2005). Another recent study also based on extensive archival research similarly concludes that Mitterrand was “an uneasy but crucial facilitator of German unity, not its foe”; see Mary Elise Sarotte,
1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 3. Yet a third archival-based study concurs that France did not seek to slow down reunification; see Tilo Schabert,
How World Politics Is Made: France and the Reunification of Germany
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), xi. Among the critics are American insiders: Robert Hutchings, Philip Zelikow, and Condoleezza Rice. Hutchings, who served on the National Security Council, called the French, compared to Margaret Thatcher, “more determined and effective in using their not inconsiderable influence to retard the process”; see Robert Hutchings,
American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 96; Zelikow and Rice, who had access to records and sources unavailable to others, stress the reluctance and pessimism of the French, but see them as less obstructionist than Margaret Thatcher; see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice,
Germany Unified and Europe Transformed
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Other experts are more muted in their criticism. Julius Friend argues that Mitterrand did not accept the inevitability of reunification until January 1990, and believes that Mitterrand's fumbling of reunification cost him the confidence of the French people; see Julius Friend,
The Long Presidency: France in the Mitterrand Years
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), 211-21. Stanley Hoffmann stresses French fears of an unfettered Germany and finds Mitterrand's policy “somewhat erratic” until the middle of 1991; see Stanley Hoffmann, “French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe,” in
After the Cold War
, ed. Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 130. Howorth, “Renegotiating the Marriage Contract,” 73-96, argues that Mitterrand overplayed his hand, failing to recognize that France had become less indispensable to the United States after the fall of the Berlin Wall.