The Last Days of George Armstrong Custer (34 page)

Most of the world had not even been informed about the battle when a curious document dated July 4, 1876, surfaced. This petition had been allegedly signed by 235 or 236 of the Seventh Cavalry survivors of the Little Bighorn—accounts vary but approximately 80 percent of the survivors of Reno's and Benteen's commands were said to have signed.

This document was sent “To His Excellency the President and the Honorable Representatives of the United States.”

The text read:

We, the enlisted men the survivors of the battle of the Heights of Little Big Horn River, on the 25th and 26th of June 1876, of the 7th Regiment of Cavalry who subscribe our names to this petition, most earnestly solicit the President and Representatives of our Country, that the vacancies among the Commissioned Officers of our Regiment, made by the slaughter of our brave, now heroic, now lamented Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer, and the other noble dead Commissioned Officers of our Regiment who fell close by him on the bloody field, daring the savage demons to the last, be filled by the Officers of the Regiment only.

That Maj. M. A. Reno, be our Lieutenant Colonel vice Custer, killed; Captain F. W. Benteen our Major vice Reno, promoted.

The other vacancies to be filled by officers of the Regiment by seniority.

Your petitioners know this to be contrary to the established rule of promotion, but prayerfully solicit a deviation from the usual rule in this case, as it will be conferring a bravely fought for and justly merited promotion on officers who by their bravery, coolness, and decision on the 25th and 26th of June 1876, saved the lives of every man now living of the 7th Cavalry who participated in the battle, one of the most bloody on record and one that would have ended with the loss of life of every officer and enlisted man on the field only for the position taken by Major Reno, which we held with bitter tenacity against fearful odds to the last.

To support this assertion—had our position been taken 100 yards back from the brink of the heights overlooking the river, we would have been entirely cut off from water; and from those heights the Indian demons would have swarmed in hundreds picking off our men by detail, and before midday June 25th not an officer or enlisted man of our Regiment would have been left to tell of our dreadful fate as we then would have been completely surrounded.

With prayerful hope that our petitions be granted, we have the honor to forward it through our commanding officer.

Very Respectfully,

[236 signatures]

At face value this petition would appear innocent enough. The enlisted survivors of the battle—at least 236 of them—in appreciation of the gallant efforts of their senior officers for saving their lives and perhaps in an effort to maintain continuity within the regiment had formally requested that Major Marcus A. Reno and Captain Frederick W. Benteen be rewarded with promotions.

The petition was trumpeted by newspapers and forwarded through military channels until reaching General William T. Sherman, who returned it with his endorsement. Sherman noted, however, that only the president and Senate could grant the petition. The matter never did reach the White House or Congress, and no further action was taken.

The first inclination that there could be a question about the validity of the petition arose years later when General Edward S. Godfrey looked into the matter, and wrote: “There were several men of the 7th Cavalry at Soldiers Home and in Washington in 1921 and 1922 who, when asked if they had signed the petition, denied ever having had such a thought, yet their signatures proved genuine.… Not one would admit that he had signed, until shown his signature.” Taking into consideration the absolute authority that officers had over enlisted men, perhaps these soldiers had been “ordered” to sign or had signed without knowing the content of the document and had later dismissed the act as inconsequential or were ashamed to admit that they had been coerced.

In 1954, Major Edward S. Luce, the superintendent of Custer Battlefield National Monument, became suspicious about certain irregularities within the petition. He noticed that a number of the signers were not on regimental rolls at the time of the battle and others had always signed the payroll with an “X” but had signed their full names on the document. Luce called in the Federal Bureau of Investigation to determine the authenticity of the signatures in question.

The FBI, although hindered by a lack of handwriting samples from many of the enlisted men, nevertheless concluded that at least seventy-six of the signatures—one-third of the total—were “probable forgeries.” Many had purportedly been signed by one man—First Sergeant Joseph McCurry of Company H, which was commanded by Captain Frederick Benteen.

That overwhelming evidence clearly points toward a devious scheme by a person or persons unknown who perhaps had a desire to head off any potential criticism and validate his conduct on June 25, 1876. The finger of guilt, given the fact that First Sergeant McCurry was involved, would point directly at Captain Benteen. Furthermore, McCurry could not have accomplished the task without Benteen's knowledge. And the captain was no stranger to conducting unscrupulous business behind people's backs.

Benteen was indeed popular with the enlisted men and had distinguished himself during the hilltop fight—although his actions beforehand are a subject of controversy—and possibly in the minds of the troops he was deserving of a promotion. Reno was not well liked, but the petition would have been far less credible had his name been left off. Without additional evidence—a “smoking gun”—the guilty party or parties will never be revealed.

The Enlisted Men's Petition, however, stands as a perfect example of the pattern of deception that has created many myths, controversies, and conjectures about the battle while suppressing the true facts and preventing a clear view of actual events to emerge.

