Luftwaffe Fighter Aces (20 page)

Fig. 17. Boxing
Boxing was standard whenever the Germans had greater numbers in an engagement
,
notably over Malta. It could be done two-versus-one
,
as shown here
,
or by a large formation against a small formation. Directly the attack went in
,
the defenders broke into it
,
only to have the second aircraft or group on their tail.

The
Jagdflieger
had greater advantages over the defenders of Malta than anywhere else in theatre. They could gain altitude at leisure on the long climb out from their Sicilian bases, arriving over the island at 20,000ft or more, where the tired Hurricanes were no match for them. They could accept or decline battle as they chose. Often they accompanied German or Italian bombers, frequently with Italian fighters also in attendance. Invariably they had both position and a superior aircraft.

Incessant bombing and strafing took its toll of the RAF defenders. Even when replacement aircraft were flown in, the fact could not be concealed from the Axis and their arrival was the signal for a concerted airfield attack. On such a small island there was little chance of effective dispersal, and many were destroyed on the ground shortly after arrival. Spares were in short supply, and the number of serviceable British fighters frequently sank to single figures.

The first
Jagdwaffe
unit to operate against Malta was
7/JG 26
, which took up residence at Gela in Sicily on 9 February 1941. Led by Joachim Müncheberg, who had flown as Galland’s
Kacmarek
in the Battle of Britain and had adopted the same dive and zoom tactics, this single
Staffel
quickly gained the ascendancy. With the exception of a brief excursion to the Balkans,
7/JG 26
operated against Malta until late May, during which time it claimed 41 victories, mainly Hurricanes. Of these, Müncheberg accounted for eighteen, plus one more in the Balkans.
Underlining the measure of
Jagdflieger
superiority at this time, not one pilot was lost.

The
Luftwaffe’s
absence from Sicily from June allowed Malta to recover its strength. The interdiction of Axis sea lanes was so successful that Rommel’s army in the desert, starved of supplies, came close to defeat by the end of the year. Reinforcements from the Russian Front were rushed to the area, arriving in December. The fighter element consisted of four
Gruppen
—
JG 53
in its entirety plus
II
/
JG 3.
All were equipped with the new Bf 109F.
Luftwaffe
operations reached a new pitch of intensity during the spring. Many defenders were lost when, short of fuel, they needed to land, only to find pairs of Messerschmitts patrolling the airfield approaches. But, just when the battle seemed won, victory was thrown away. The demands of other fronts saw
II/JG 3
and
I/JG 53
depart for the East, while
III/JG 53
left for North Africa, leaving only
II/JG 53
in Sicily. This coincided with wholesale reinforcements of Spitfires to the island. Almost overnight the situation was reversed.

The rest of 1942 saw further
Luftwaffe
fighter movements.
I/JG 77
arrived from the East in July;
I/JG 53
returned in September. Very heavy fighting took place, but the time had passed. The Battle of Malta had been lost at the very moment that victory was in sight.

During 1942 three
Jagdflieger
surpassed Müncheberg’s score over Malta. Gerhard Michalski of
II
/
JG 53
counted 26 of his eventual total of 73 victories, closely followed by Siegfried Freytag of
I/JG 77
with 25 (final score 102). Herbert Rollwage
of II/JG 53
claimed 20. Rollwage later transferred to home defence, where he became the champion slayer of American heavy bombers with 44 Fortresses and Liberators out of his final total of 102. Only 11 of his victories were gained in Russia.

The campaign in the desert was a war of movement over vast areas of featureless terrain. Advances and retreats of hundreds of miles followed each other with monotonous regularity. While advancing was a sign of success, it stretched supply lines to breaking point, causing shortages of fuel, ammunition and spares, the lack of which often resulted in a headlong retreat. So often was this the case that the ebb and flow of battle became known to the irreverent British as the ‘Benghazi Handicap’!

Air operations in desert conditions were not easy. Sand got in everywhere, causing excessive engine wear, even though filters were fitted, which, combined with the ferocious heat, materially reduced performance. Frequent sandstorms reduced visibility to nil, making flying impossible. Rather surprisingly, so did rainstorms, which turned airfields to mud. Both sides had mobile radar sets, although the range of these was so short as to result in a heavy reliance on radio monitoring systems for advance warning of enemy air movements.

With few strategic targets available, the majority of air activity by both sides was dedicated to supporting the ground forces. This in turn dictated that the bulk of the air fighting took place at medium and low altitudes. The superior performance of their Messerschmitts generally allowed the
Jagdflieger
to obtain an altitude advantage for their initial attacks.

As previously noted, the British, with their South African and Australian allies, were forced to make shift with whatever fighters could be spared from Europe. Spitfires and Hurricanes have been covered previously; the other main fighter type in theatre was the Curtiss P-40. A direct development of the Hawk 75 used by the French in 1939–40, with a liquid-cooled Allison engine, it retained that aircraft’s pleasant handling traits. Its main shortcoming was that its engine was not high altitude-rated, and above 20,000ft the P-40 was totally outclassed by Messerschmitts.