 

Seventeen

Clearing the Smoke from the Battlefield

Even as the smoke still wafted over the battlefield strewn with bodies, fingers of blame pointed and controversial theories abounded. The United States Army simply does not lose that high of a percentage of men in one engagement to not come under fire from countless critics who wanted to know why and how it could happen. The entire nation wanted to know what had happened to the gallant Custer and his brave Seventh Cavalry troopers.

Theories for this battle have ranged from the marginally credible right on down to the ridiculous. Sadly enough, each one of these assumptions has been taken seriously by certain factions of the history community and many have taken root long enough to appear true.

Surprisingly, the order issued by Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry to George Armstrong Custer on June 22, 1876, has become the most enduring misconception. This document has ignited a major controversy over whether or not Custer willfully disobeyed Terry's instructions.

Here is the uncensored copy of those orders:

Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River
Montana Territory

June 22nd, 1876

LIEUT.-COL. CUSTER 7TH CAVALRY COLONEL:

The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his views of what your actions should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reasons for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank. The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly enclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible.

The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tulloch's Creek, and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's column, with information of the result of your examination. The lower part of the creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon's command. The supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks if the river is found navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander, who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon, desires you to report to him not later than the expiration of time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the meantime you receive further orders.

Very respectfully your obedient servant

E. W. Smith

Captain 18th Infantry

Acting Assistant Adjutant General

When reading the text of this order, with phrases such as “It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement,” and “the Department Commander [Terry] places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action,” and “He will, however, indicate to you his views of what your actions should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reasons for departing from them,” one sees that Custer was for all intents and purposes on his own in making decisions about the march after he had ventured up the Rosebud, which he did.

It must also be remembered that Terry had no practical experience fighting Indians; Custer had plenty. Therefore, it would only be logical for Terry to give Custer a free hand with respect to his own initiative depending on what he found in front of him and where the trail led him.

Yet people after the battle and through the ensuing years, mainly fueled by statements from defensive military participants shamed by their own ineptitude, have come to the conclusion that Custer brought about the loss of his command by disregarding those orders. This accusation brings the term “scapegoat” to the forefront.

Even President U. S. Grant made remarks in the public debate following the battle that reflected his malice toward Custer over the Belknap affair when he said: “I regard Custer's Massacre as a sacrifice of troops brought on by Custer himself, that was wholly unnecessary—wholly unnecessary.” Grant was no stranger to his own battlefield blunders—his ill-advised frontal assault at Cold Harbor during the Civil War left nearly seven thousand federal soldiers killed or wounded.

At the time of his statement, Grant was dodging barbs for his own actions toward Custer. The pro-Custer faction blamed the president indirectly for Custer's defeat, maintaining that Grant's earlier humiliation of Custer undermined the Seventh Cavalry commander's authority and set the stage for the questionable military behavior of Benteen and Reno.

In addition to his official report that outlined the facts of the battle, General Terry, in an attempt to deflect criticism from himself, wrote a “confidential” report on July 2, 1876. This second explosive report, which was leaked to the press by General William T. Sherman, implied that Custer had disobeyed orders by not following Terry's “plan.” Terry's “plan”—whatever that might have been—was never revealed.

The press was quick to engage in sensationalism. Newspapers revealed this shocking story under headlines such as “Custer's Blunder” and “Custer's Fault.”

Terry also told reporter Charles S. Diehl that had Custer survived he would have faced a court-martial for disobeying orders. At the time, it must be noted that Terry, the ranking officer who had remained back at the Powder River base camp when Custer marched, was fighting for his military life. His own competence in the matter was being questioned, with at least one newspaper calling for his court-martial.

In addition to the top brass circling the wagons, Custer critic Captain Frederick W. Benteen, no stranger himself to disobeying orders, wrote to his wife on July 4, 1876: “Had Custer carried out order he got from Genl. Terry the command would have formed a junction exactly at the village—and have captured the whole outfit of tepees, etc. and probably any quantity of squaws, pappooses &c. &c. but Custer disobeyed orders from the fact of not wanting any other command—or body to have a finger in the pie, and thereby lost his life.”

It would be doubtful that by the time this letter was written Benteen had been privileged to read or know the contents of the order that Custer received to have enough knowledge to determine whether or not the orders had been disregarded. Perhaps Benteen had written his letter from the position that the best defense is a good offense. No doubt Benteen's scheming mind had already dreamed up plenty of excuses why he had not immediately ridden to the sound of firing when Custer sent him the order to “hurry.”

Benteen's letter, Terry's order, and other questionable statements have led some historians to suggest that Custer was scheduled to rendezvous with the Terry-Gibbon column on June 26 or at least was required to send a messenger when he found a village and wait for the other column to arrive before attacking. But Terry did write in his order that “its [Gibbon's column's] future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise.” That column, by the way, did not arrive at the battlefield until the twenty-seventh. By that time, the village would have been vacant whether Custer had attacked or not.