The first
Jagdwaffe
unit in North Africa was
I/JG 27
, which arrived in Libya in April 1941, led by Edu Neumann. By
Experten
standards, Neumann had a very modest personal score, but he was renowned throughout the
Jagdwaffe
as one of the great fighter leaders. In this he paralleled the American Don Blakeslee. In his
Gruppe
was the man who was to become the greatest of them all, Hans-Joachim Marseille—of whom more later.

In order to make the best use of limited resources,
I/JG 27
was allowed a ‘roving commission’, with the object of reducing the enemy’s strength, rather than flying in direct support of the Army. With most Hurricane and Tomahawk units doubling in the attack role, it was hardly surprising that the majority of combat was fighter-versus-fighter, although Blenheim, Boston and Maryland light bombers were also encountered.

The outnumbered
I/JG 27
was reinforced by the 2nd
Gruppe
in September 1941. The Allied offensive at the end of the year also resulted in
III/JG 53
being deployed from Sicily in December, although this unit was only in North Africa for a matter of days before returning, its place taken by
III/JG 27.
This was in time for Rommel’s counter-attack, which regained the territory lost in previous weeks. On 8 February 1942 Marseille raised his score to 40 to become top scorer in the desert, a position he never lost, although Gerhard Homüth (final score 63) reached the same figure a day later.

III/JG 53
returned to the desert on 20 May. Operations continued at a fast pace. Marseille, who had by then perfected his almost unique style, claimed his 101st victim on 17 June and was ordered home to be decorated. On this same day Otto Schulz went down near Sidi Rezegh, his score of 51 including 42 desert victories.

Marseille returned to Africa late in August and was at once caught up in a flurry of action. In the final five weeks of his life he accounted for a further 57 Allied aircraft, including a well-publicised 17 on 1 September alone. This figure was only once exceeded, by Emil ‘Bully’ Lang of
III/JG 54
, who claimed 18 Russian aircraft on one day in December 1943. Marseille was killed on 30 September when his parachute failed to open after his aircraft caught fire. He was the
third Experte
of the
Gruppe
to die that month. Günther Steinhausen (40 victories)
had been shot down on 6 September and Hans-Arnold ‘Fifi’ Stahlschmidt (59 victories) on the following day. Demoralised by these losses,
I/JG 27
was transferred to Sicily.

The Second Battle of El Alamein began on 23 October, with unrelenting air attacks by the Desert Air Force, by now heavily reinforced with Spitfire Vs. Four days later
I/JG 27
returned to the fray, accompanied by
III/JG 77
, replacing
III/JG 53.
The remaining
Gruppen
of
JG 77
, now led by
Kommodore
Joachim Müncheberg, followed shortly afterwards. But now the Axis retreat was irreversible, and defeat only a matter of time. The remnants of
JG 27
were withdrawn completely.

The Allied invasion of French North Africa signalled the end. As usual the
Jagdwaffe
was used as a fire brigade and rushed to the scene of the latest conflagration. First to arrive in Tunisia was
II/JG 51
, followed by
II/JG 2
with FW 190As. A few fighter-bomber FW 190As had been used in the theatre previously, but this was the first fighter unit equipped with the type.

The Axis forces were caught between the jaws of a vice and were gradually compressed into Tunisia. In the air they were not only totally outnumbered but had to face new types of Allied fighters—Mustangs, Lightnings and Spitfire IXs. Gradually they were ground down. But a heavy price was paid. On 23 March 1943 Joachim Müncheberg shot down a Spitfire. It was his 135th and last victory. A devotee of close-range firing, he apparently collided with his victim. In May Axis resistance collapsed.
JG 77
, now under the command of Eastern Front
Experte
Johannes Steinhoff, were evacuated to Sicily with their mechanics stuffed into the fuselages of their aircraft. It was the end of an era.

By comparison with the Russian Front, the scores of the
Experten
over Malta and North Africa were, with one notable exception, modest. The exception was of course Hans-Joachim Marseille, the ‘Star of Africa’. Once he began to demonstrate the art of the possible, he naturally had his imitators, but even the most gifted of them failed to match his final score, the highest ever against Western-flown aircraft.

Fig. 18. Marseille against the Defensive Circle
,
North Africa
Marseille dives below the circle
,
then comes up and under
,
opening fire from very close range as his target vanishes beneath his nose. He then continues his climb
,
rolls inverted and comes down behind another target.

HANS-JOACHIM MARSEILLE
Jochen’ Marseille arrived in North Africa with seven victories to his credit, all British fighters, and with a debit account of having been shot down four times. His
Staffelkapitän
during the Battle of Britain, Johannes Steinhoff, had him transferred out of
4/JG 52
for insubordination. His next unit was
I/JG 27
, where his new
Kommandeur
, Edu Neumann, recognised his potential and took a lenient view of his failings. This posting eventually sent him to North Africa and ensured him a place in the pantheon of
Experten
, Such are the quirks of fate.

Marseille left no first-hand accounts of his actions. However, many witnesses of his flying and shooting skills survived the war, and from their recollections it is possible to piece together a fairly comprehensive picture of his methods. From an early stage Marseille was an outstanding aerobatic pilot. While aerobatics as such can have no place in the combat repertoire of a fighter pilot, they do improve his confidence and his familiarity with his machine, enabling him to function effectively no matter what attitude he finds himself in.